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AFIT-ENS-14-M-31
Abstract

According to Argonne National Laboratories, “Resilience is the ability of an
entity to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.”
Resilience in a system is important because it allows a system to adapt its operations to
unknown and altered operational environments. Presidential Policy Directive 21 states
that increasing resilience of critical infrastructures is not only desired, but United States
policy. Communications infrastructures are one such critical infrastructure.
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology for measuring resilience
in satellite communication systems for use as a key criterion in the selection and
acquisition of new satellite architectures, in accordance with the National Security Space
Strategy. The base methodology utilized in this thesis is Extreme Event Modeling
implemented through the use of Bi-Level Programming with monotonically nonlinear
continuous and mixed integer variables. This model differs from previous efforts applied
to other critical infrastructures in that it captures the temporal component associated with
multiple events, as well as the repairs, or reconstitution, of infrastructure components.
Furthermore, a heuristic based upon a ratio of impact to cost and local searches is
developed to solve the resulting continuous bi-level problem.
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A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING RESILIENCE IN A SATELLITE-BASED
COMMUNICATION NETWORK

I. The Problem

Why Resilience Matters

In 2010, Washington D.C. was struck by a blizzard which forecasters watched
build with the aid of satellite data. It was considered to be one of the largest winter
storms that the Mid-Atlantic region had seen in nearly 90 years. As a result of this storm,
roads, hospitals, and railways were closed, and three hundred-thousand citizens were
without electricity the following day. That was with the aid of the satellites to make
preparations. Experiments show that the size of that storm, without the aid of satellites,
would have been predicted at less than half of its size and intensity, a prediction that
would have left many Americans out in the cold (Cushman).
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On July 15, 1996, then-President William J. Clinton signed Executive Order
13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection. The very first section was to establish the
"President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection."
The purpose of this commission was to identify vulnerabilities, both physical and
cyber, as well as to provide "expert guidance to critical infrastructures to detect, prevent,
halt, or confine an attack and to recover and restore service" (EO 13010 sect. 7.5.1).
What the President was demanding nearly two decades ago is still being worked as a
critical issue.
In PPD-21, 16 critical infrastructure sectors are designated, three more than
denoted in 2002, but two fewer than in 2009. Those sectors are: Chemical, Commercial
Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base,
Emergency Services, Energy, Banking and Finance, Food and Agriculture, Government
Facilities, Public Health, Information Technology, Nuclear, Transportation, and Water.
Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, and Nuclear are four new sectors,
with the former Postal sector being absorbed into Transportation. These new sectors
were added in 2009 along with National Monuments and Icons, which, like Postal and
Shipping, was absorbed into other sectors in 2013.
On January 11, 2013, the president’s National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee (NSTAC) released a report on its most recent endeavors, which are
focused on increasing “the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of Governmental
unclassified communications” (NSTAC 2013 p2). In that report, one area of their
examinations includes “the interdependencies of networked systems, resulting in higher
potential consequences from successful events” (NSTAC 2013 p1). One such network
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is the satellite communications network (NSTAC 2013). To eliminate confusion of
terms, the mathematical definition of network, which is “a set of objects (called nodes or
vertices) that are interconnected”, is used throughout. The connections between the
nodes are called edges or links” (Nykamp Network Definition).
More recently, in February 2013 a new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) was
released on the subject of "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience", PPD-21. It
states that "it is the policy of the United States to strengthen the security and resilience of
its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats" (PPD-21 p. 2). Much
like in 1996, the goal is to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the consequences of
events (PPD-21). Accompanying that PPD was EO 13636, Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity. In EO 13636, a major threat to critical infrastructure was
outlined, the cyber threat. As infrastructures become more and more complex,
dependence upon computers to aid in daily operations grows as well. The less vulnerable
infrastructures are to this threat, like any other, the more resilient they become.
“It is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and
resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a
cyber environment … while promoting safety, security, business
confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.” (EO 13636 Section 1)
On April 9th, 2013, at the 29th National Space Symposium, General William
Shelton, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command, stated (Moskowitz p1) :
“Shrinking government budgets, combined with a growing
reliance on space assets by the United States - especially by its
military - are putting the country in an undefended position.”
During his speech, Gen. Shelton “advocated reaching a sweet spot
between ‘capability, affordability, and resilience’.”
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Despite many misconceptions, space systems are not safe. Accidental collisions
with other satellites, debris, or meteors are just a small portion of the threats these space
assets face. Every satellite must be able to transmit information to and from a terrestrial
station, whether directly or indirectly, if they are to be useful to their operators. This
means that anything which might interrupt or distort that transmission is also a threat to
the capabilities the space assets provide. This can include radio frequency interference
(RFI), cyber attacks, and even weather. Recently, a rise in the potential threat of an
attack on space assets from kinetic weapons has occurred, as seen by the rise in the
technology related to anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry (NSTAC p. 12).
Resilience is important because it allows a system to adjust and adapt to the
unknown, to survive, and to either regain its former status, or to adapt in a useful way of
operating in the altered conditions. As the world changes, the preference for
infrastructures plans have shifted from resistant plans which focus on withstanding the
effects of known threats, to designs that focus more on building systems that can handle
an unknown disruptive event.
As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in
current capabilities, we will include resilience as a key criterion in
evaluating alternative architectures.
National Security Space Strategy
(Fact Sheet: Resilience of Space Capabilities)

Defining Resilience

Over the years, an array of definitions of resilience have been proposed, each
geared towards the user’s purpose for a specific system and type of disruption. In 2000,
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Luthar and Cicchetti defined resiliency as a "positive adaption" and that it was
"considered a demonstration of manifested behavior on social competence or success at
meeting any particular tasks at a specific life stage" (Luthar p. 110). Clearly, their focus
was not on critical infrastructure; much of the earliest work in resilience dealt with
psychology.
Collins English Dictionary defines resiliency for ecology as "the ability of an
ecosystem to return to its original state after being disturbed". In physics, the same term
is defined as "the amount of potential energy stored in an elastic material when
deformed" (Dictionary.com). In 2010, Hill, et al, utilized data from United States history
to derive a method for measuring regional economic stability based upon not only
employment/unemployment rates, but also a variety of components which include, but
are not limited to, laws, reaction to previous shocks, or abrupt reduction of system
performance.
In this section, existing definitions are reviewed in order to determine the key
components that many current definitions, if not all, deem to be pieces to the resilience
puzzle. At the conclusion of this section, the definition is to be used in this thesis is
specified.
Regardless of how the definition has varied over fields of study and time, they all
center on the same root concept. Merriam-Webster defines resilience as "an ability to
recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change". Resilience originated from a
Latin word, resiliens, which means "to spring back, or recoil". However, the focus of this
thesis is not to universally defining resilience. Rather, what is needed is to consider
resilience in the context of a critical infrastructure.
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In Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, C.S. Holling, considered to be
the first to provide a system level definition for resilience, defines resilience as follows:
(Holling p. 14)

Resilience is a measure of the persistence of systems and of their
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the
same relationships between populations or state variables.

In A Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Infrastructure and Economic
Systems, definitions from multiple other works on resilience are provided; however there
is one group that best demonstrates the evolution of the definition of resilience (Vugrin p.
84). In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defined resiliency as "the
capability of an asset, system, or network to maintain its function during or to recover
from a terrorist attack or other incident" (DHS NIPP p. 104). Two years later, their
definition had evolved to "the ability to resist, absorb, recover from or successfully adapt
to adversity or a change in conditions" (DHS Risk Lexicon p. 23).
A change in the most recent version of the definition may already be seen as a
new strategic goal of resilience is "enhanced preparedness". (Keil) Argonne National
Laboratory, a leading research laboratory for Department of Energy, has altered its
definition to "the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, community, region- to
anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance."(Carlson
p. 7) They go on to break resilience down into three main components: "Reduced failure
probabilities, reduced consequences from failures…, and reduced time to recovery."
(Carlson p. 16) Their belief is that, while many confuse resistance with resilience,
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resistance should be considered as a subcomponent of resilience, and thus included in the
definition. Doing so allows the definition, as well as the resulting measure, to not only
measure how efficiently the system "bounces back" from a disturbance, but also takes
into account proactive measures taken to protect the system. Hence the addition of
anticipate and resist to the definition.
Mathematically, a measure, μ, on a set, A, is a function from A to the set of real
numbers, R, which possesses, at a minimum, the properties of monotonicity and
subadditivity. Monotonicity is a property stating that if E1 and E2 are two subsets of A
where, E1  E2  A , then μ( E1 ) d μ( E2 ) . The subadditive property states that for a

§f · f
μ
countable sequence of sets, Ei, ¨ * Ei ¸ d ¦ μ Ei (Royden p. 31).
©i 1 ¹ i 1
For the purposes of this research, the parent set A is the complete set of nodes in
the network, all operating at optimal capacity. Each subset Ei, which is referred to
henceforth as states of the network, is then a state in which one or more of the nodes in
the network have been degraded below optimal operational capability, either partially or
fully. Given two sets Ei and Ej, Ei  E j if and only if every node in the network at state i
is at or below the operational capability level of the exact same node in state j.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) also has their own definition of resilience
(Fact Sheet: Resilience of Space Capabilities) .
Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions
necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse
conditions. An architecture is “more resilient” if it can provide
these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced
capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and
threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative
government, commercial, or international capabilities.
In this definition, four main components are intended (Fact Sheet: Resilience of Space
Capabilities).
Avoidance: countermeasures against potential adversaries,
proactive and reactive defensive measures taken to diminish the
likelihood and consequence of hostile acts or adverse conditions
Robustness: architectural properties and system of systems design
features to enhance survivability and resist functional degradation
Reconstitution: plans and operations to replenish lost or
diminished functions to an acceptable level for a particular
mission, operation, or contingency
Recovery: program execution and space support operations to reestablish full operational capability and capacity for the full range
of missions, operations, or contingencies
It should be noted this definition has much in common with the stated Argonne National
Laboratory definition. While this indicates a move towards a common definition across
infrastructure, a commonly accepted one has yet to be attained. Avoidance and
robustness are directly related to the concept of resistance and their breakdown, “to
anticipate, resist, absorb”. The definition of avoidance given by the DoD Fact Sheet
introduce a concept that, while included in the realm of resist, was not formally stated,
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and that is the use of countermeasures to diminish the impact of an event. Reconstitution
is the act of replenishing functions in the near future, or to “respond to, adapt to”.
Finally, Recovery is the easiest to compare as the final piece of the Argonne definition is
“and recover from a disturbance."
It is evident that, though no one definition has yet to become the standard for
resilience, the more work done with the concept, the closer definitions converge to a
similar idea of what resilience must be. While the DoD definition did say what they
wanted a resilient architecture or system, it does not directly address the subject of what
resilience is. However, the intended components illuminated that piece very well. Those
components were imbedded in the reviewed definition from Argonne Laboratory, an
expansion of the most recent DHS definition available and one that captures all of their
desired attributes of the word. Therefore, this thesis will progress with the following
resilience definition (Carlson p. 7):

Resilience is the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization,
community, region- to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt
to, and recover from a disturbance.
Argonne National Laboratory
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Key Components of Resilience

In this section, the key components of the DoD definition and the Argonne
National Laboratory definition is decomposed in order to describe to the reader the
aspects of a network that must be included while measuring resilience. Recall that from
the DoD definition, four main components of resilience exist: Avoidance, Robustness,
Reconstitution, and Recovery. In this section, a review the necessary nature of resilience
measures in order to capture these components is conducted.
Avoidance consists of the steps taken to lessen the likelihood and consequences
of an event. Each step taken to reduce the impact of an event generally increases the cost
in some other aspect of financial or operational burden. These expenditures need not be
on material objects. For example, funds spent to increase friendly relations with an
adversary will lessen the likelihood of a negative event occurring from that adversary.
Unfortunately, a network operator cannot and will not always know who the
network’s potential foes are or may be over the life of a system. Another option is
material countermeasures. These could come in the form of missile interceptors,
eliminating the threat at its location before the interdiction can be completed, employing
additional cyber security assets to an imminent threat, or any other actions which may be
taken to deter a diminishing of network capabilities.
Interdiction is defined by the DoD as: (Joint Publication 3-3 p. vii)
1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s
military surface capability before it can be used effectively
against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.
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2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert,
disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as
appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo.
The purpose of interdiction operations is to prevent the adversary
from using assets at the time and place of his choosing.
Robustness is the ability of the design to survive and resist degradation. For
systems of systems, this can be effectively broken into two distinct pieces, the larger
system and then sub-systems. To avoid confusion, in this thesis these levels are referred
to as the network and the node respectively, however this process of viewing hierarchical
levels separately can be applied to any level of the system with varying levels of
difficulty.
In a node, the robustness may be increased by providing more effective inherent
components. These could be things such as the antivirus software installed, on-board
redundancies for critical components, shielding from radiation, or increased fuel for
maneuvering out of danger and readjusting configuration after an event.
In a satellite network, the robustness may be increased by the sheer quantity of
ground stations and satellites incorporated as well as on-orbit spares. Moreover, the
robustness of the network relies upon the robustness of each satellite in said network. For
example, if each satellite in a network is shielded against radiation and electromagnetic
pulses, then the network is robust against such anomalies. Regardless of the level at
which these protections are implemented, as well as the amount of protection offered by
each feature, each comes with its own requirement of resources, both initial and enduring.
Reconstitution is determined by the set of plans and operations needed to restore
the network to an acceptable level of operation. What is considered acceptable may be
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dependent upon the time and nature of the event. From a DoD perspective, it is first
essential to regain sufficient capacity in the network to proceed with a mission or critical
function. However, after an initial phase, the network must also be able to be
reconstituted to acceptably support its original function. As before, reconstitution of
assets requires time, money, and potential operational tradeoffs, but the level of
reconstitution needed is time dependent.
Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research is to provide a measure for network level resilience
of Satellite Communications for use as a key criterion in evaluating the implementation
of alternative satellite architectures. This measure is divided into multiple distinct time
periods, and includes the probability of maintaining mission essential functions, as well
as the costs and times associated with maintaining and reconstituting the system, for an
assumed level of adversity and a set of individually evaluated intelligent adversary
objectives.
In the following chapter, previous work done on measuring resilience in critical
infrastructures is reviewed. Particular attention is granted to their measures, how those
measures were derived, and how the authors calculated those measures. Those measures
and infrastructures will then be related to a satellite communications network to ensure
the validity of any translation of methodologies.
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In Chapter III a bi-level model is formulated as the primary method for measuring
resilience. A heuristic for solving the resulting problem is developed, as well as the
method for analyzing the output to achieve the resilience measure.
In Chapter IV a case study is included, which utilizes variations on a satellite
network to demonstrate how changes to a network can affect resilience. The results of
the case study are analyzed, as well as how the model, measure, and heuristic behaved in
regards to the variations. Furthermore, the shortcomings of the method and potential
restrictions on its use are investigated.
Chapter V provides a summary of the findings of this research, both respect to
developing a resilience measure, as well as the methodology utilized to calculate that
measure.
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II. Literature Review

This chapter is a review of relevant literature to include existing methods for
measuring resilience, as well as the comparison of a satellite network to other critical
infrastructures with existing resilience measures. It compares the methods previously
used for strengths, weaknesses, and adaptability. The chapter concludes with establishing
a baseline minimum measurement of resilience for a notional network.

Threats and Vulnerabilities

A key paper dealing with threats and vulnerabilities is the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Report to the President on
Commercial Satellite Communications Mission Assurance (November 2009) (NSTAC
2009).
In 2005, a Multiple Path Beyond Line of Sight Communications (MUBLCOM),
digital communications satellite from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), collided with Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology
(DART), a NASA sponsored project intended to demonstrate automated navigation
abilities. In 2009, Iridium 33, a former satellite in the Iridium constellation, collided with
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Cosmos 2251, a retired Russian satellite, obliterating both. In January of 2013, a piece of
debris from a Chinese missile test collided with a Russian satellite, rendering it unusable.
Accidental collisions are not the only threat. “On January 11, 2007, China
conducted its first successful test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile to purposely destroy
the aging Fengyun-1C meteorological satellite that had been in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
since May 10, 1999.” (NSTAC 2009 p. 12) Shortly after in 2008, the US Navy utilized a
modified Standard Missile-3 to shoot down a malfunctioning National Reconnaissance
Office satellite. The purpose of this US mission was to protect civilians from potentially
toxic fuel (Galdorisi p. 1).
In NSTAC’s Report to the President on Commercial Satellite Communications
Mission Assurance, three main categories of threats are outlined (NSTAC 2009 p. 11).
Physical Threats: Destruction of physical network infrastructure,
or physical threats to operational personnel. Examples include
explosions, cable cuts, hostage-taking at control centers, natural
disasters, power failures, satellite collisions, and space-based
attacks.
Access and Control Threats: Unauthorized access, control, or
prevention of the operator’s control of its network, underlying
devices, control links, and physical plants. Examples include
unauthorized commanding of or preventing control of routers,
switches, servers, databases, or satellite buses used to control the
network; distributed denial of service attacks against network
control infrastructure; compromise of network security protocols;
and actions by malicious insiders.
User Segment Threats: Events, such as denial of service attacks,
that occur on user traffic paths of the network that degrade or deny
service to users by exhausting or preventing customer access to
network resources. Examples include botnets, denial of service
attacks, route hijacking, viruses, worms, and RFI.
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NSTAC determined that SATCOM networks “often contain the same subsystems
as their terrestrial counterparts that are vulnerable to malicious and inadvertent
disruption.” (NSTAC 2009 p. 11) As a result, any vulnerability that is determined as
existing in a terrestrial station also likely exists in the corresponding SATCOM. This
permits the relation of common ground threats to both the terrestrial stations and the
SATCOM network.
Since it is assumed to be easier to disrupt a ground station’s functions, NSTAC
determined that the ground stations are much more likely to experience an attack.
However, these satellite stations generally are not necessarily at any greater risk than
those of other communication providers (NSTAC 2009 p. 11). This is due in part to the
large number of redundancies that the commercial operators employ.
While terrestrial stations remain unprotected against a variety of intelligent
strikes, they often have many geographically diverse redundant stations from which to
operate their satellites (NSTAC 2009 p. "ES-2"). Furthermore, each ground station
“generally maintains 24-hour guarded access, security fencing, external lighting,
registration and clearance of visitors, and security cameras” (NSTAC 2009 p. 17) In
addition, 100% of those who participated in NSTAC’s questionnaire reported that all of
their ground sites were connected by “multiple communication links that provide
redundancy and physical path diversity” (NSTAC 2009 p. 17).
In the cyber realm, most satellite operators were in compliance with the National
Security Agency’s (NSA) approved encryptions for transmissions, and more continue to
meet compliance as new satellites are placed in orbit. Along with the encryptions, many

16


satellite operators utilize “deaf satellites”, which require very large transmission antennas
in order for the satellite to receive commands. They also utilize out of band commanding
to reduce the risk of shared frequencies. Carrier lockup is a protocol employed to prevent
insertion of commands from the redundant ground stations while the primary is still
operating, uniqueness in command decoders, autonomy in case of interference, and
diversity to allow for redundant telemetry streams (NSTAC 2009 p. 18).
Up to this point, threats that are common for both satellites and ground stations
have been reviewed; however there are a significant number of “vulnerabilities and
threats of special concern to satellite systems” (NSTAC 2009 p. 18). The greatest of
these lies in the physical realm, where there exists the probability of collisions with
debris and meteorites. Though the probability of an accidental collision is extremely low,
such collisions do occur.
Satellites that are physically damaged can usually not be repaired. While there is
no publicly documented precedent to date of a malicious physical attack on another
nation's satellites, a more intelligent threat may come in the form of recent advancements
in anti-satellite technologies, such as missiles, cyber warfare, and jamming.
China's ASAT launch in 2007 demonstrated ASAT capability. It also created a
cloud of debris that expanded to twenty times its original size in under a month. Two
years later, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network catalogued 2,378 pieces of debris
exceeding 5cm that are a result of the ASAT test, as well as an estimated 150,000 pieces
of smaller debris. This one strike resulted in what is now “over 25 percent of all debris in
the LEO regime” (NSTAC 2009 p. 13). Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in tracked
satellites, much of which is debris.
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Figure 1: Graph of Tracked Satellites (DoD p. 1)
Another unique threat is that of interference. RFI is an increasing issue for
SATCOM. The majority of interference is unintentional, and can be caused by human
error, equipment failure, interference from an adjacent satellite or the ground, or even
from solar radiation. However, each of these causes can be intentional as well. One of
the more common methods of causing interference is to employ jammers.
Jamming and spoofing, the transmitting of a false signal while the original is
hijacked, are relatively inexpensive methods for denying the capabilities of a satellite.
However, the more protected a satellite becomes, such as by concentrating “its power in a
small frequency band” (Wright p. 120), the more power a jammer requires to be
effective, thus restricting its mobility. Moreover, a jammer is seen as a legitimate target
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during military actions, and the wider an area the jammer attempts to cover, the easier it
is to identify (Wright p. 120). As such, the amount of degradation provided by a jammer
is inversely proportional to the time that the jammer would be considered effective.
GEO satellites are, however, a slight exception to the last observation. Because
the distance from one footprint point on Earth is nearly identical to another, and since
GEO satellites maintain the same footprint, it is possible to jam communications from an
entirely different nation for an extended period of time. This occurred in 2003 when the
United States Telstar 12 satellite was jammed by an installation in Cuba, and again in the
same year when China’s Shenzhou V was jammed via transmitters in Taiwan. As such,
jammers are considered to be more effective against GEO satellites than LEO (Wright p.
122).
Another method for jamming is space-based, via the use of satellites with onboard
jamming technology. Because the satellites can remain relatively close to the satellite
being jammed, they require significantly less power to be effective (Wright p. 123). The
jamming satellite would need to be at an altitude lower than the satellite being jammed.
Satellites must move very quickly to maintain orbit; the closer a satellite is to Earth, the
faster it must move. While there is a proportional difference in effectiveness based upon
the terrestrial area covered, the time in which a jamming satellite is within range of its
target is roughly equivalent so long as the distance between them is the same.

“A jammer in orbit 1 km below a satellite whose antenna was
designed to view the entire section of the Earth below it would cross the
broadcast receive area in 2 to 3 hours, whether the satellite was in low
earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit.”
(Wright p. 123)
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While many commercial operators have shielding against unintentional or
extremely low level jamming, few have protection against high powered intentional RFI.
Even in the military, not all of the satellites are protected against this type of attack
(NSTAC p. 20).
A more recent method employed for denying the use of a satellite is through the
use of a high powered microwave (HPM) (Wright p. 130). HPM utilizes a high-powered
microwave burst to overwhelm a target satellite’s components. This method utilizes the
same theory as a Nuclear Burst in that the high intensity radiation is what overwhelms the
components. However, an HPM is specifically aimed to the target’s receiving frequency,
reducing the collateral damage and potentially requiring less energy.
An HPM’s energy requirements and effectiveness are proportional to the distance
from the weapon to the target. As such, the ideal methods for deployment are either
“those based in space or popped up using a suborbital missile” (Wright p. 131).
Depending upon the strength of the pulse, as well as the protection of the satellite, an
HPM could be classified as either a temporary effect or permanent destruction.
HPM’s actual usefulness remains uncertain though as the technology, both for
explosive power generation and transmission, is still progressing. “Electronics can be
hardened against microwave attacks of moderate levels without a great cost…a hardened
satellite can withstand orders of magnitude higher HPM flux than an unhardened
satellite” (Wright p. 133).
High powered lasers also pose a growing threat for LEO satellites. While the
components and energy required to construct a laser of sufficient power, as well as treaty
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agreements, have precluded their research in space-space tests, ground-based megawatt
class lasers could damage unshielded robust satellite components in a matter of seconds.
Kilowatt class lasers are also able to inflict damage, however, only on unshielded fragile
parts over a longer period of time (Wright p. 134). While these terrestrial based lasers
pose a threat for LEO satellites, GEO satellites’ great distance have protected them thus
far as lasers suffer exponential heat loss. Using lasers for temporary denial of service has
thus far been restricted to dazzling hyper spectral imagery components (Wright p. 126).
At this time, reasonable methods of partial degradation to communication
satellites over a period of greater than a few hours appear to be restricted to either
jamming from a neighboring nation or otherwise restricted to imagery components.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that any goal of medium-long term effects is of the
destructive type, which, with the exception of terrestrial nodes with multiple components
spaced sufficiently far apart to not be simultaneously affected by a single destructive
effort, will have a discrete kill-no kill effect. This assumption only remains valid in the
current state of satellite degradation technologies, and only for communication satellites.
For example, imaging satellites may already experience a permanent, partial degradation
when portions of their imaging devices are damaged.
In this section, a number of threats that currently exist to terrestrial and satellite
nodes in a space based communication network were reviewed. The threats included
both intelligent and unintelligent occurrences, which fell into a category of either
temporary denial or permanent destruction. Based upon the brief literature review, one
may conclude that, while many methods exist for temporarily denying capabilities for a
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particular node, a medium-long term goal would currently be ill-served with most
methods short of destruction.

Key Motivations for Building Resiliently

The need for a more robust, resistant, and adaptive infrastructure has quickly
become clear to decision makers, both within the military and in the civilian sector.
Moreover, as outlined in the preceding Threats and Vulnerabilities section, the potential
for a degrading event, both intentional and accidental, are already present. What remains
is to determine which factors are most important to stakeholders in regards to the
development of a more resilient infrastructure.
In this section the motivations that a stakeholder may have for constructing a
more resilient communications infrastructure are discussed, as well as what rewards
would most likely motivate a push for resilience. A key paper in this section by Jennings,
Vugrin, and Belasich focuses on the construction of resilient buildings, but many of the
key points can be related to a generic network (Jennings p. 1).
In 2012, Jennings et al. set out to answer three main questions (Jennings p. 4):
1) Are stakeholders aware of what resilience is and what it means?
2) What would motivate stakeholders to construct more resilient
structures?
3) “Do the stakeholders have any opinions about key program
features that need to be included or developed?”
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To answer these questions, Jennings et al. developed an interview questionnaire,
and conducted interviews with subject matter experts in a variety of building stability
related categories, to include construction, owners, insurance, and certification programs
(Jennings p. 6). Because of the qualitative nature of the questionnaire, highly trained
individuals conducted the interviews, a single team member rated all of the interviews
and answers to ensure consistency, and additional team members rated interviews to
ensure unbiased (Jennings p. 9). After 15 interviews, their study concluded with 7 major
findings, which are laid out in Table 1.
These findings were followed up with what the interviewed experts considered
the greatest motivations for building with resilience included in the design process.
Overwhelmingly, the greatest motivators were those directly related to cost, whether
through decreased recovery and down time or through decreased insurance rates. Those
indirectly related to cost, such as being able to bring in more tenants or users and charge
more because of the “attractiveness” of the building, were split almost evenly. Finally,
the lowest ranked motivator was “It is ‘the right thing to do’”, with more experts
admitting that it provided no incentive (Jennings p. 15).
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Table 1: Stakeholder Interview Findings (Jennings p. 11)

Jennings et al. proceed with recommendations for what should be included in a
resilience certification program, including financial incentives, education, historical data,
and partnerships between public and private sectors. The most notable recommendation
was to “develop a cohesive resilience story across the Federal government’s multiple
resilience efforts” (Jennings p. 16). By creating a single definition and measure, or at the
very least a measurement process, across the entire government, separate components
that factor into the resilience of a building, such as the resilience of the infrastructures
they use, may be considered in calculations (Jennings p. 11).
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Defining Costs Associated With Satellite Networks

In this section, some of the common costs associated with building, maintaining,
and operating a satellite network are defined. When determining costs of a satellite, it is
possible to categorize costs as either deployment or on-orbit costs (Eremenko p. 2).
Common deployment costs are Launch and Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs.
Common Operations and Maintenance (OM) costs are Operations and Recurring
Engineering (RE) costs (Eremenko p. 15).
To break these down further, an initial inspection of the costs associated with
deployment must be completed. Some main costs in deployment are simply the cost to
launch the satellite, or group of satellites, into orbit, and the cost of the satellite
(Meckling p. 2). However, some background costs which must be completed initially are
the development costs and the investment costs (Meckling p. 4). Investment costs are
considered because the different manners by which a component is paid for, such as
upfront or regular payments, affect the present value cost of the component.
When determining the cost of a ground terminal, a similar division can be used,
namely the cost of constructing the station and the cost of operating and maintaining the
station. Common construction costs are, of course, the facility itself, along with any
associated land, the equipment required to operate, such as antennas, satellites, and
computers, the instillation of all equipment, and any initial fees associated with the
required utilities and infrastructure of the facility (Meckling p. 11).
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The OM costs of a terrestrial station are the same as those seen in most used
facilities: “Facility Maintenance, Equipment Maintenance and Parts, Pay and
Allowances, Services (Utilities) and Miscellaneous” (Meckling p. 11).
The OM costs associated with a satellite, with the preceding cost allocations, is
then diminished. Because the personnel and terrestrial equipment required to operate a
satellite is considered in the costs associated with the terrestrial station, what remains is
the cost of refueling, and repairing an on-orbit component. Previously, doing either was
considered impossible, however recent advancements have made both a reality.
Since 2011, efforts have been placed on refueling and maintaining aging satellites
with the aid of high precision robots. As of 2013, NASA and the Canadian Space
Agency (CSA) have a prototype robot which has successfully refueled satellites,
performed basic fitting, cap, and screw removals, as well as the manipulation of the
thermal blanket (SSCO RRM). With the next set of instruments set for delivery to the
International Space Station (ISS) by early 2014, the next phase of the Robotic Refueling
Mission is to attempt replacement and internal repairs of on-orbit satellite components
(SSCO RRM Phase II).
These innovations provide the answers to what the OM costs of a satellite will be:
Component delivery, Maintenance, and Refueling. This does imply that the Robotic
Refueling Mission (RRM) will spawn a quantity of high precision space maintainers or,
at the very least, a consideration for their use when the time arises.
Based upon the NASA and CSA work, the RRM is designed to remain at the ISS
until needed, and then return when its mission is complete. This means that whenever
maintenance is required for a satellite, the associated OM costs are the cost of the fuel,
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components, fuel required by the refueler, and the cost of delivering those item to the
ISS. However, this technology is extremely new, and as such many of its potential
limitations, such as which orbits it may operate within, remain unknown.

Comparing Satellite Networks to Supply Networks

In any supply network, there exist three main components:
1. Source-where the supply is coming from,
2. Sink-where the demand exists
3. Relays/Transshipment- the points bridging the sources and the sinks.
A source is the point of origination for a supply network. This is a node where
the product is stored and/or produced. In a satellite network, products are transmissions
which originate from the users of the network.
A sink is a point where the supply chain terminates. The set comprising the sinks
may be larger or smaller than the set comprising the sources, but it still follows the
general idea of "Where is this product needed?". For a satellite network, a sink is the
transmission's destination.
The relay points are all those points that must be traversed in order to transport
goods from sources to sinks. Common relay points in supply networks are depots, sea
ports, airports, and train stations. Each of these relay points may also offer their own
supply as well, or inversely may have a demand of their own which must be filled. For a
satellite network, a relay can be anything such as a transmission tower, satellite, gateway,
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or even a switchboard. While it is unlikely that a transmission tower is making any
phone calls, it may send occasional data bursts to an offsite location detailing its status
and use. On the other hand, it is very likely that a terrestrial based gateway station is
making and receiving many transmissions as they are generally operated by humans.
A supply chain also has the possibility of degradation of product in route, more
commonly known as losses. For many products, this degradation is simply products that
were lost in transit, however for items with a short life such as produce, the degradation
must also include the products that arrived, but were unusable. This is necessary for a
satellite network because every transmitted signal is another potential place for the signal
to become further degraded. If too many relays are used, or if the relay used must
traverse areas of high interference, the signal may be unusable when it reaches its
destination.
As closely related as these two networks are though, there is still a main
difference that must be addressed. Satellite networks and supply networks differ in that
every source node for a transmission in a satellite network is potentially a sink node as
well. Furthermore, while most supply networks have relatively static node locations,
satellites, excluding GEO, are constantly changing their relative position with respect to
Earth. This means that a transmission from point A to point B may traverse a set of nodes
S at time t, but then traverse an entirely different set of nodes R at time t+1.
In many communications networks, there are also locations known as “Gateways”
(Werner p. 371). In order to determine a user’s ability to utilize a network, each
transmission device sends out a code when attempting to initiate a connection. Before a
transmission may be completed, it must be relayed through the network to a gateway,
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where the code may be verified. The gateway then relays the transmission through the
remainder of the network to the destination. When attempting to complete a transmission
to a user of the network in question, the transmission still must be routed through a
gateway to ensure that the receiver has authorization for network use (Werner p. 373).
Hence the name “Gateway”; in order to utilize the network, whether as a sender, receiver,
or both, every transmission must be routed through a gateway first.

Comparing Satellite Networks to Power Grids

In this section, relations between satellite networks and power grids are
established by comparing each of the components that make up the networks. This
comparison is necessary for the validity of comparing work done on resilience in power
grids, which is seen in the section, Previous Resilience Measurement Methods Used, to
the satellite network.
Merriam Webster dictionary defines a power grid as "a network of electrical
transmission lines connecting a multiplicity of generating stations to loads over a wide
area." Meanwhile, ATIS Telecoms defines a satellite network as "a satellite system, or
part of a satellite system, and the cooperating Earth stations" (ATIS).
In Defending Critical Infrastructure, the power grid consisted of buses, power
lines, transformers, and generating units (Brown 2006). The buses are able to distribute
the power down a variety of paths which were defined by the power lines. The power
lines were able to transmit electricity in either direction. The transformers adapted the
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electricity for travelling long distances, and then reverted the electricity to its common
form for every day use. The generating units, or power plants, are where the power
originates.
Currently, a direct translation exists for most of these components into a satellite
communications network. The majority of these translations come from work done by
The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).
See Figure 2 and Figure 3 for a visual comparison. The power buses are loosely translate
to the satellites, capable of sending and receiving a data stream to another connected bus.
The power lines in a satellite communication network are not physical wires, but rather
the transmissions themselves, radio frequencies being the most common, which are sent
and received via uplinks and downlinks. As such, the satellite "power lines" are
determined by line-of-sight and distance. The transformers of a satellite network are the
assets required to encode/decode the data for transmitting, much like a power transformer
converts the energy for long distance travel or how cargo is palletized when being
shipped via air.
Finally, the generating units are those nodes from which the transmissions
originate. Note that in this case, these generators are the people or system creating the
transmission and the transformers are the devices used to transmit the message. In the
case of a phone call, the generator would be the human speaking and the transformer the
phone. However, for aggregation purposes, these two components are often considered
as one in the same for the purpose of modeling, making exceptions only when a gateway
is necessary for switching between networks operational encodings.
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There are many close translations between a satellite network, a supply network,
and a power grid. However, one main difference remains, and that becomes apparent
when operating a network handling multiple transmissions instead of only one.
A power grid has one main product for the purposes of these studies, and that is
electricity. Like many networks, if the power plant requires any power itself, it supplies
itself, thus eliminating its demand and reducing its supply. Likewise, sink nodes such as
homes, factories, or office buildings are supplied by these sources. If they produce any
power of their own through the use of technology, such as solar panels, windmills, or
watermills, that amount is deducted from their demand before additional power is
purchased or excess power is sold.
The source nodes and sink nodes in the model make no distinction as to where the
power is shipped so long as all demand is met for the lowest possible cost. Another way
of thinking about this is that the model does not care where the power came from or
where it is going, only the path utilized to meet its objective.
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Figure 2: Hybrid Satellite/ Terrestrial Communications Network (NSTAC p. 5)

Figure 3: Example Power Grid (CIP Vigilance p. 1)
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A satellite network follows this same principle, but only when viewed one
transmission at a time, or when a single transmission is being broadcast to a large
population of sinks. Whereas a power plant may not care if the power it sends goes ten
feet or ten miles, a businessman making a phone call to Texas may be expectedly
unhappy if he is connected to a take-out restaurant in Maine. It is because of the need for
high-fidelity in transmission source and destination that any adaptation from a clear
source-sink model needs to be modified.
Another difference between power grids and satellite networks is the way in
which they make transmissions. When viewing a single instance in time, the differences
in the methods of transmission are insignificant. However, when viewing the two in a
time-dependent fashion, it is clear that while power lines remain fixed, the connections in
satellite networks are dynamic.
For Motorola's Iridium satellite network, the average in-view time for a satellite is
10 minutes (Pratt p. 1). This means that every 10 minutes, a ground location essentially
breaks one connection and forms another. Furthermore, while each satellite in the
Iridium network maintains a connection with the adjacent satellites in its orbital plane,
connections are also established to satellites in adjacent co-rotating planes. However,
these inter-plane connections do not occur when the geodesic location is in excess of 60o
latitude (Pratt p. 8). While this may appear as if the satellite links are dependent upon
location as well, the location of each satellite can be estimated using its orbital
parameters, starting location, both of which are relatively unchanging, and time. Thus,
the connections are time dependent.
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Therefore, when viewing a snapshot of single transmission in a satellite network,
there is little difference between this network and a power grid. However, every
transmission is essentially an additional commodity to be sent through the network, and
every new point in time a new network to be solved. Any adaptations of work made must
be able to accommodate these differences.

Previous Resilience Measurement Methods Used

In this section, previous works on measuring resilience are reviewed, with an
emphasis in the area of critical infrastructure defense and network defense. Major case
studies used in previous methods show a focus towards the fields of disaster planning,
supply networks, and power grid distributions.
One measure presented as adaptable to measuring any type of infrastructure
comes from Argonne National Lab’s Decision and Information Systems division, whose
definition of resilience is initially presented in Chapter I. Carlson et al. utilize an index,
aptly named the Resilience Index, which may be used to determine the “most important
lower level systems” (Carlson p. 20). In this index, four components are combined:
Preparedness, Mitigation measures, Response capabilities, and Recovery Mechanisms
(Carlson p. 21).
These components were later changed to Robustness, Resourcefulness, and
Recovery. The output from this analysis results in numerical values, scaled 0-100 (see
Figure 4) showing the index value of each component and the overall Resilience Index.
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Figure 4: Resilience Index Dashboard (Argonne)
Like the index itself, each of these three components are measured via indices.
These three indices are the weighted sum of multiple subcategories, which are to be
calculated using the weighted sum of a series of survey questions aimed at analyzing
aspects of the individual sites when taken together form a system, as well as the system
as a whole (Carlson p. 39). Each question itself is attributed a rank, 1 through 5, and a
corresponding weight as determined by the average weight assigned by subject matter
experts.
While the resilience index constructed by Carlson et al. does have the advantage
of being relatively easy to use, it does suffer from the potential uncertainty that comes
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with soliciting weights and with survey-based metrics. This effect, minor in itself, is
compounded multiple times over, both within the four main components of the index, and
then across the indices to construct the overarching resilience index.
Furthermore, this resilience index, while highlighting the area of concern with
follow-up analysis, provides relatively little information except for use as a comparison
between systems performing identical duties. Even with similar system duties, such as
power distribution, weights can vary between providers in two different locations,
resulting in identical systems having very different scores. As such, this index may only
be compared between networks of the same type operating in an extremely similar, or the
same, environment.
In addition, Argonne National Laboratory’s resilience index fails to consider the
extreme events, which can stress a system in unseen ways, instead focusing on capturing
the common or frequent disruptions which a network may face. Where as an analytical
measure may be capable of determining combinations of disruption which, together, have
a much greater impact, and index of this type would be unable to capture the impact of
more than a singular disruption.
Cimellaro et al. define resilience as “a function indicating the capability to sustain
a level of functionality or performance … over a period defined as the control time”
(Cimellaro p. 3640). From this definition, the reader can already see the coming
implications of resilience as a time-dependent measure of performance. This is
confirmed when they later mathematically define resilience as the area under the timedependent functionality curve.
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To do this, they consider the functionality curve as a piecewise function
incorporating a time of operation before an event called the control time, the time after
the event until function levels have stabilized, and from that point until the end of the
graphed span of time. An example of this function is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Functionality Curve (Cimellaro p. 3642)
Cimellaro et al. go on to describe how the recovery section of this curve can
describe the preparedness of a community. With a fixed time for recovery, a curve with
more area is more prepared, and as a result of their resilience function more resilient
(Cimellaro p. 3644). Their resilience measure is presented as a percentage of desired
functionality provided over the span of time in regards to a known or predicted event. In
their case study, they utilize an earthquake affecting a hospital (Cimellaro p. 3646), as
well as an equal time span to compare the resilience provided by multiple construction
options. By doing so, the question being answered is “Which option makes me most
resilient to event X?”.
Zobel and Khansa, employ a similar method in which multiple scenarios are
tested against a common event and time span (Zobel p. 83) However, Zobel and Khansa

37


take into account that multiple degrading events may occur while the system is still
recovering. For a visual representation, see Figure 6.

Figure 6: Multi-Event Resilience Graph (Zobel p. 84)
Opposite of Cimellaro et al, the measure for resilience is the impact of an event,
or how much functionality/quality was lost. In this case, the goal is not to increase the
resiliency measure, but to reduce it. Zobel and Khansa also note that very different
structures can result in an identical resulting resilience value, specifically pointing out the
trade-off between reducing the lost quality, as they refer to it, and the time to recover
(Zobel p. 87). This two-dimensional tradeoff results in a series of equal-resilience
curves, shown in Figure 6.
Zobel and Khansa refer to these variables as effects, dependent upon the
robustness and rapidity of a system. Unlike the Cimellaro et al. paper, which aimed to
determine which safe-guard or defense should be utilized to increase resilience against a
specific threat, Zobel and Khansa strive to describe what is making the current system as
resilient as it is (Zobel p. 92). As a final note, Zobel and Khansa specify that it is
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important to determine what the decision maker considers important, both as criterion for
measuring as well as threats for being resilient against (Zobel p. 92).

Figure 7: Resilience Curves (Zobel p. 88)
One area that is quickly advancing in resilience models is the area of
transportation networks. More specifically, supply networks are a prime candidate for
viewing the different methods available for use. Klibi and Martel utilized stochastic
methods in order to evaluate the resilience of their network (Klibi p. 1). Their model
developed a measure based upon the intensity of a disruptive event, and the time to
recover from that event.
Klibi and Martel extended the paradigm by modeling the time to recover as a
continuous function of the impact. In addition, they included a term for random error.
Inter-arrival times, order sizes, the aforementioned error term, as well as the location and
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size of the disruptions are all then associated with probability distributions. Moreover,
they included the concept of a temporary demand surge, Figure 7, which follows the
recovery of the system (Klibi p. 6). As the reader will note, this is the third time in as
many graphs in which a structure utilizing a time-dependent performance measure has
been seen as a basis for resilience.

Figure 8: Recovery Function Examples (Klibi p. 6)
Utilizing Monte Carlo simulation, Klibi and Martel use random number draws
"first to generate multihazard [disruption] arrivals, second to generate recovery functions,
and third to generate daily [demands and capacities]" (Klibi p. 7). The use of simulation
was due in part to the scale of the network they were modeling. Were the network very
small, a series of distribution convolutions could have provided an exact result.
However, with even moderately sized networks, that process is cumbersome and
computationally daunting. Through the use of simulation, an approximate final
distribution can be attained. In the Klibi and Martel case, an intolerance level was set
with the measure being product-days lost. Figure 8 shows a histogram of their results for
a large network.
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Figure 9: Distribution of Product-days Lost (Klibi p8)
After the event, a separate model following the same constraining guidelines as
the model before the event occurred, minus the lost resources of course, determined the
optimal manner in which to operate. This is because their networks are built through
intelligent design, and are able to be adapted to whatever the situation might be. Though
this adaptation may not be sufficient to instantly meet all demand, it does have the effect
of lessening the lost network capability during reconstruction.
Klibi and Martel present multiple modeling methods. Another method is their
development of a Risk-Neutral Design Model. In this model, the focus is on the expected
values of the distributions, and assumes that the modeler has no preference between
avoiding the more frequent low-risk scenario nor the less frequent, but more damaging,
high-risk scenarios. In this risk-neutral model, much of the probability and intensity
portions are lost and the model becomes deterministic at the expected value.
A separate method for measuring resilience conducted at the Naval Post Graduate
School by Brown et al. and Salmeron et al. is discussed next (Salmeron 2004), (Brown
2005), (Brown 2006), (Salmeron 2009). This research line focused primarily on
deterministic modeling methods in order to locate a probable worst-case interdiction by

41


an intelligent adversary on a network, and the actions an operator might take in order to
diminish the impact of the event while rebuilding the network. The similarities between
the underlying processes of measuring resilience are clear.
The main difference between analyzing a “worst case” model and the "expected
values" for an event is that, for a plausible adversary, it puts more emphasis on "how bad
could the network performance be impacted" instead of "how bad is the network
performance expected to be impacted" (Salmeron 2004).
Henceforth this type of model is referred to as an extreme event scenario. This
method of thinking is common with high consequence, low probability events, referred to
as the Risk of Extreme Event (Haimes p. 515). One method that is utilized for
accounting for these events and evaluating outcomes is to restrict the probability being
analyzed to what is commonly referred to as the tail of a distribution (Haimes p. 483).
In line with this action-reaction, extreme event methodology, Brown et al. utilized
a bi-level optimization model known as Attacker-Defender Models. Attacker-Defender
models key in two underlying assumptions. The first is that the defender has an objective
they would like to be attained at an optimal level. The second is that the attacker has an
objective which conflicts with the defender's objective. In Brown et al., the defender is
minimizing the cost of the network and the attacker is attempting to maximize this
minimal cost. Note that cost is not necessarily monetary, but could be anything such as
resources or time (Brown 2006).
One example Brown et al. use is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Louisiana
pipelines, shown in Figure 9. In this complex network, the sources supply the petroleum
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to demand nodes (sinks). More often than not, this was done via transfer stations, which
had neither demand nor supply.

Figure 10: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Louisiana Pipelines (Brown 2006 p. 537)
In this example, they are not looking for the vulnerabilities of the current system
specifically, but instead broke their analysis into three distinct pieces, each geared around
a separate defense plan. It is those defense plans which were analyzed. Thus, the analyst
was able to say "if the system had these protections, how safe are we?" Once again, the
measurements of “best” were determined by which plan was least costly, or rather which
plan, if optimally interdicted, still cost the least.
Salmeron et al. begin by first constructing a simplified version of their network
and its operations, and then slowly including more and more details, allowing their model
to incrementally expand and increase in accuracy (Salmeron 2009 p. 98). Their first
simplification was to assume constant demands and a single repair time in order to
eliminate variability. The objective function they utilized was a single minimization
problem in which the operator of a network sought the lowest possible generation and
load shedding costs for their power grid.
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The flow of power and placement of resources resulting in this lowest cost was
referred to as the Optimal Power Flow model. This model provides the baseline cost and
establishes the values that each relay point experiences based upon the supply and
demand of the model. The next step determined the optimal attack. The determined
interdiction is the one that maximizes the operating costs of the system.
As part of the constraints of the Salmeron et al. model, the nodes where attacks
may or may not occur are based upon binary decision variables. Unlike linear
programming (LP) models, which are able to arrive relatively quickly at an optimal
solution, or alternate optimal solutions, mixed integer programs (MIP) can take
significantly longer to solve. Because the latter model is often more complicated than the
former, and is intended for an extremely large network, Salmeron et al. formulate an
improved algorithm for Benders Partitioning, commonly used to solve large integer
programs. The improved method is known as Global Benders Decomposition Algorithm
(GLBDA).
The main improvement comes with solving bi-level models. Salmeron et al.
suggest whereas Benders Partitioning is only able to maximize concave functions, GLBD
is able to maximize convex functions as well, so long as two requirements are met. The
first is that the function in question must be "easy" to evaluate at fixed values. The
second is that valid and useful cut coefficients can be defined for the MIP. Salmeron et
al. go on to validate these requirements for a large-scale power grid (Salmeron 2009 p.
100).
Salmeron et al. measure the “difference in operating cost, including penalties for
un-served demand” between the initial state of the system and the system after the shock
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(Salmeron 2009 p. 98). This methodology permits the allocation or rental of new
resources, which combined with the remaining pre-shock grid components, provides the
baseline cost to operate the post-shock grid. What remains are the miscellaneous costs
associated with clean up, repair, increased security, as well as the penalty costs for
demand not met.
As this measure is dissected, it becomes possible to categorize these costs into the
components of the definition. Recall that the definition of resilience being utilized is "the
ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization, community, region- to anticipate, resist,
absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance"(Carlson p. vii). In
Salmeron et al.'s measurement method, there is no explicit accounting for anticipation
and resistance. If these components are present, they are absorbed in the operation costs
before the disruptive event. There is also no method in their paper for including the
acquisition cost for pre-event defensive measures. Response is included in the post-event
costs as clean up. Adaptation comes into effect as short term resources or new resources
are procured to minimize the event. Finally, recovery can be seen as the repair costs as
well as the time to repair.
Salmeron et al. introduces the concept of a time persistent resilience model. This
permits an adjustment to the model for three possible objectives: Short, medium, and
long term outages. Salmeron et al. focused on the medium and long term outages,
arguing that the effect is “likely to be much greater.” In these methods, the time to repair
is considered much more important because the most likely target may no longer be the
easy-to-repair bottleneck, but rather a substation that requires a significantly longer
period of time before being functional again (Salmeron 2009 p. 99) .
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Based upon this approach of including varying time lengths, it can no longer be
assumed that an intelligent adversary will utilize all resources in a single coordinated
attack. Instead, it is possible that the most optimal solution could be to continuously restrike a node such as an easy-to-repair bottleneck. For an opponent with multiple strike
capabilities, keeping this single node disrupted for the duration of the model time horizon
could potentially be more beneficial than disrupting a multitude of nodes elsewhere.

Compare and Contrast Prior Methods

Many of the preceding methods exhibit existed three main similarities:
1) A defense, if any, was established, the attacker strikes, and then the
defender recovers.
2) Once set the nodes and paths could not move, but could only be
operational or eliminated.
3) There were clear source and sink nodes.
In networks exhibiting specific structures, such as networks consisting of only
immobile ground nodes, GEO satellites, and operational requirements precluding the
repositioning of GEO satellites, these similarities are expected to hold true. However, in
general, a satellite resilience model only follows the first of these three. Unlike terrestrial
infrastructure, satellites are able to be repositioned. Each change in location potentially
forms an entirely new network, with new arcs being added and former arcs being
destroyed. In many situations, such as when the ground components are highly mobile,
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the repositioning of a satellite allows it to serve an otherwise under capacitated region,
which leads into the violation of the third similarity of clear source/sink nodes.
As was mentioned previously (refer to section Comparing Satellite Networks to
Supply Networks), there are clear source and sink nodes in a satellite network only when
viewing a single transmission at a time. When viewing the network as a whole, however,
each node is a potential source and sink. A simple example of this would be a satellite
phone. So long as a satellite is within service range, the phone may transmit or receive a
call. Once the call is established, a two-way communication stream is continuously
passed back and forth until one side or the other ends the transmission, either
intentionally or by leaving a covered area. Any model chosen must be adaptable to these
unique operations in which every transmission has a specific source and destination.
One possible way of doing this would be to assume that every end-point of the
network be split into two, a transmitter and a receiver. A simulation model could be
utilized at this point. Each node may be split into sending and receiving nodes, and each
new transmission assigned a random number that would determine its destination. From
this simulation, the satellites servicing the most capacity, or acting as bottlenecks, could
be identified. Such an approach would require a large increase in the number of nodes.
Unfortunately, while simulation is an excellent tool for providing insight into how
the system operates, it can be difficult to use to accomplish large scale optimization, and
is even more unwieldy when attempting to make a single model adaptable for multiple
architectures or configurations. The desired model should be easily adaptable from the
example network to the actual operational system, because its intended purpose is to be
used on multiple architecture alternatives to determine which is most resilient.
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Another matter are the consideration of Black Swan events. A Black Swan is an
event which is highly unlikely and causes extreme impact, but an event which humans
will investigate retrospectively, “making it explainable and predictable” (Taleb p. xxii).
In reviewing the purpose for studying and measuring resilience, the focus falls on
maintaining system functionality in the face of unknown and unexpected adversity.
“Black Swan logic makes what you don’t know far more relevant than what you
do know” (Taleb p. xxiii). As such, seeking predictions from experts while operating in
“environments subjected to the Black Swan” provides little information, as if the general
population were polled (Taleb p. xxv). Because of the inherent unpredictability of these
types of events, a more resilient system will be better able to continue functioning in such
an environment.
When considering the strengths that a resilience measurement method should
possess, five main aspects can be derived from the methods reviewed:
1. Adaptable: Can it be applied to multiple systems and
scenarios with few modifications?
2. Highlights System Vulnerabilities: Will the measure or
a bi-product of the method’s output alert the analyst
to potential network vulnerabilities?
3. Intuitive Method: Similar to adaptability, can the
method be easily decomposed into the
capabilities/components and recreated?
4. Inclusion of Time: Time is seen as a key criterion in a
resilience measure. Can every/most events occur in
multiple time periods?

48


5. Consistent: Is the measurable comparable within
networks performing a similar function?
A characterization of the most prominent methodologies, an indexing method,
Monte Carlo Simulation, and Worst-Case Interdiction, are displayed in Table 2. These
strengths are based upon the methodologies and show which are preferable in regards to
the criteria displayed. Cells in Table 2 are marked with an “X” if the method possesses
the respective strength.

Table 2: Method Strengths

Based upon the strengths, the Worst-Case Interdiction method used by Salmeron
et al. appears to be the strongest, though the failure to include the time component is a
drawback in measuring resilience. Conversely, the Index method, the most prominent of
which comes from Argonne National Labs, shows the least strength. Still, it is
acknowledged that this method is the simplest to calculate, with the exception of first
requiring input from sufficiently many subject matter experts (SMEs) to arrive at an
average weight to be used.
Similarly, there exist a number of shortcomings of each model which may be
compared. Each of these shortcomings could hinder the method’s ability to achieve a
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good resilience measure, whether by under-stating the high impact Black Swan events,
discarding the common place disruptions, or in a cacophony of other ways.
Shortcomings 2 and 3, Explicitly Constructed Scenario and Subjective Measure,
are contrary to Taleb’s assertion that expert predictions provide little usable information.
Thus any scenario or weight constructed by an expert may not serve to increase the
system’s ability to continue operating when faced with an extreme-event.
1.

Scenario Dependent: The most common shortcoming, a
resilience measure dependent upon scenarios answers the
question “Resilient against what?”

2.

Explicitly Constructed Scenario: Clearly Scenario
Dependent, this shortcoming requires the analyst to
construct the adverse events, preventing the model from
creating the high impact perfect storm.

3.

Subjective Measure: Though mitigated with analytical
techniques, does the model require a subjective
estimation of relative value, component durability, or
other system parameter?

4.

Focuses on Likely Disruptions: The model fails to stress the
impact of possible Black Swan events.

5.

Discrete Degradation (Kill/No Kill): Are the degradation of
system components discrete to the point of Kill or No Kill,
or can it exploit synergistic partial degradations?

6.

Threat of Compounding Error: Are lower level uncertainties
compounded while striving for a network level measure?

7.

Deterministic: Is the method incapable (in its current form)
of including system reliability or risk?
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8.

Provides Little Usable Information: Does the method output
only allow for resilience comparisons?



Table 3: Method Shortcomings



Table3 displays whether each method possesses a shortcoming by marking an “X”

in the respective table cell. It can be seen that the Monte Carlo Simulation method
utilized by Klibi and Martel has the fewest shortcomings. Of those two shortcomings, the
focus on likely disruptions is a direct result of utilizing probability distributions and
random number draws. However the cause of that shortcoming is also the same reason
for the methods strengths elsewhere. In addition, this is the only method which does not
show a dependence upon scenarios. While Klibi and Martel do utilize scenarios to
achieve their measure, they utilize a great many number and variations, making the final
resilience measure almost independent of the situation.
Once again, the index method falls to the rear, possessing every short-coming
listed. This method is unique in that it was the only one of the three to utilize explicitly
constructed adverse scenarios, be calculated using subjective measures, whose
uncertainty results in compounding errors, and is the only measure which does not
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provide greater insight into the behavior of the model. The Resilience Index developed
by Argonne National Laboratories is intended for use as a comparison of resilience for
facilities performing the same function in highly similar environments. The Resilience
Index was constructed to be extremely simple to calculate to promote wide use for this
reason. As such, it does not explain system behavior, does not exemplify vulnerabilities,
and does not explain which component of resilience is strongest or weakest in the system.
Falling in the middle of the shortcomings was the Worst-Case Interdiction
method. Because of its optimization basis, the method is inherently scenario dependent
as well as being deterministic. However, the simplifying assumptions made by Salmeron
et al. also limited the original form of this method to discrete degradations.
Clearly the two main competitors of methods to be utilized are the Monte Carlo
Simulation method developed by Klibi and Martel, and and the Worst-Case Interdiction
method used by Salmeron et al. (Klibi), (Salmeron 2009). While both provide valuable
information both about the resilience of a system as well as the behavior under adverse
conditions, Worst-Case Interdiction is more adaptable. By modeling the Attacker and
Defender capabilities as mathematical constraints, an entirely new system may be
modeled with relative ease.
This same adaptability, combined with the intuitive nature of the modeling
process, could be exploited in order to include time-dependent Attacker capabilities, as
well as removing the requirement of Discrete Degradation. By making these two
changes, Worst-Case Interdiction becomes the front-runner method, though admittedly
still not ideal. In the next section, solution methods, both to optimality and through the
use of heuristics, are explored.
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Solving Bi-Level Programs

Bi-level and multi-level programs have been used since the early 1970s in efforts
to model hierarchical, interrelated events, and began as an evolution of leader-follower
game theory (Moore p. 6). One early method was developed by J.E. Falk in 1973. A key
breakthrough in Falk’s work was the acknowledgement that while the leader and follower
in a bi-level program (BLP) may have competing objectives, they each have their own
separate resources and methods that may be employed to achieve their objective (Moore
p. 10).
The solution methods have continued to evolve since Falk’s initial work in 1973,
involving both methods for converting the bi-level program to a standard mathematical
program, as well as the development of multiple heuristics and decomposition methods.
In 2004, Salmeron et al. begin by converting their BLP by utilizing a decompositionbased heuristic to indirectly arrive at a result (Salmeron 2004 p. 907).
Through iteratively solving the defender and the attacker portions of the BLP,
Salmeron et al. permitted the defender to generate the network, and then allowed the
attacker to strike the optimal locations to achieve their objective, followed by the
defender’s optimal response to the event. While their result is not guaranteed to be
optimal, it provides a method for calculating and improving interdiction plans. This
method required that the original BLP be broken into two separate models, with each
iteration including additional constraints to both models (Salmeron 2004 p. 909).
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Indices and Index Sets:
iI
g G
l L
cC

Buses
Generating units
Transmission lines
Consumer sectors

sS
i  Is

Substations
Buses at substation s

g  Gi

Generating units connected to bus i

lL

Lines connected to bus i

Bus
i

l L

Sub
s

l'  L

Lines connected to substation s

Par
l

Lines l' z l running in parallel to line l

Parameters
o(l), d(l) origin and destination buses of line l
i(g)
bus for generator g
d ic
load of consumer sector c at bus i
Pl Line

transmission capacity for line l

PgGen

maximum output from generator g

rl , xl

resistance, reactance of line l

hg

generation cost for unit g

f ic

load shedding cost for customer sector

c at bus i
Decision Variables
PgGen generation from unit g
PlLine power flow on line l
Sic

load shed by customer sector c at bus i

Ti

phase angle at bus i
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Figure 11: Power Flow Model (Salmeron 2004 p. 906)
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Figure 12: Interdiction of Power Flow (Salmeron 2004 p. 907)
The Salmeron et al. BLP model, shown in Figure 12 works off of the assumed
objective of the attacker maximizing the minimal cost to operate the system, the interior
optimization model from Figure 11, but is clearly incorporated in Figure 12. By building
the Defender’s model first, which is the main point of validation for this particular type of
modeling method, a large portion of the work for the BLP model was completed. In
Figure 12, every constraint followed by (IDC.#) constructs the modified version of the
Defender model. Meanwhile, the remaining constraints, which directly precede the
internal Defender constraints, are the Attacker’s restrictions.
The heuristic utilized by Salmeron et al. relied heavily upon the Defender model,
which modeled the behavior of the Power Flow network. By optimizing the Defender
objective, interdicting the most heavily used nodes, and then resolving iteratively until all
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resources had been consumed, their heuristic arrived at a solution, and was able to plot
the effect that increasing Attacker resources would have (Salmeron p. 909).
In 2005, Arroyo and Galiana continued the Salmeron et al. case study by
converting the BLP into an LP, using a two step process to achieve this conversion.
“Step 1) the explicit characterization of the inner optimization
problem by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions; Step 2)
the use of integer algebra results due to Floudas’ Nonlinear and Mixed
Integer Optimization: Fundamentals and Applications and to FortunyAmat and McCarl’s A representation and economic interpretation of a
two-level programming problem to convert the nonlinear KKT relations
into equivalent linear forms.”
(Arroyo p. 790).
What follows is the nomenclature used by Arroyo and Galiana:
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A. Indices
j

Generator Index

l
n

Transmission line index
Bus index

B. Sets
J

Set of indices of generators

Jn

Set of indices of generators connected to bus n

L
N

Set of indices of transmission lines
Set of indices of buses

C. Functions
L(v) Lagrangian Function of the inner optimization
problem, which depends on vector v
D. Constants
A nl
Element of the network incidence matrix that is
equal to 1 if the bus n is the sending bus of line l, -1 if
bus n is the recieving bus of line l, and 0 otherwise
FR(l) Sending bus of line l
M
Sufficiently large positive constant
Pnd

Demand at bus n

Pl f

Power flow capacity of line l

Pjg

Capacity of generator j

Pjg

Minimum power output of generator j

TO(l) Recieving bus of line l
xl
Reactance of line l

G
G

Upper bound for the nodal phase angles
Lower bound for the nodal phase angles

Pl
Pl

Upper bound for Pl

I Spec

Lower level of total load shed specified by
the terrorist

Lower bound for Pl
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E. Variables
hl

Slack variable used in the linear expression
equivalent to the produce of Pl and vl

Pf

Vector of line power flows

Pg

Vector of generator power outputs

slFR

Slack variable used in the linear expression
equivalent to the product of vl and G FR (l )

sTO
l

Slack variable used in the linear expression
equivalent to the product of vl and G TO (l )

tl

Variable equal to the product of Pl and vl

vl

0/1 variable that is equal to 0 if line l is destroyed
and equal to 1 otherwise

w

0/1 variable used in the linear expressions of the
complementary slackness conditions

z tFR

Variable equal to the product of vl and G FR ( l )

TO
t

Variable equal to the product of vl and G TO (l )

z

Dn

Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper
bound for the load shed at bus n

Dn

Lagrange multiplier associated with the lower bound

G

for the load shed at bus n
Vector of nodal phase angles

'P d

Vector of nodal loads shed

One major drawback in Arroyo and Galliana’s method for solving the BLP from
Salmeron et al. is the increase in size and complexity. Adapting a simplified version of
the model used by Salmeron et al , shown in Figure 13, they converted the linear BLP to
a single level mixed integer non-linear program (Salmeron 2009). Using Karush-KuhnTucker conditions, Arroyo and Galliana then converted the nonlinear constraints into
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equivalent linear constraints (Arroyo). The resulting model, Figure 14, grew in
constraints by a factor of five.
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Figure 13: Simplified BLP (Arroyo p. 791)
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Figure 14: Single Mixed Integer Linear Program (Arroyo p. 792)
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Using the Lagrangian function of the inner optimization problem, the “Defender”
or “Follower” problem, Arroyo et al. convert the inner problem to an equivalent mixed
integer nonlinear dual. Taking advantage of logical binary variables, all nonlinear
constraints, of both binary variables multiplied by continuous variables, and of the
complementary slackness conditions, are then converted into an equivalent set of linear
constraints.
However, it remains unclear whether or not this solution bought anything in the
way of efficiency or results. Whereas Salmeron et al. ran their algorithm until the
improvements were negligible, Arroyo et al. allowed their model to stop so long as prespecified levels were met. This approach, when coupled with their objective of the
fewest nodes attacked to achieve these levels, does not guarantee selecting levels the
model may need to select the optimal combination. Furthermore, the conversion of the
BLP to an MILP required a large increase in the number of constraints, which was
accompanied by an even greater increase in the number of integer variables (Arroyo p.
792). As such, this single model, when coupled with the much greater pre-processing
time than the heuristic used by Salmeron et al., may achieve very little in terms of
computational efficiency (Salmeron 2009). However, the model does demonstrate a
method for converting a bi-level model to a single-level optimization model.
A similar method to Arroyo et al.’s for solving a BLP indirectly is to utilize
Benders’ partitioning (Brown 2006 p. 533). In the case when the inner problem is an LP,
taking the dual of the attacker-defender model will result in a Mixed Integer Linear
Program (MILP). Unfortunately, this is the most simplistic BLP case, and as Brown et
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al. point out, when the BLP is not Attacker-Defender with Defender being modeled as an
LP, no general transformation of this form exists (Brown 2006 p. 535).
As one may notice, both Arroyo’s and Brown’s solution methodologies, which
utilized the dual of the problem and incorporated KKT conditions, showed very little
effectiveness and were restricted in terms of applicability. This is primarily due to the
nonconvexity that all BLP, even those who are entirely linear and continuous, exhibit.
However, the heuristic Salmeron et al. used in 2004 showed very few restrictions and
quickly achieved a result above what Arroyo’s proposed optimal method, which had to
use the original objective from Salmeron et al work as a fixed constraint, could produce
(Salmeron 2009). “We are still only able to solve moderate size problems. Heuristics
and what have become known as global optimization techniques, offer additional
possibilities” (Bard p. 361).
A recent publication by Alderson et al. at the Naval Postgraduate School
continued the efforts for an exact solution, seeking to now solve a tri-level optimization
model, the Defender-Attacker-Defender model. With their setting as a traffic scenario
using “The Seven Bridges of Konigsberg” (Alderson p. 38), the general outline for the
formulation of constraints remains nearly identical to that used in previous work by
Brown and Salmeron. The main difference in this case study from the one utilized in
Salmeron et al.’s work on Power Flow is size, possessing only a fraction in number of
nodes and arcs. Continuing with the efforts applied to the Global Benders
Decomposition, a similar method is used in the case of a three tiered optimization model.
This method uses a meta-heuristic, shown in Figure 14, which takes advantages of
bounds established by the Global Benders Decomposition developed by Salmeron et al.
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Figure 15: Algorithm DAD Decomposition (Alderson et al. p. 37)
While Alderson et al.’s paper is a clear continuation of previous BLP efforts done at
Naval Postgraduate School, the efforts have been focused on improving the method for
solving discrete, linear, time independent models.
Little work has been done thus far on solving continuous network interdiction
models. A continuous network interdiction is a case in which the nodes or arcs of a
network may be partially diminished in a continuous fashion. One of the main
difficulties with making these variables continuous is that “we can no longer resort to
standard linearization procedures to solve the interdiction problem by a single integer
program” (Lim p. 20). Lim and Smith demonstrate two distinct methods for solving
continuous network interdiction bi-level programs, an exact approach and a heuristic.
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Their exact method is based upon a partitioning algorithm which solves |A| subproblems where A is the constraint matrix of the defender’s mode, and each of these
resulting sub-problems are mixed integer linear programs (Lim p. 21). Their partitioning
algorithm, laid out in page 21 of their paper, first determines if a solution exists, or rather
if the attacker has sufficient resources to interdict any node even partially. Next, Lim and
Smith’s algorithm solves a model to select and interdict the most beneficial point to
eliminate and what impact would be most beneficial for the resources required. If the
resulting objective function is better than the previous result, then the current settings are
kept and another iteration is performed to find the next best node to degrade. If no
resources are left to be expended, or no nodes remain to be eliminated, then the algorithm
terminates. Note that this method is close to enumeration and may require a large amount
of processing power.
In their heuristic section, Lim and Smith point out that the exact solution method
“may not be suitable for solving large-scale problems.” (Lim p. 21). To start their
heuristic method, Lim and Smith systematically fully eliminate a single node in the
network and view the resulting effects. If resources remain, then another node is
interdicted, much like in the exact case. However, should resources remain that are
insufficient to fully interdict another node, then those resources are utilized to partially
interdict the next point which “exhibits the best ratio of objective decrease to budget
consumed when interdicted” (Lim p. 22). This heuristic, which follows immediately,
demonstrated an improvement in solve time by approximately 35%, with a penalty to
optimal solution of roughly 9% (Lim p. 24).
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Heuristic Algorithm from Lim and Smith p. 22
Unfortunately, Lim and Smith found that their heuristic, while operating quickly
with an acceptable margin of optimality error, were applicable only to “grid structured
problems” and were found to be unreliable for “general topologies generated by
Mnetgen” (Lim p. 25).
One heuristic method that is quickly gaining recognition is ant colony
optimization. Ant colony optimization is a metaheuristic that was first proposed in 1992
by Dorigo as a method for solving the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) (Solnon p. 1).
Based upon swarm intelligence, in a travelling salesman problem ants are sent out from
the point of origin and probabilistically select a path to travel. When a path is travelled, a
“pheromone” correlating to the objective value derived from travelling that path is
assigned to it (Solnon p. 109). This “pheromone” then alters the probability of that
particular path being chosen again, and every time the path is selected, the “pheromone”
is increased (Solnon p. 110). To ensure that premature convergence to an answer is
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avoided, a degradation function is placed on the pheromones so that their effect does not
explode in a short period of time and the method can converge to an overall best solution
(Solnon p. 111).
Ant Colony Optimization was recently used to solve a BLP by Calvete et al.
Their method took advantage of the nature of BLP which solves first the attacker portion
before solving the responsive defender model. Using an adapted form of ACO, Calvete
et al. send their ants down the many possible paths in their production-distribution case,
solve the resulting defender model, calculate the attacker’s objectives, and finally update
the pheromone trails based upon the attacker’s objective values (Calvete p. 324). This
method, which is similar in concept to that used by Salmeron et al. in 2004, explores the
many possible combinations the attacker may exploit, and slowly converges to the area of
a best solution. Calvete et al. close by saying that, with modifications, more complex
problems may be applied to the lower level defender problem (Calvete p. 327).
While Calvete et al. have used more advanced techniques than Salmeron et al.
used nine years prior, their method at the core is an improvement in the rate of
convergence. Where Salmeron et al. eliminated whole combinations when it was showed
that a better solution existed, Calvete et al. used the nature of ACO to force their heuristic
to trend towards the best individual options, which together created the preferred sets.
However, the Calvete et al. paper still shows the same restriction of discrete binary
options of where to place a supply node based upon the location of the demand nodes
(Calvete p. 325). As was discussed in Lim and Smith’s work, the restricted discrete case
is significantly easier to solve due to the restricted number of options and the nature of
the current solution methods being pursued to solve BLP.
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Heuristics for Large Scale Set Covering Problems

In this section, prominent works for heuristics designed to solve the Set Covering
Problem for large scale models are reviewed. Key works for this section are A Heuristic
Method for the Set Covering Problem (SCP) by Caprara et al., Ant Colony Optimization
and Constraint Programming by Christine Solnon, and A New Model for Planning
Emergency Facilities in Shanghai by Luo et al.
The most common heuristic method across all optimization problem types is the
greedy algorithm. In a SCP the greedy algorithm selects the placement which gains the
most value, regardless of resource cost. Being an approach commonly tested against, the
greedy approach rarely shows as the best method, and, as in the following papers to be
reviewed, is frequently the worst. However, due to its simplicity, the greedy algorithm
does serve as a fall-back when all else fails.
In A Heuristic Method for the Set Covering Problem by Caprara et al., a
“Langrangian-based heuristic” (Caprara p. 730) was developed to solve very large scale
SCP. The key points of this heuristic are that it utilizes dynamic values and column
fixing to find “improved solutions” (Caprara p. 730). Caprara et al. focus solely on a
continuous linear covering problem which utilizes the dual constraints and a Benders type
convergence method to obtain a near-optimal solution.
While the method showed little improvement in final solution versus the
“classical” strategies, which refer to a greedy approach, the method presented by Caprara
et al. does converge to that solution in roughly one quarter of the iterations (Caprara p.
733). Furthermore, by utilizing the Lagrange of the dual, the method will always
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converge to a good solution if allowed to run long enough. For case studies, Caprara et
al. utilized massive sets based upon the Italian railway company. The largest of the sets
run on a personal computer was 507x63,009 nodes, which required 634.8 computer
seconds. The remaining sizes required a high-performance computer to complete
(Caprara p. 735).
Some restrictions to the method utilized by Caprara et al. is the need to find the
dual, and for the dual problem and the original problem to converge to a solution. While
this is always true for linear problems, non-linear problems often struggle with both
restrictions.
Another, more recent method to solving set covering problems is through the use
of Ant Colony Heuristics. “The whole is more than the sum of its parts.” (Solnon p.
106). The concept Solnon is conveying is known as holism and is an underlying principal
of Swarm Intelligence, and the later evolution to Ant Colony Optimization (ACO).
Swarm Intelligence is the “collective ability to achieve global tasks” (Solnon p. 107).
Through basic interactions, the entities of a swarm influence each other as well as the
objective value of the system, either directly or indirectly. These interactions occur at an
elementary level, such as in the example of a shortest path problem. In such a problem,
the elementary decision to be made is which path to proceed down next, which in many
cases is countable. This decision then leads to a new set of paths which may be tread.
Many swarms operate by using pheromones to transmit paths travelled; however
if a path has never been travelled then no pheromone exists to be followed. The
individual entities in a swarm begin with initially no preference of a pathway or option,
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making the initial decision random. As time progresses, the better paths become
frequented more often, and an increased quantity of pheromones are deposited at a faster
rate than the less used pathways (Solnon p. 108).
Having been originally developed for the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) in
1992 (Solnon p. 1), this metaheuristic shows its roots in the original formulations. Given
v, the currently occupied vertex, v’ the destination vertex, and finite number of feasible
pathways J, an entity will travel between these two points via edge ei , i ࣅ J, with
probability:
D

pvei (t )

ª¬Ivei (t ) º¼
,
D
ª
º
I (t )
¦
¬ ve j ¼
jJ

where Ivei (t ) is a function determining the strength or quantity of pheromone along edge
ei based upon the number of entities who have selected edge ei previously, and Į is the
sensitivity of the entities to the pheromone (Solnon p. 110).
Since the time of its original use in TSP, ACO has become more generalized as a
greedy heuristic with biased probabilities. The pheromones used biasing the probability
trend the paths towards the more desirable orders to such an extent that the heuristic may
“learn” to more often place some object j after object i (Solnon p. 117). This ordering
method is frequently used in “vehicle routing problems, car sequencing problems, and job
scheduling problems” (Solnon p. 117).
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At every point, the objective of the ACO is to find the best combination of objects
to optimize the objective, beginning unbiased. Using local searches, combinations may
be improved much more rapidly, which may allow a greater rate of improvement and a
stronger pheromone trail (Solnon p. 118).
Intensification encompasses the need to increase the strength of the pheromone
applied to a trail based upon its resulting value (Solnon p. 128). Diversification is the
need to allow less travelled routes to be re-inspected at regular intervals, either through
branching or through steady degradation of the pheromone to prevent an excess bias
(Solnon p. 136). It is important that intensification and diversification be balanced so that
no trail becomes overpowering, as well as reducing the likelihood that a potentially better
trail is ignored.
In 2013, Luo et al. utilized Ant Colony Optimization techniques to determine the
placement of first aid emergency facilities in Shanghai, China, which they modeled as an
integer program (Luo p. 224). With an objective function of minimizing the expected
cost of delayed responses, as well as the cost of operating each station and vehicles, Luo
et al. utilized a set of permissible locations and respective radii based upon equipment to
be used at the location. Any location that fell within that radius was considered to have
no delay, while any location outside of the radius and not covered by any other station
suffered a delay dependent upon the distance to the nearest station (Luo p. 225).
To adapt the ACO algorithm to set covering problem, Luo et al. determined that
every visited vertex was an activated supply station while any vertex not visited remained
closed/unused (Luo p. 226). The probability that a node would be visited was defined as:
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In this equation, p represents the probability of being selected, y the number of
ambulances to be located at the vertex in question, Ĳ the gained likelihood of a vertex
being activated based upon previous iterations, Ș a static measure showing the deviation
from y, and ȕ the significance of the measures Ĳ and Ș (Luo p. 226).
The following two equations are used by Luo et al. to ensure that a
minimal number of ambulances within an area are sufficient to permit the double
coverage of their requirement. Here, y’j signifies the minimal number of ambulances
required by an area Wj.
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The results of this heuristic show that the cost of providing care could actually be
reduced by half increasing the number of emergency facilities from 29 to 47 (Luo p.
227).
In this section, heuristics designed to solve the large scale Set Covering Problems
were reviewed. These heuristics were based on Lagrange, Duality, and Ant Colony
Optimization techniques. It has been determined that, while the use of dual problems
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guaranteed convergence in the models reviewed, it required that all constraints be linear.
The method derived from Ant Colony Optimization, on the other hand, made no
restriction to the type of constraints, but also is unable to guarantee convergence to a
single best point or set of best points.

Is an Empty Network Resilient

In this section, a step that is often used in Fourier Transforms of functions is used,
and that is to define the bounds. Because the number of nodes in a satellite network can
become large, the only bound requiring a hard definition is the lower bound of a nonexistent or empty network. Defining this bound is important from a mathematical
standpoint because it will create a baseline for the analysis.
As the framework for the model developed in this thesis is constructed, there is an
issue that remains to be discussed, and that is if a network with no nodes is considered to
be resilient. Recall that Salmeron et al. measure resilience as “the difference in operating
costs, including penalties for un-served demand, after and before interdiction.”
(Salmeron) Consider a network where there are no nodes that can be attacked.
This network is certainly resistant to interdictions as there is no change from
before an event to after an event, regardless of how difficult it would be to discern an
event on a system that does not exist. Because there is no change in the system from
before and after the shock, there is no change in un-served demand, and thus no change in
penalty for un-served demand. There is also no increased cost for clean up and repair.
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Based upon Salmeron et al.'s measure, a network that does not exist is certainly the best
network, an error that must be accounted for.
Utilizing the measure for resilience presented by Cimellaro et al., in which the
measure is the integral of the network performance over time given an event, the opposite
occurs. In this situation, one can see intuitively that an empty network, which is
permanently unable to provide any performance, is the least resilient. An exception to
this is the situation in which there is simultaneously zero function and zero need for the
function. In such a situation, the network is both the least and the most resilient, as the
desired level of performance is always achieved.
In line with the Argonne definition followed in this work, as well as the
components of resilience outlined by the DoD, the effects that increasing network
capacity is viewed, whether for relaying or being a source of commodities, by examining
the change that increasing the number of homogenous nodes has on resilience under each
measure. Recall from Chapter I section Defining Resilience, the four components of
resilience are avoidance, robustness, reconstitution, and recovery.
Increasing the number of homogenous nodes in the network will have a
combination of two effects, acting as a spare should a primary node collapse and
satisfying previously unsatisfied demand. Note that it may wholly fall under a single of
these effects. In the situation when a node is a spare, the change in costs would be
lessened as there is less change in un-served demand. However, if the new node is
satisfying a set of only previously unsatisfied demand, then after an event in which a
node is lost, the change in un-served demand is the same as if the new node had not been
included.
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The effect this change would have on the measure utilized by Cimellaro et al. is
now inspected (Cimellaro). In case of a new node acting as a spare, the change in
network performance would experience a lessened shock as a result of the degrading
event. As such the resilience measure would increase. If the new node is satisfying a
unique set of previously unsatisfied demand, then the network performance curve is
translated up, though the lost performance as a result of an event remains the same. In
this situation, the network is still considered to be more resilient than if the new node had
not existed.
Clearly, including a new node should increase resilience so long as it is
performing some function, whether as a spare or as a new primary relay/source node. As
such, the resilience measure should increase, though not necessarily by the same amount,
in both situations. The measure utilized by Cimellaro et al. measure satisfies this while
that used by Brown et al. does not (Cimellaro), (Brown 2006).
As no specification has been made as to the number of nodes in the network
before the addition, this remains true for transitioning from a nonexistent network to a
network with only one node, making exception for the obvious irrational situations in
which a new node is useless, such as a supply network with only a relay node and no
source. Since a network with one node should be more resilient than a network with no
nodes, then a nonexistent network cannot be the most resilient. As such, the nonexistent,
or empty, network must be the least resilient.
In this section, the measurement methods of Brown et al. and Cimellaro et al.
were utilized to exemplify setting an empty network as possessing the theoretical lower
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bound on resilience. Furthermore, the concept of increasing network size having a
positive effect on robustness and recovery, and as a result on resilience, was presented.

Measuring Resilience


In this section, inherent measure characteristics and behaviors prescribed by the
DoD definition, as well as those apparent in The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb,
and the Argonne National Laboratory definition, are reviewed.
A portion of the measure guides are laid out in the DoD definition of resilience
(Fact Sheet: Resilience of Space Capabilities).
Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions
necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse
conditions. An architecture is “more resilient” if it can provide
these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced
capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and
threats.
From this definition, the DoD outlines that the measure of resilience of a system
should improve is it can maintain its functionality in the face of a wide range of
adversities. The measure should also improve if recovery time is decreased or if the
probability of failure when faced with adversity is decreased. Note that the improvement
may be negligible or nonexistent, but never negative.
From The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, which investigates robustness
and fragility, another set of guidelines is exposed. First, robustness, a component of
resilience as determined by DoD and the Argonne National Laboratory definitions, is
improved as redundancies are included (Taleb p. 312). By extension, the resilience
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measure should improve as well. Mitigating actions, actions which lower the probability
or the impact of an event, improve resilience by improving robustness and avoidance
(Taleb p. xxvii).
Consider the Argonne National Laboratory resilience definition (Carlson p. 7):
Resilience is the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization,
community, region- to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt
to, and recover from a disturbance.
Argonne National Laboratory
It is clear that any action which results in reduced recovery time, increased adaptation,
and an increase in a system’s ability to resist or absorb degrading events will also
increase resilience.
An obvious characteristic of the resilience measure is its ability to capture the
performance and functionality of the system when faced with adversity. It must also
incorporate the probabilistic nature system survival and reliability, but must do so while
acknowledging the possibility of a Black Swan event. Recall the measure utilized by
Klibi and Martel (Klibi p. 6), which was the network performance over time. This
measure is also utilized by Cimellaro et al. (Cimellaro p. 3642) and provided the basis for
Zobel and Khansa’s measure of resilience (Zobel p. 84).
Another system aspect seen to improve resilience is diversification. Diversifying
components of a system, be they resources, locations, or capabilities, reduces the impact
that environment changes and degrading events may have on a system (NSTAC p. ES-2). 
Utilizing network performance as a basis, established and well known measures
are incorporated. Incorporating the time component, both for the duration of the
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degrading event as well as the recovery and post-operation portions, the resilience
measure may also capture the behavior and functionality of the system over time.
Redundancies and mitigation efforts may be captured through the use of
scenarios, though a level of scrutiny should be utilized in order to not over inflate their
effect. Including such a component or defense may serve to only shift the point of
degradation and not actually improve resilience (Taleb p. xxvii; Salmeron 2004 p. 911).
When constructing scenarios, it is important to capture the Black Swan events,
which stress the system beyond its normal operational environment. As such, explicitly
constructed scenarios or those scenarios constructed through the use of probability
distributions and past knowledge are less equipped than those models which are capable
of seeking the “Worst-Case” system degradation combinations.
Finally, a resilience measure should be at its worst for systems which do not exist,
as was determined in the section Is An Empty Network Resilient. As such, the measure
should not directly rely on a change in the network or aspects of the network which do
not alter the functionality of the network.
Based upon this information, the following resilience measure is proposed.
Resilience is measured as the time-averaged expected network
performance under extreme-event degradation.
This proposed resilience measure has a number of implications. The most
obvious of these is that it is scenario based. By utilizing a scenario, resilience measures
of varying systems must be compared with the same adversary scenario. However, this
also allows for gauging the impact of redundancies and mitigation efforts, as well as
viewing system behavior when faced with adversity.
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This measure also assumes the incorporation of time. Time is a necessary
component of resilience, as seen in the components respond, adapt, and recover of the
resilience definition. However, multiple events and repetitive degradation can also occur
across a wide range of time, further impacting an already degraded system. Time can
also be a hindrance though, requiring certain modeling restrictions such as a time
horizon.
The probabilistic nature of the system and degrading events should also be
considered. A common method for reducing probabilistic curves to a single measure is
the expected value. It is well known that reducing a curve to a single value results in a
loss of information, but there is no requirement on the remaining information being
entirely discarded. Though the resilience measure is reduced to the expected value, the
remaining output may be retained for potentially invaluable information and insight.
In this chapter, the threats that communication satellites face were reviewed, as
well as the similarities and differences that these satellites have when compared to other
well known networks. A number of previous efforts and methods used in measuring
resilience were presented with particular emphasis on their strengths, weaknesses, and
commonalities. Finally, the chapter was concluded by noting desirable characteristics of
a resilience measure based on the DoD and Argonne National Laboratory definitions
which may be applied to not only satellite communication networks, but any system in
which resilience is measured.
In the following chapter, the many concepts and insights presented here are used
to develop a methodology for measuring resilience. The chapter will begin by adapting
methods presented in this chapter, working to pull the many strengths of the methods
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together. At the end of the chapter, a measure for resilience, and a method for attaining
the measure is developed.
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III. Methodology

In this chapter, two bi-level models are developed, one of which is used to
optimize the effects of an attack over a single network cycle, and another which does the
same for a much longer time span. A heuristic based heavily upon Lim and Smith’s work
is developed to solve the BLPs. This methodology is demonstrated with a case study,
which utilizing two variations on an approximated network.

Model Notation

The indices, variables, and parameters utilized in this chapter are presented
succinctly in this section, as well as in Appendix A. Note that some parameters are
exclusively utilized by the medium/long term model to be presented later in this chapter
and may not appear in short term model. In addition, a change of indices occurs with
respect to time.
Short-Term Model:

Primary Time is Short Term Interval (STI)
Secondary Time is always 1

Medium/Long-Term Model: Primary Time is Long Term Interval (LTI)
Secondary Time is Short Term Interval (STI)
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Indices
i, j , k
t

All three are to be used to denote the node.
Source node of the transmission

l

The network system the transmission last experienced
The security level of the transmission

s
d
w

Gt

Time (Primary)
Time (Secondary)

e

Duration of a single STI
Attack type
Active Defense node

r

Orbital Radius {0,1,2}

a

Variables
yi, j ,t ,l ,s,w,d

Flow of transmission from node t currently flowing from node i to node j
with security level s and node i operating in network system l

wyi,t ,s,wd

Amount of unsatisfied demand at node i with security level s

TCactivew,d

Binary variable noting whether an active TC station exists at time d , w
(1=yes, 0=no)

Excess_Caps,w,d

Amount of capacity of security level s in the network that
remains after all demand has been filled at time d.

Excess_Valuew,d

Value of remaining capacity in network at time d

Excess _ Cap _ PCTw,d
Total_Net_Value

Percent capacity remaining in Network at time d
Total value of the attempted calls in the network

Mi,a,g,d

Amount of resources of type g to be used against node i in attack type a

Zi,a,d

ª¬0, RqRsci,a,g º¼
Binary Variable denoting an attack of type a against i at time d

ADFirede,a,d
xi,w,d

Binary Matrix specifying if defense e, a was used at time d
Degradation of node i at LTI time d

Fueli DistPosi

Fuel burned by node i given the distance repositioned

emptyi,d

Binary variable denoting if node i is out of fuel at time d

RepoDi (DistPosi )

Time to reposition node i given the distance repositioned

RepoSi

LTI time node i begins its repositioning
Distance repositioned by node i

DistPosi
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Parameters:
bi ,t , s
ci ,t, s
capi ,l , s
x i ,w , d
TCi
Network _ Value
ecs
Conn i, j,w ,d
costOi

Supply/Demand at node i from source node t with security level s
Value of transmission to node i
Capacity of node for network type l and security level s
Operational Status of node i at time d , w
Vector denoting if node i is a Tracking and Control station
Sum of network capacity multiplied by value of security rating
Value of excess capacity with security level s
Binary parameter denoting the connection between node i and j
at time interval d , w
Cost of operating node i for 1 time step

GlobeMax
RegMax

Cost of reparing node i from attack type a
Global capacity of network
Regional capacity of network

CostMax
AdvRsc g

Maximum possible cost resulting from a probable event
Adversary Resources of type g

costR i , a

Required Resources of type g to eliminate node i via attack type a
f i , a ,d (Mi , a , g , d , ADFired e ,i , a ,d ) Function computing node i effectiveness at time d
based upon amount of resources used and active defenses used

RqRsci , a , g

IntDur
TimeRi , d ( xi , a , d )

Duration of each time step
Time to repair node i after an attack degrading to xi ,a ,d

CostRi , d ( xi ,a , d )

Cost to repair node i after an attack degrading to xi ,a ,d

TimeRpci

Time to replace node i

CostRpci

Cost to replace node i
Minimum threat of type a worthy of considering defense from e

STe , a

ADRTe , a

Maximum distance defense e can protect against attack type a
Cost to use defense node e against attack type a
Time between uses of defense e given it was used to

ADProt e ,i ,a

protect against type a
Binary matrix denoting if node i is protected from attack type a

ADFPe , a
ADRCe , a

Mobilei
maxposi
minposi
maxfueli , d
FuelUseR i
footprint i , r
OD
CN
OT
CT

by defense node e
Binary variable denoting if node i is mobile
Maximum distance node i may be respositioned to
Minimum distance node i may be respositioned to
Maximum fuel available to node i at time d
Amount of fuel used by node i per time step d
Radius of footprint of node i for orbital radius r
Polar Orbit Direction of orbital plane at some starting time d =0
in regards to a contiguous half sphere of Earth (1 if North, -1 if South)
Number of lateral orbits completed during each cycle
Orbit Time
Cycle Time
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Adapting to a Satellite Network

Recall that in Chapter II, two major differences were discussed that differentiated
satellite networks from other common distribution networks. In this section, the
methodology used to adapt previous methods to a satellite network is presented.
The first difference to discuss is the time-dependent nature that a satellite network
exhibits. Because satellites are in constant motion, orbiting at different speeds, in
different planes, and travelling in different directions as adjacent orbits, the links with
other satellites and with terrestrial areas are brief and temporary. This is especially true
with LEO satellites which must move at high velocities to maintain a stable orbit due to
their relatively closeproximity to the Earth’s surface. While many properties determine
when a satellite is able to establish a connection; the main three are line of sight, distance,
and rotation of orbital plane.
Line-of-sight is much easier to account for with inter-satellite links (ISLs) than
with up/downlinks. Geographical features such as mountains and valleys can have a
significant impact on if a link is viable. Terrain can obscure large plots of land from the
satellite's view.
The connections between terrestrial nodes and satellites are highly dependent
upon distance. Using distance alone, the footprint of a satellite on a smooth surface can
be determined. On a perfectly smooth surface, if the terrestrial node falls inside of that
footprint, then a connection is established.
As discussed in Chapter II, a snapshot of a satellite network possesses the same
stability as a common distribution network, and the location of a satellite can be
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estimated when given a specific time. Therefore the model views the satellite network at
short, discrete time intervals. Doing so, the average usage for those discrete intervals of
time must be used in place of a higher fidelity and more accurate continuous method,
resulting in a slight loss of accuracy.
The second major difference between a satellite network and common distribution
networks is the need to force transmissions from one specific node to another equally
specific node. Reaching back to network flow models, a transmission is forced between a
chain of nodes if a node on one end of the chain has a supply, and the node on the other
end has a demand. This is why, for one transmission, a satellite network’s performance
can be optimized the same as any other network.
However, when combining many thousands of transmissions into a single model,
the simple transmission can no longer be the single encompassing commodity. The
resolution is to not view the network as a large quantity of transmissions moving through
the nodes, but rather a large set of transmission products defined by their origin, which
can be handled by multi-commodity network flow.
By making a transmission from every point of origin in the network a separate
commodity, there is control to where it is sent, maintaining the limitations of the network
by retaining nodal capacities. Moreover, this high-fidelity method can be simplified, if
needed, by translating the demands and supplies of the lowest level nodes up to the next
level in the network, or by aggregating multiple connected origination nodes into a single
node, adjusting the capacity of the satellites as necessary.
For example, as with a satellite phone network, the points of origin are every
single phone and ground station. This network is massive to the point that any general
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model built would likely be intractable. If instead the satellite phones are approximated
to grids on Earth, a very large problem is reduced to a smaller one. However, the
capacity of the covering satellite needs to be reduced by the number of calls whose origin
and destination were within the same grid. Note that this adjustment is a simple
preprocessing of values.
Making another step towards improving model performance, those grids may be
eliminated and their supply and demand translated up to the satellite covering their
respective area. Once again, the capacity of the satellite needs to be reduced by any
demand now served from within the covered area. These two short steps can reduce a
model size considerably.

Approach

Brown et al. state that "For many situations, a linear program will provide an
adequate model of the defender's system and its operations" (Brown 2005 p. 106). Over
the course of this section, the prescribed method for measuring resilience and all of its
components is formulated, including assumptions as they become necessary. This
method results in not a singular equation, but rather a step-by-step process that presents
multiple equations and objective functions to arrive at the final measures.
Bi-level programs allow for optimizing the solution of directly competing
objectives. One general bi-level program is the max-min problem (Brown 2005 p. 106).
In this model, the defender, interior objective function, is minimizing some measure, and
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the attacker, outer objective function, seeks to maximize that minimum (Brown 2005 p.
106).
Recall Salmeron et al. define short term as the period between the time of the
event and the time to repair a cascading failure. In the model short term is defined as a
single network cycle. This provides a clear break for when a short term model may be
terminated, as well as setting firm bounds on the model, while still being adaptive to the
network. With networks experiencing no cycle time, such as pure GEO networks, this
would essentially reduce the short-term model to a single time step.
The next issue is to address cascading failures. Patera states that as the amount of
debris in a satellite’s orbiting area increases, so does the probability of a collision (Patera
p. 716). For the purpose of this research, the following assumptions are made. The first
is that the capacities of the satellites cannot be exceeded, thus precluding a cascading
overload from usage spikes, the most likely cause for a cascading failure in a power grid.
The second assumption is that the only cascading effects possible, in regards to
satellites, is the increased probability of collision with an orbital object, which may be
achieved through either the raised quantity of debris, or through the elimination of
Tracking and Control stations whose purpose is to perform maneuvers to reduce the
probability of collisions.
The basis of this assumption comes from the inherent defenses employed by
satellite operators, which prevent a dangerous overload of capacity, as well as allow the
satellites to, for a duration, autonomously maintain their orbits. While this begins down
the path of reliability and probabilistic effects, it is an important piece to consider as the
probability of collision may spike dangerously high as a result of an event. As there may
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be collateral damage as the result of an attack, this term is restricted to referring to effects
that come as a direct result of the primary attack, which may include time lingering
effects, area of effect, or a combination of both.
Unlike power grids, satellites also experience the benefit of being mobile. It
would seem ideal to define medium term as the time after the short term has concluded,
and until the satellites are able to migrate in order to compensate for the losses, should
the operators choose to do so. Unfortunately, this method is not viable due to the
multitude of ways in which such a period may be affected by choices made by the
operator. Mobilizing a satellite requires the burning of fuel for rapid repositioning, or in
some cases the allowance of a slow drift.
Many satellites, especially those in an elliptical orbit such as HEO and LEO
satellites, experience a slow longitudinal drift (Kumar p. 719). However, repositioning
via this method requires a significant amount of time, and may only apply for relatively
close orbital planes. For example, Iridium used a combination of a fuel burn and drift
method to position new spares Iridium 90, 94, and 96 in February 2002, and again in June
2002 to reposition Iridium 98. In addition, in 2005, Iridium 98 was maneuvered from one
stable orbit to another via a drift-burn combination. The trip, which moved only a third
of the circumference of the LEO realm required the time from June 2005 till May 2007
(Sladen).
For a movement from spare to operational orbit burn, another precedence is found
in Iridium, after the 2009 Iridium 33-Cosmos collision. Immediately following the
collision, efforts began to move the spare, Iridium 91, up to operational range. The
transition took approximately one month (Sladen). To this point, Iridium has neither
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utilized an orbit to orbit burn nor have they repositioned an operational and in-use
satellite, instead choosing to drift spares or to position replacement satellite packages
nearest the orbital plane most in need. Therefore, a separate medium term model or
definition is not included, but is instead presented as a modification of the long term
model.
Salmeron et al. define the long term, being the period after the satellites have been
repositioned and until the network's performance has returned to a level at or above its
previous state, which may include procuring replacements or repairing destroyed nodes.
(Salmeron p. 99). While this period seems ideal, if sufficient satellites are eliminated,
reconstituting the network to a state equivalent to, or exceeding preceding status could
potentially take years, at which point the advancement of technology, as well as the usage
of newer architecture models, may create complexities unable to be properly captured by
the model or analyst. Moreover, the inherent complications that arise from allowing
multiple time-dependent degrading events creates far too much chaos, greatly blurring the
lines of periods defined in such a manner.
As such, the long term timeline is limited to include sets of short term periods,
starting from a predetermined time and extend up to the point where changes in
technology and policy is considered to be significantly great to warrant high
unpredictability in network components that may be utilized by the conclusion of the
model duration. In extension, the medium term may be considered to be any period of
significance greater than one period, but shorter than the duration described as the long
term. However, mathematically this results in no significant change to a long term
model, allowing us to construct a single medium/long-term model to accommodate both.
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While defining these partitionings is important, the true separation between
medium and long-term is irrelevant when maintaining a worst-case scenario model. This
is because a worst case event may involve recurring disruptions, which blur the split
between the two epochs. As such, the medium and long term models remain connected
while making the assertion that any long term model must contain a medium term model.
If only a medium term model is desired, the model developed later in this chapter for the
long term scenario may have the reconstitution component removed and the time duration
adjusted accordingly.
Due to restrictions in time and resources, the model is constructed with the
definition simplified to:
Resilience is measured as the time-averaged expected network
performance under extreme-event degradation.
The measure was simplified in this manner because of the choice to utilize a
deterministic modeling approach. As such, the resilience measure which arrives as an
output of the yet-to-be developed model tend to be a slight overestimation of the true
resilience of the system.
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Building The Defender Model

To measure network operating levels, two preexisting measures are employed: the
percent of transmissions blocked and the percent of excess capacity. These two are
selected because they directly translate to measures which DISA uses to measure network
performance, which is confirmed by Eremenko et al. in their own cost-benefit analysis
(Eremenko p. 4).
In DISA's Telecommunications Service Level Agreement, the main measure
utilized to specify performance levels is Percent Management Threshold, which states the
minimum acceptable level of performance, in their case availability, that must be ensured
at all times (DISA 2012 p. 1). In this thesis the means for measuring percent availability
when the calls have dropped below 100% connected is to use the value weighted percent
of transmissions blocked. Since many methods exist for eliciting these weights from
decision makers and the determination of weights is outside the scope of this research
effort, no further detail is provided in this work as to the many methods for soliciting
weights, nor is there any restriction on the weights to be used at this point. Because this
measure cannot account for any capacity in excess of all-calls-connected, this measure is
coupled with the percent of capacity remaining in the network. For example, if using the
level of 90% of the capacity in the network to complete all transmissions, operational or
otherwise, then the percent capacity remaining is 10%.
The first step is to calculate the network operating levels for an empty set of failed
nodes by constructing the inner Defender IP. The purpose of this step is to determine the
network performance of the fully operational state of the network.

91


Min z=c<wy
y

Subject to:
a j x y+wy=b j
Fy d U(1-x)
y t 0, x ={0,1}
Model 3.1
In this linear programming model, which is formulated as general a fashion as
possible, ajƔ is the jth row of constraints, y is the main decision variable adjusting
commodity flow, and wy is the total amount of demand not met. Another way of
thinking of this demand is the number of calls blocked. Because calls can have varying
levels of importance, the cost vector, c, is included to denote the varying levels of
importance of those calls. Note that if the model is pulled away from the lowest level and
aggregated to some higher level, the cost is no longer associated with a transmission from
a single node, but now with an area or region depending on how low or high the fidelity
is.
In the following model, multi-commodity flows, varying levels of security
requirements, a supply/demand Tracking and Control commodity, and the need for a
gateway to pass calls between nodes operating incompatible frequencies, procedures,
authority, and so forth are included to increase model validity. It shall be assumed that,
in an unaltered network configuration, those operating the networks are aware of or are
able to estimate, what connections exist at each time step, or are capable of determining
these connections on their own, both within the network nodes as well as terrestrial
zones. Thus, Conni,j,d is a binary parameter denoting the connection between node i and j
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at time interval d. While in most cases Conni,j,d=Connj,i,d, this need not always be the
case.
Though the equations are much more explicit, a close read will show that the only
major change between the following model and the general linear model presented before
is the addition of extra subscripts. As such, they shall be defined very carefully.
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Model 3.2
In the preceding IP, recall that xi is known, currently a zero-vector, and is

implemented to the model in order to determine the network operating level, or the
importance of the blocked calls. This is different from a true Attacker-Defender bi-level
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model which would select those degradation levels, xi. Meanwhile, Total_Net_Value is a
constant and actually has no effect on what the optimal configuration will be. Excluding
or including it in the objective function will, computational error notwithstanding, only
serve to adjust the final answer by a predetermined scalar. If a node is unable to transmit
to or receive from a particular system, or if its security level is insufficient, then capi,l,s
will prevent the flow through that node via constraint 3.2.(1).
Constraint 3.2.(2) ensures that the total capacity of the node is not exceeded.
Constraint 3.2.(3) allows the supply the vary, which is necessary when wy begins to grow.
Note that supply is negative, and the equations are flow-in minus flow-out. Constraint
3.2.(4) is the standard network flow constraint. Constraint 3.2.(7) forces at least 1
Tracking and Control (TC) transmission to be transmitted to every demanding node so
long as the node is still active and an active TC station exists. Constraints 3.2.(9) and
3.2.(10) build the second measure, the percent excess capacity in the network. Constraint
3.2.(11) measures the total value of the calls being placed in the network. Note that, as
specified in constraint 3.2.(12), the value of supply is 0. This is done so that
transmissions are not double counted. This constraint may easily be preprocessed out to
conserve memory as the c array is a parameter and not a variable.
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Model 3.3

The value weighted percent of calls blocked and the value of the percent excess
capacity associated with this network state are recorded in an array for later use. These
values are used in order to calculate the Attacker objective value that results from the
current state of the system.
At the moment, the network is currently modeled as operating under perfect
conditions. However, to proceed a baseline value for the impact that each node in the
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satellite network possesses is required. To do this, the preceding model is resolved, but
with a single “deactivated” node each run.
This is done because, though the method utilized here is to construct a continuous
mixed integer non-linear bi-level program (CMINLBLP), currently the only well
established method known for solving such problems, large or small, is to utilize
heuristics. As discussed in Chapter II, this is due to the non-convexity that all BLP in
general are subject to, even when both components are linear. Determining a baseline
importance for each node will allow the CMINLBLP heuristic to more rapidly arrive at a
solution by establishing initial node preferences for selection.
In this section, the inner Defender model to the CMINLBLP was developed and
the values necessary to determine initial preferences to be used in the heuristic were
calculated. In the following section, this Defender model is utilized to construct the
Attacker-Defender Model.

Extreme Event Attacker-Defender Model

In the previous section, the interior Defender model was developed. In this
section, a bi-level Attacker-Defender model is built around that IP in order to determine
where the vulnerabilities in the network are and the effects of those weaknesses being
exploited.
At the moment, the most probable disturbance to a satellite communications
network is a natural or accidental one, as no known malicious attack on a satellite have
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been publically recorded to date. However, the Attacker-Defender model employs the
aspects of an intelligent adversary in order to determine the worst cases in which a
disruption may occur given a fixed level of resources. Another way of viewing this
problem is the occurrence of a “perfect storm” against the network with a feasible level
of severity.
Recall from the previous section that the final integer programming model was
Model 3.3. To apply a bi-level program to this IP, first an objective, or set of objectives,
for an adversary must be determined. These objectives should be as simple as possible to
reduce complications and specificity, which could result in unintentional restraint on the
attacker’s actions, but broad enough to be valid. An example of three such objectives
which can easily encompass many more specific objectives include:
1. Reduce global capacity
2. Reduce coverage of a particular region of the planet
3. Increase the cost of operating the network.
Each of these objectives is simple, pertain to the network, and are reasonable
objectives for an adversary to pursue. To compare these objectives in the model, each of
them is divided by their unconstrained optimal level. This means that one must first
know what each of the optimal solutions are. Note that it is not necessary to utilize these
specific objectives; a different set may be chosen.
Cost has yet to appear in the model in any way; this includes the costs of a
satellite, a Tracking and Control (T&C) station, or the cost of a node failing. However,
these costs are fundamentally the same as the values placed on transmissions and
capacity. If the values of transmissions are converted to units of cost, or vice versa, then
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the cost of losing/rebuilding a node is in the same units as the value of transmissions
unable to be accomplished.
To proceed, the following assumptions are made. The first is that all costs of
operating, procuring, and repairing all nodes are known by both the defender and the
attacker. The second assumption is that the time for all necessary procurements and
repairs is known by both the defender and the attacker.
The first two assumptions, while not always true in reality, are necessary in order
to apply a BLP. A BLP is a deterministic optimization model; thus it is assumed that all
information is known with certainty. If these costs and times were permitted to be
unknown or highly variable, then a method of modeling other than BLP would need to be
employed. With these assumptions in mind, GlobeMax, RegMax, and CostMax, along
with a few cost and resource parameters, are included:
While GlobeMax and RegMax may be quickly calculated from pre-existing data,
CostMax is not as simple. In order to determine this value, first a model with this as an
attacker’s sole objective must be formulated.
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Model 3.4
Model 3.4 is a bi-level optimization program, specifically an Attacker-Defender
model. This multileveled optimization can be seen in the overarching maximization
objective, as well as the embedded objective at constraint 3.4.[4]. Just as the whole
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model has constraints it must satisfy, so too does the inner Defender model. In this
scenario, each level of the model controls a different set of decision variables, which are
denoted below the Max/Min. The Attacker then has perfect knowledge of the Defender’s
responses, whereas the Defender may only act in response to the attacker.
Note that, excluding xi changing from a parameter to an Attacker controlled
variable, Model 3.4 required no change to the pre-existing portions. This is because the
Attacker’s objectives and restrictions do not affect the defender’s. In this model, the
Attacker’s sole objective is to maximize the cost of operating the network, which is
calculated in 3.4.[2]. Another simple way of thinking about the degradation, xi, is the
percent of capacity remaining for usable transmissions.
If the Attacker’s resources are extremely limited, or if the defender’s network is
very large, then one may pursue this same method when determining the remaining two
objectives, GlobeMax and RegMax. Doing so reduces the amount of rounding error that
may occur when dealing with extremely small decimals.
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Model 3.5
Currently, the model is still restricted to the same base assumption from Brown et
al., where every attack is fully successful and there is no option for partial degradation.
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However, this assumption is becoming less and less valid as advances are made in the
cyber realm, which holds the potential for limiting usage without entirely eliminating a
node. Therefore, the binary requirement of xi,a is now relaxed so as to permit the variable
to take on a continuous bounded range.
Let xi,a=fi,a(ĳi,a,g), ĳi,a,g [ 0,RqRsci,a,g], be a function such that fi,a[0,RqRsci,a,g] is a
monotonic decreasing continuous function covering [0,1]. This function must be
decreasing simply because x=1 has been selected in this work as the node being
operational and x=0 as the node being eliminated. If the opposite is selected, then along
with a few constraint modifications, the function must be made increasing.
RqRsci,a,g specifies the resources needed to fully eliminate a node in the network,
though less may be used to achieve a partially degraded result.
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Model 3.6
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Network _ Value

The basic bi-level model associated with an extreme event under the Brown et al.
assumptions of a single coordinated, fully effective strike with one attacker objective was
presented. Multiple possible attacker objectives were also introduced, and the model was
formatted for a generalized function to scale the impact of a partial attack.

Including the Time Component

In this section, integer programming based scheduling methods is incorporated
into Model 3.6 so that it may select not only where and how to attack, but also when. By
including this time component, the model is now capable of degrading a node multiple
times, if desired.
With respect to introducing a time component, one approach would be to first
view the problem as a scheduling problem. In essence, the model attempts to schedule
when and where the notional adversary strikes. Along with allowing the attacker to
choose when to strike, the model must allow the defender to respond.
The most basic response is repair. To begin, the following assumptions are made:
1) The duration and cost of repair is independent of both time and the state
of other nodes in the network.
2) If repair is possible, then along with the associated costs, there will also
be a necessary time component over which the repairs occur.
These assumptions are for simplification of parameters, though cost and time-torepair as a function of the current time period, which is known, would still be valid as
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long as appropriate minor alterations to the deterministic model are made. To
accomodate these time-independent repair functions, two functions must be formulated.
Let CostRi,d(xi,a,d) be a one-to-one continuous decreasing function with
CostRi,d(1)=0 and CostRi,d(0)=CostRpci where CostRpci is the cost of replacing node i.
Let TimeRi,d(xi,a,d) be a one-to-one continuous decreasing function with TimeRi,d(1)=0 and
TimeRi,d(0)=TimeRpci where TimeRpci,d is the time required to replace node i. Once
again, these functions must be decreasing because of the specified xi,a bounded [0,1] with
1 being operational. The function TimeRi,d(xi,a,d) is guaranteed to be positive, because
TimeRi,d(xi,a,d) is decreasing, continuous, and TimeRi(max(xi,a,d)) = min(TimeRi,d(xi,a,d)) =
TimeRi,d(1)=0. CostRi,d(xi,a,d) is also guaranteed positive for similar reasons.
Next, the model must be adjusted to allow for attack time selection. To do so, the
model must regrettably include more variables and parameters. Let IntDur be the
constant stating the duration of each time interval in the same units used in TimeR. Let D
be a sufficiently large number restricting the number of intervals the adversaries may
strike within. D may be set to any integer such that:

Dt

1
max{¦¦ TimeRi ,a ( fi ,a ,d (Mi ,a , g )) |
IntDur
i
a

¦¦M

i ,a , g

i

d AdvRscg }

(EQ 3.1)

a

to ensure sufficient size, however it is recommended that the model be permitted to run
for a longer duration.
Restricting D as set forth in EQ 3.1 permits the full time for longest recovery
period possible in the model. While this does permit the calculation of network
performance over time, in many cases, namely where the repair times of nodes are
relatively similar, such a small D could preclude the re-degrading of nodes. In such a
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case, there is no significant difference between this model and the one developed by
Brown et al, which permits only a single event.
Next, create a binary variable matrix which will specify when a node is available
for attack and when it is not. Assume that a node will only be interdicted via one method
at any given time. This assumption, while potentially invalid in reality, is used to
simplify the model and reduce the dimensionality, as well as allowing the occurrence of
an event to act as a trigger in later constraints. Let Tgt be a nxD matrix where n is the
number of nodes in the network. For every Zi,a ,d  Tgt , if Ȧi,a,d, node i at time d by
method a, is targetable then Ȧi,a,d=1, otherwise Ȧi,a,d=0.
Unless otherwise specified, each node is targetable at the initialization of the
model. For any node i that is deemed non-targetable at any given time, include a
constraint in the model to the effect of ¦¦ Zi , a , d
a

0 . If a node is only non-targetable

d

for a specific time interval or set of time intervals, NT, by attack type, a, then include
constraints

¦

a , dNT

Zi ,a,d

0 . For example, if an anti-satellite missile has a finite footprint in

which it may strike, and its firing location if fixed, then any satellite i may only be
attacked by weapon a at time d if satellite i is within weapon a’s footprint.
The time subscript, d, is now included on variable ĳi,a,g, making this variable
ĳi,a,g,d so the adversary may select when to use resources. In extension, all associated
variables will require the same addition. Using this, the following pseudo-constraints are
included:
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Model 3.7
Constraint 3.7.(2) restricts the targeting matrix Tgt by forcing some of its
elements to be non-targetable. It is inside this constraint where the computer is prevented
from continuously targeting the same node for an infinitesimally small value infinitely
many times. Unfortunately, 3.7.(2) is not in a form that may be confidently solved by
most deterministic solver programs. This is due to its if-then formatting, which is
currently only a pseudo constraint format. These pseudo-constraints may be reformatted
equivalently as:
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Model 3.8
Note that constraint 3.8.(2) allows for only one attack on a single node for the
duration of its degradation by taking advantage of the way in which TimeRi,d was
constructed. When a node experiences a repair time, or is destroyed as such an event was
built into the repair time, then the node becomes non-targetable for TimeRi,d time units.
However, if TimeRi,d=0, then no further constraints are placed on the network. Constraint

107


3.8.(3) is a switching constraint that triggers the binary variable , which is necessary in
constraint 3.8.(2).
Finally, the model must allow immediate reactionary methods the defender may
utilize to mitigate the event, such as interception of conventional weaponry. These
methods is referred to as Active Defenses, not to be confused with Passive Defenses such
as structural hardening or on-board antivirus software. These defenses will follow much
the same principals as the other nodes in the network in that they will have associated
costs, repair or reload times, and a footprint in which they may operate. If the defense is
global, then the footprint is considered to be of sufficient size to encompass the planet.
Let index e denote an individual Active Defense node. Let ADFPe,a denote the
maximum distance in which the defense e is effective against attack type a. Let ADRCe,a
denote the cost to operate and reload the defense. In the case of a physical defense, this
cost may refer to the ammunition while in a cyber event this cost may be the cost of
personnel and resources dedicated to combating the threat. Let ADRTe,a denote the time
required to reload the defense e, or the time required for the defense e to have been
effective. In a physical scenario, this time would be associated with reloading and
retargeting. In a cyber event, this would be the time required for the threat to be
eliminated.
Let STe,a be a value denoting a minimum quantity of utilized resources of attack
type a below which a threat is considered insufficient to allow the model to utilize Active
Defense e. If there is no such minimum and every threat is sufficient in magnitude, then
let ST=1. Lastly, let ADFirede,a,d be a binary matrix specifying if Active Defense node e
was used against a threat type a during time step d.
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In words, the following constraints are constructed. If node i is within distance
ADFPe,a of node e during an attack of type a, then allow protection of node i at the cost
of ADRCe,a. If node e is used against attack of type a in time step d, then force
ADFirede,a,d=1. If the sum of ADFirede,i,a,d over all nodes i is 1, then force
ADFirede,i,a,d’=0 for all i and all d’ in the set [d+1,d+ADRTe,a].
Notice that much of these constraints are similar to when the model’s attack
constraints were formulated. Using some initial distance calculations, it would be
prudent to now calculate the distances from nodes to active defenses. For each node,
active defense combination, let ADProte,i,a be a binary matrix denoting if node I is
protected by node e against attack type a. These operational requirements and behaviors
lead to the following constraints:

f (Mi ,a , g ,d ) o f (Mi ,a , g ,d , ADFirede ,i ,a ,d )
STe ,a * ADFired e,i ,a ,d d f (Mi ,a , g ,d , 0)* ADProt e,i ,a
d  dˆ

¦ ¦ ADFired

d' d

dˆ

e ,i , a , d

d1

i

ª ADRTe,a º
« IntDur »
«
»

With this last addition and modification of constraints in place, along with the
addition of usage costs to the before defined Cost variable, the following bi-level model
is formulated.
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Model 3.9
In this section, an Attacker-Defender model, Model 3.9, was developed with
which to model an extreme event intelligent adversary strike on a satellite infrastructure.
This model is constructed to be operated for a single orbital cycle, and as such currently
only exhibits the “short-term” scenario. In the following section, adaptations is
developed to account for “medium-term” and “long-term” recovery options.

Increasing the Time-Span

In this section the preceding Attacker-Defender model, Model 3.10, is adapted for
“medium-term” and “long-term” recovery options. Major adaptations are the inclusion of
spares and reconstitution.
In the preceding Model 3.10, no indication was made as to whether a node was
actually operating, only if it could operate. However, if on-orbit satellite spares or
terrestrial station spares exist, then they will not be operating until after an event occurs,
though they are able to operate at any given point there-after. When investigating
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adaptations to be made, the model must be able to differentiate between a terrestrial spare
or an orbital spare, the main difference of which is the mobility of a satellite and its
ability to be repositioned in order to eliminate major gaps in coverage.
First, a distinction must be made between the time-intervals involved in the
“short-term” and the “medium/long-term”. Recall that the “short-term” time intervals
(STI) constructed were partitioning on the time to complete a single cycle. However, as
shown in the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision recovery (Sladen ), a satellite may require
many cycles in order to be repositioned. Depending upon personnel issues, a terrestrial
node may also require multiple cycles before being activated, though it is desired that the
number of cycles for such is relatively low.
As such, the “medium/long-term” time interval (LTI) is defined as a multiple of
the network cycle, with the assumption that some initial event must occur within the first
cycle, but that later cycles may also experience degrading events. This assumption
makes no actual change to the freedom of the model, but instead reduces the
dimensionality of it by restricting the amount of memory utilized at the start of the model.
The model also requires an upper bound on the number of cycles, one which is sufficient
enough to capture the reconstitution of the network, but not so long that complicating
network changes become overwhelming. A common phrase associated with this limit is
a Planning Horizon.
In a perfect world with unlimited memory and computational power, one would
now increase the dimensionality of the model to incorporate these longer time-steps,
breaking each LTI into STI. Unfortunately, the model is already cumbersome and
increasing the dimensionality potentially thousands of times is impractical as well a
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potentially intractable. It is for this reason that the method must differentiate between the
two very distinct types of objectives, short-term and medium/long-term. The short-term
model is already constructed, and unless a replacement may be included in a single cycle,
no alterations need be made.
For the long-term model, the nodes of a network must be considered as falling
within two distinct categories, stationary footprint or cyclical footprint. These categories
require the assumption that long duration erratic satellite movements do not occur in the
network. Erratic movements, which are corrected via on-board computers or Tracking
and Control stations, are probabilistic in nature. In essence, this assumption
approximates those probabilistic positional variations to the expected path of a satellite,
which, due to correctional movements, remain on the projected assumed paths.
One must account for the flow of transmissions in the network, no longer viewing
the nodes at discrete time steps as points, but instead as the cyclical paths they traverse
over a single LTI. As always, when aggregating constraints in order to conserve
memory, an amount of fidelity and precision is lost.
To tackle this problem, a common LEO orbit type is examined, the polar orbit.
Polar LEO satellites travel from the south pole to the north pole, their latitude
independent of the rotation of Earth. Because of this, an orbit of satellites may visit the
entire planet one or more times over the period of a single cycle without ever
significantly breaking their cyclical path. What this means is that it is no longer possible
to examine specific transmissions and their flow through the network nodes over the
model’s new time periods.
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As Pratt et al. point out in their review of the Iridium constellation, the discrete
loss of a single satellite operating in a cyclical nature exhibits a time loss of coverage for
an area, for each area it covers in its cycle (Pratt p. 5). For a continuous case, the time
loss does not accurately capture the effect of partial coverage, and it also fails to align
with the network performance measures. The model will utilize the time-dependent user
rates and will adjust the number of successful transmissions by the degraded operating
capacity of the satellite. Note that through pre-processing, if only the number of
transmissions for an area in a cycle is available, and is not time-depended, then the
transmissions may be approximated based upon a probability distribution of operating
times.
An additional sequence of preprocessing is pursued in which the number of
transmissions attempting to be serviced by the cyclical satellite are summed. Continuing
with d denoting the time steps, though now for LTI, 0  xi,d  1 denoting the degradation
level of node i at time step d, ci,t,s,d the cost or relative importance of transmission from
node t to node i with security rating s at LTI time step d, and bi,t,s,d denoting the number
of attempted calls from node i to node t of security rating s during LTI d.
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Model 3.10

114


d capi , s < xi ,d

This model may be restructured for equivalent results, while requiring fewer
calculations and slightly faster running time as follows:
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Model 3.11
This linear program simply allows the model to choose the most beneficial or
most important transmissions and process those based upon priority. Using this
information, which is completed before the actual model long-term model has been
executed, a great deal of information may be discerned. Note that though xi,d, the
degradation level of node i at time step d, is included in this model, there has been no
allowance for any attacks. This means that only the baseline degradation of the node,
that which is already in place or expected to be in place during the time phases that these
calculations are used for, is used in the preceding linear program.
In order to account for a spare being mobile or immobile, with respect to its place
in the network, the model requires yet another variable with which to discriminate
between operating nodes and stand-by nodes, or spares. Let Mobilei be a variable
specifying the maximum distance a node i may traverse for repositioning. The time
required for a short term time interval is denoted as STI, and a long term time interval as
LTI.
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In order to limit the inherent complexities in calculating the distance actually
traversed by an orbiting spare to a new location in the orbit, or a new orbital plane
entirely, the distance traversed is reduced to simply the great circle distance between its
starting location and its desired final location at the same STI, though not the same LTI.
While there are very few theoretical limitations on how far a satellite may move,
especially as the satellite may utilize drift to alter position, operationally it would not be
unreasonable to restrict the repositioning of a satellite to within n orbital planes to regain
service faster, especially following an event on the satellite network. If the operator has
no such preference or limitation, then the fuel available and predicted fuel consumption
rates may be utilized to set such a bound.
Let Statei be an integer variable of the set {0,1,2,3} such that 0 specifies
permanently destroyed, 1 specifies temporarily disabled, 2 specifies operating and in use,
either degraded or fully operational, and 3 specifies an operational spare, also either
degraded or fully operational. Furthermore, let MobileRFBi be the fuel consumption per
distance unit of moving node i via a burn. Let MobileIFBi be an initial fuel consumption
of moving node i via a burn. Let MobileTBi be the time required per unit distance of
moving node i via a burn.
Similarly, let MobileTDi be the time required per unit distance of moving node i
via a drift. Let MobileIFDi be an initial fuel consumption of moving node i via a drift, or
in other words to raise or lower the node to an engineering altitude to allow for the drift,
if necessary. The model must account for a node switching from state 1 to state 0, state 2
to state 1, state 1 to state 2, and state 3 to state 1. Any node, i, currently in states 2, or 3
must be permitted to travel up to Mobilei. Furthermore, any mobile node must be
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allowed to utilize a combination of burn and drift, thus resulting in a trade off for fuel use
and time operationally active.
Based on precedence from historical satellite movements, Iridium satellites
currently being repositioned, either from a spare state to operational state, or from one
operational location to another, is unable to be utilized operationally for the duration of
the transition (Sladen Website). In such a scenario, it is unnecessary to account for a
node moving directly from state 3 to state 2, or vice versa. All satellites in such a
network moving from 2 to 3 or 3 to 2 must pass through 1 first. However, if this is not
the case, or rather, if the satellite may continue its operational duties during the duration
of the repositioning, then no such requirement exists. As a result, no state switching
would need to occur.
The imbedding of a time-dependent covering problem into the defender model
greatly increases the complexity of the problem. The imbedded covering problem is
determining the optimal location to place satellites which will utilize the least fuel and
permit the greatest coverage.
One method of considering fuel consumption is the quantity of units of fuel used.
In this manner, the closest satellite is always the best option. Another way is to instead
view the consumption as percent of remaining fuel used, in which a close satellite with
the largest fuel remaining is more likely to be selected. Both are viable options,
especially as the efforts in robotic refueling progress, and as both can be directly
translated to different perspectives of life-time remaining.
By viewing the amount of fuel utilized, and knowing how much fuel the satellite
requires over a period of time, it is relatively simple to convert from fuel used to instead
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life-time used. Similarly, the percent of remaining fuel used may be converted to the
percent of remaining life used, or the percent reduction in life. As both are equally valid
methods, the Chapter IV case study, as well as the following model formulations, will
proceed with using the raw quantity of life-time consumed which is converted into an
integer number of LTI. This decision may be changed with minor alterations to the
model and associated equations.
It is a requirement for all orbiting satellites to have their operating frequency and
orbit, or in the case of GEO satellites their geospatial coordinates, internationally
registered to reduce the probability of a collision. However, no requirement could be
located as to exactly where these positions or orbits must be so long as the position is not
currently occupied and the satellite’s residence is approved. As such this problem is
continuous.
One common method utilized for solving continuous covering problems is to
establish a multi-parameter grid in which the parameters are continuous and the resulting
area of influence is a function of those parameters. In a spherical grid, the most taxing
problem is the need for the boundaries of the grid to be equivalent, even if the values
when approaching from opposite directions is extreme. To overcome the consideration
the two parameter polar coordinate system is utilized. The polar coordinate system is
most commonly thought of as three parameters, however with the radius of the satellites
being relatively constant based upon orbit type, (terrestrial, LEO, MEO, GEO), the radius
is fixed as a property of the node in question (Wright p. 30).
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Standard notation for polar equations are f (M ,T ) , however those symbols have
already been used in the formulation. Therefore, f(ĭ,Ĭ), 0< ĭ <ʌ for latitudinal and 0<
Ĭ <2ʌ for longitudinal placement is utilized.
As the transmissions being attempted are based upon the terrestrial and nodal
components and not specifically related to the positioning of the nodes, the main
tribulation is to determine what nodes fall within the satellite's footprint and at what time,
and how many satellites or terrestrial components can serve the demand of that node at
each respective time period. By knowing those, one can accurately determine how many
transmissions must enter the engineered portion of the network through that node at that
time period.
Determining what areas a satellite may serve at any given time is dependent upon
the time-dependent location of the satellite and the footprint of that satellite in that
location. While it is well known that the terrain affects the size and shape of the
footprint, the simplification that the footprint suffers no obstruction is made in this thesis.
While this assumption may not be valid for high fidelity models, it does provide a
suitable approximation. Future efforts may be employed to increase the fidelity of the
footprint in this analysis, if required.
Next it is necessary to determine how many network components capable of
transmitting the signal are in range of a given terrestrial area. If the preceding
calculations are already completed, then this step is trivial. However, what is not trivial
is determining a function which will complete all of these calculations.
As the reader will recall, a linear model, Model 3.6, was utilized to determine how
transmissions would flow throughout the network by taking advantage of the operator's
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assumed knowledge of their own network. In this thesis’ case study, an approximation of
the time-dependent connections is assumed known or determinable via knowledge of
footprint size and node location. The calculations is completed by knowing first where a
satellite is at a given time, the orbit time, OT, orbit direction, OD, cycle time, CT, and the
number of lateral orbits completed during each cycle, CN.
To do this, it is necessary to imbed the short-term time steps in the long-term
model, denoted as subscript į, and the duration of each short-term time step as įt. This
blends the covering model with the long term model. The following constraints will use
the starting locations of the nodes as the decision variables, with the remaining orbital
parameters acting as discrete functions.

w *G t
i,w
OT
w * G t * CN
2) POSi ,G ,1 4i 
i,w
CT
3) dist i , j ,w t (1  Conni , j ,w )*footprint i i,j,w

1) POSi ,w ,0

) i  OD *

(EQ 3.2)

4) dist i , j ,w t (1  Conni , j ,w ) *footprint j i,j,w
Here POSi ,w ,0 is the North-South position of node i at time w , POSi ,w ,1 is the EastWest position of node i at time w , disti,j is the distance from node i to node j at time w ,
footprinti is the radius of the footprint of node i, and Conni,j,į is a binary variable equaling
1 if a connection can exist between nodes i and j at time w and 0 otherwise. In the
preceding constraints, the distance from node i to j must be less than both footprints in
order for a connection to exist. However, it is not required that, if in range, a connection
be established. If the connection is beneficial at the time step, then the model, as a result
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of optimizing the objective within the constraints, will activate the connection and utilize
it as it determines to be optimal.
The constraints in EQ 3.2 are not yet ready to be integrated into the rest of the
model though. At the moment, they are the generic approximation of positioning and
connection possibility. To determine an actual position it is necessary to take into
account the initial positions of the nodes in the network, specifically the mobile nodes
such as satellites. To do this, ĭi,0 and Ĭi,0 are indexed as thus to denote the initial
positions of the nodes, making their counterparts in the preceding constraints 1 and 2, ĭi,1
and Ĭi,1 respectively. If limited or unreliable information is available as to the exact
positioning of each node as they currently exist or are expected to exist, then this same
method may be employed to estimate the current positioning of the nodes. The
constraints in EQ 3.2 were constructed to approximate location based upon the new
position of the nodes.
While it is left to the user to determine the best method for computing distances,
two limits are certain. The first limit is a maximum distance that the satellite may be
repositioned from its current location, maxposi, and the second is a minimum distance for
repositioning, minposi. The distance travelled by a node is denoted as DistPosi, the fuel
consumed in such a move as a function of the distance, but possibly distinct for each
node, Fueli(DistPosi), and the accompanying max fuel as maxfueli.
Another important aspect to repositioning is the LTI when the repositioning
occurs. Define RepoSi to be the decision variable denoting the time step in which the
repositioning is initiated. RepoDi(DistPosi) is the number of time steps required for
repositioning and is a function of the distance being traversed.
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There is a clear need for consideration of the user’s values. In the Fueli(DistPosi)
and RepoDi(DistPosi) functions, a single output is determined from a single input,
however the satellites may be repositioned through a combination of burns and drifts.
This results in a fuel-time tradeoff, as the increased fuel usage results in a faster
repositioning and reactivation of service. While one could allow the model to determine
the tradeoffs, preprocessing this function would conserve memory and allow the model to
run faster. In the case study, Fueli(DistPosi) and RepoDi(DistPosi) are set as
preprocessed functions of the illusory user’s preferences and tradeoff values.
Parameters :
MobileRF(B/D)i Initial fuel consumption of moving node i via a burn/drift
MobileIF(B/D)i Initial fuel consumption of moving node i via a burn/drift
MobileT(B/D)i Time required per unit distance of moving node i via a burn/drift

Functions :
RepoDi DistPosi

(TOi )* MobileTDi  MobileRTDi * DistPosi 
+(1  TOi ) MobileTBi +MobileRFBi * DistPosi

Fueli DistPosi

(EQ 3.3)

(TOi )* MobileIFD i  MobileRFDi * DistPosi 
+(1  TOi ) MobileIFBi  MobileRFBi * DistPosi

In these equations for Fueli(DistPosi) and RepoDi(DistPosi), the approximation of linear
requirements of fuel used and tradeoffs, TOi, was used. However, this method will work
for any function of distance travelled. The tradeoff is that, while increasingly nonlinear
approximations may be more accurate, they are also computationally intractable. One
inherent restriction to using this preprocessed function tradeoff method is that the
functions themselves must be injective and continuous.
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The calculation of distances between nodes, with the specific method chosen left
to the user, is denoted as disti,j,į, the distance from node i to node j. The subscript, į,
denotes the STI time step in which this distance is being calculated for. Note that all of
these connections are symmetric, meaning that disti,j,į=distj,i,į.
As a note, though a distance component is provided for use between two
terrestrial components, the maximum connection distance between two terrestrial nodes
may be irrelevant due to land line connections. Because of the massive land based
communications infrastructure of many nations, as well as the submarine communication
cables spanning the oceans, and the model only repositions mobile nodes, the vast
majority of those connections is considered as constant. However, capacities may be
adjusted for the amount of data sent from one terrestrial node to another, both overall and
for each security setting.
When compared to the short term model, thus far there are three major
adaptations to the medium/long term model. The first is conversion of the STI to LTI
and the necessity to force some event to occur within the first LTI. The second
adaptation is the method for approximating the value of transmissions, and as a result the
expected lost value due to degradation of a node. The third and most important change
thus far is allowing the nodes of the model to be repositioned, which resulted in need for
a systematic method in which the model may construct an entirely new network after
each move.
To begin formulating the medium/long term model, a potentially computationally
cumbersome method is utilized, and that is to include every STI inside of each LTI.
Along with showing how the number of constraints quickly grows, building the model
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this way first aids in the adaptation to a model form capable of being performed much
more quickly.
As the reader will notice, the majority of the following model, Model 3.12, is very
similar to the short term model. This is because to accurately determine the value of
failed transmissions, it is essential to know the optimal routing of transmissions in each
new network created by mobilizing a node. The majority of the new constraints begin
with constraint 3.12.(17) which restricts the use of a node based upon the current state it
is in. Constraints 3.12.(18)-3.12.(21) are utilized solely for the purpose of estimating the
new location of nodes after a move occurs.
Constraints 3.12.(22) and 3.12.(23) calculate the distance from node i to node j at
STI  during LTI d. The model implements the Haversine formula for great circle
distance around a sphere. However, as was specified before, the analyst may utilize
whichever distance calculation method the analyst determines to be best suited to the
situation; for example line of sight if appropriate. Constraints 3.12.(24)-3.12.(26) utilize
the distance calculated in 3.12.(23) to determine if a connection can exist between any
two nodes.
Combined, constraints 3.12.(18)-3.12.(26) permit the model to independently
construct new networks based upon the  = 0 position a node exists at for each d.
Constraints 3.12.(27)-3.12.(30) model the fuel usage of a node, ensuring that only
a mobile node may move, and that once a satellite, or other mobile node, is no longer
fueled it may no longer be used. For terrestrial components not requiring fuel to continue
operations, FuelUseRi may be set to 0 and maxfueli,0 > 0. Since the node has fuel, does
not lose fuel over time, and is immobile preventing spikes in fuel usage, terrestrial nodes
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will continue to operate until destroyed. Constraint 3.12.(28) ensures simultaneously that
only mobile nodes move and that they only move once.
Constraints 3.12.(31)-3.12.(34) model the requirement of the node to be
inoperable for the duration of the repositioning. Constraints 3.12.(32) and 3.12.(33) work
in tandem to ensure that the node is disabled for at least the duration of its move and that
the disabling occurs at the same time that the move begins.
Constraints 3.12.(35) and 3.12.(36) link the change of location to the LTI in
which the change occurs, and ensures only one bounded move occurs per mobile node.
While the model expresses this in a compact form, dist(i ,1),(i ,| d |) is the distance from node i
at the start of the model and the end of the model. The decision variables used in this
distance is 4 i , d and ) i , d for the respective node and times. This method is only valid
when a single move is allowed, but may be expanded to permit multiple moves.
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Model 3.12
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In this section, a medium/long term bi-level program was developed which
models the operational parameters of the network, as well as capturing the possible
methods of degradation. The key differences of this model, Model 3.12, versus the short
term model, Model 3.9, are the inclusion of nodal repositioning/reconstitution, and
network creation/destruction based upon those modification of nodes’ parameters.

Reducing Model Size

In the preceding sections, a short term model and a medium/long term model were
developed. These bi-level programs model the ways in which the network may react and
be degraded over different spans of time, however in their current form they may be
practically intractable, or require high performance computers to solve if every aspect is
included. In this section, the medium/long term model, the larger of the two, is analyzed
and modifications are made with which to reduce its size. Many of the modifications
presented here may be applied to the short term model as well. Final versions of both
models with the improvements made in this section may be found in Appendix A.
Though constraints in bi-level programs do not directly correlate to any constant
multiple of constraints in single level programming, a bi-level program that can be
converted to a single level more often requires a sharp increase in the number of
constraints. As such, the number of constraints serve to show a lower bound on the
amount of memory required by using this method of imbedding the short term model in
the long term model. The preceding bi-level medium/long term model has:
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4  i 4  d ª¬9  a 2  e  w 6  5 j  s<t >l  3@ º¼  t < s  d e<a  w > 2  s @ (EQ 3.3)
constraints.
As an example, a constellation with:
Network Parameters

Index Max

90 nodes and a ground fidelity of 1x1 degree ground grid

i=j=t=64890

Five security levels

s=5

Two network encodings

l=2

Time fidelity of every ten minutes on a 24-hour cycle

=144

Three years with time steps at each cycle

d=1095

Three methods of attack

a=3

Six active defense nodes

e=6

has at least 1.9918 < 1016 constraints. Reducing the fidelity of the terrestrial grid to 2x2
degree components, i=j=t=16290 and the number of constraints is reduced to 1.255 < 1015,
which is a reduction in size of approximately 93.7%, but is still prohibitively large
repeated for application.
If the short term time components, , could be removed, even without removing
all associated terms that would be eliminated by separating the short term network
operations from the long term mobility constraints, the number of constraints would be
reduced to 2.345 < 1009. This is a reduction of over 99.9%. Making both changes
simultaneously, the number of constraints is reduced to 5.889 < 1008.
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Our final change to this example is single security level, single operational
encoding single attack method, and no active defenses. Even with these simplifications,
which reduce the generality of the model and fail to capture the many options available to
both the Attacker and Defender, the minimal number of constraints is still 1.962 < 1008.
As the reader can see, even in an idealized situation in regards to the model, a strict
optimization of this bi-level problem, even if an exact method is determined, would be
unreasonable in many, though not necessarily all, situations.
One exact constraint number, assuming no exploitation of special structures, is the
constraints of the Defender model. The Defender model, in which the operational
options of the network exist, have 1.9918 < 1016 constraints in the original example, but
only 1.249 < 1008 constraints in the idealized modification. This indicates that the
majority of the constraints exist in the Defender model, which can be seen intuitively
when viewing the Attacker’s seven constraints versus the Defender’s thirty-six.
Therefore, the key to reducing the dimensionality of the problem is not to reduce
the number of nodes in the network, which is presently insignificant when compared to
the ground grid constructed, but is instead to reduce the fidelity of ground coverage, and
to reduce the number of time indices,  and d, whether by reducing fidelity or reducing
the time-span. However, reducing the STI intervals, as well as reducing the time
modeled below a single cycle, may cause a gap in coverage modeling, making 
essentially exempt from alteration. Reducing the ground fidelity to 4x4 grids and the LTI
to 10 cycles, and leaving all other parameters in the example as they were originally
specified, reduces the number of constraints to 8.108*1008. While this value is still
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almost eight times the idealized number of constraints, it was reached by reducing
accuracy, but maintaining validity.
It is important to view another example with a very different structure. Up till
now, no assumptions have been made upon which types of satellites are included in the
network, meaning that the model had to be adaptive enough to handle both LEO, MEO,
and GEO. However, many networks involve only GEO satellites, which are much less
mobile relative to a terrestrial location. The question may be posed if as many constraints
would remain.
To answer that question, a new example is formed based only upon GEO and
terrestrial nodes. This example begins by setting sizes for the dimensions of the new
network.
Network Parameters

Index Max

6 GEO nodes, 8 terrestrial nodes, and a ground fidelity of

i=t=64814

1x1 degree ground grid (64800 grids)

j=14

Five security levels

s=5

Two network encodings

l=2

Time fidelity of every ten minutes on a 24-hour cycle

=144

Three years with time steps at each cycle

d=1095

Three methods of attack

a=3

Six active defense nodes

e=6

As the reader can see, with no further adjustment to the model other than the
alteration in network components, very little has changed in terms of size of each
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dimension, the only change being in the number of nodes, being reduced by 76, which by
itself is notably insignificant. The model may be further improved for these conditions
by removing constraints which are unnecessary due to the static nature of the nodes
remaining.
With these alterations in mind, the majority of STI parameters, save the timedependent transmissions, are irrelevant and thus may be omitted. This is because GEO
satellites and terrestrial nodes maintain a relatively constant footprint by design. This
property allows us to reasonably reduce the number of distance calculations needed.
With satellites changing footprints as quickly as LEOs do, it was necessary to continue
allowing the model to calculate new orbiting and connection parameters. However with
GEOs, calculations are only necessary when a node has been moved.
With this reduced model, the number of constraints is now defined as:

3  i<(4  d <(13  2<a  w<(1  3<t < s  l < s)  t < s)  5< j 2 ) 

 d <(e<a<(i  1)  t < s<w  1)

(EQ 3.4)

where j marks only the mobile nodes. In the example, this correlates to 9.959*1015
constraints, compared to 1.9918*1016 from the earlier example. A common thought
would be that many of the remaining requirements, such as the high fidelity transmission
constraints, are unnecessary. Since a node may still be degraded at any LTI, d, and the
transmissions in the network, which may be time dependent, flow in according to the
relay nodes available, the model must still be permitted to optimize the flow of
transmissions through remaining nodes at each time step. Moreover, the model allows
the transmissions to be STI time dependent, which require the optimization of flows.
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As for the remainder of the constraints, the satellites are still mobile, meaning that
the model must still be able to reposition them, reduce their fuel, determine new
connections, and adjust their states accordingly. While the model no longer needs to map
the movement of the satellites around the planet, the elimination of these constraints
constituted 2.044 < 1010 of the original constraints. While that number is large in and of
itself, it is still only 0.0001% of all constraints.
The largest reduction of the alteration occurred with the elimination of the need
for the STI components in the bulk of the constraints and were able to be reduced to only
the LTI component in which a move occurred. This alteration resulted in a reduction of

i< j <(w<d  j ) , which correlates to 1.43 < 1011, 0.0007 % of original constraints. To show
this visually, Figure 16 provides a visual representation of the original example.



Figure 16: Snapshot Projected Location of Example 1 Nodes
In Figure 16, each circle represents an active node and its location with respect to
Earth. Understandably, there appear to be a number of nodes to contend with, and they
appear to be randomly spread across the surface. They are, however, following a
common LEO distribution of assets, with three GEO satellites spaced evenly around the
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Equator. Figure 17 views this same map and network, but with the associated terrestrial
regions.

Figure 17: Example 1 Nodes with Associated Terrestrial Connections

Figure 18: Color Legend of 17
The squares on this map each represent a 2x2 Lat-Long grid, and only one of
every four grids is colored to maintain visibility. Even so, the sheer number of colored
squares is noticeably greater than the number of network nodes, which previously seemed
large. Here the reason behind the minor reduction in constraints in relation to the number
of network nodes can be seen. The changing of that relatively small number is near
insignificant in relation to the quantity of terrestrial regions.
The question remains as to where in the model the majority of the constraints are
attributed to. This is addressed in regards to the original model, Model 3.12.
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Table 4: Long Term Model Constraints by Function
Function

Constraint Numbers

Number of Constraints
In Variable Terms

Attacker Model
Transmission
Flow
Value
Calculations
Active Defense
Position
New Network
Mobility
States

[1]-[7]
(1)-(8)&(10)
(9) &(11-14)

2+i < (d < (2+2 < a))
d < (i < ( < (2+3 < t < s+l <
s)+t < s)+  < (t < s+1))
3+s < (t+ < d)

(15),(16)
(18)-(21)
(22)-(26)
(27)-(30)&(35),(36)
(17)&(31)-(34)

e < a < d < (i+1)
4<i<<d
5<i<j<<d
i < (2+4 < d)
i < (d < (+3)+1)

Primary
Example’s
(%) of Total
5.69 < 10-6
99.99
1 < 10-8
1.28 < 10-5
4.10 < 10-4
7.17 < 10-3
2.84 < 10-6
1.04 < 10-4

Clearly, with over 99.99% of all constraints originating from the optimizing of
transmissions through the network, this is where the focus should fall. The model that
follows is the set of constraints, as well as objective function, that come directly from the
unaltered medium/long term model.
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 ( capi < ( xi , w , d  (1  TCactivew )))  i, t , s , w , d
(8) TCactivew , d d ¦ (TC i < xi ,w , d )
i

(10 ) x i , w , d d 1  i,w , d

Model 3.12.[8]
This model was initially formulated by utilizing common network connection
techniques, in which each node of the network may be connected, but with parameter
restrictions. Those parameters could potentially limit the capacity of a flow to zero, such
as the connection binary variable, Conn. However, according to the operating procedures
of the network, one can never transmit directly from one ground grid to another without
passing through another node first, unless otherwise permitted. This is where the first
modification is made. Let j, k, t define the combined set of all nodes and terrestrial grids,
and i define the nodes in the network capable of relaying transmissions.
New constraint 3.13.(1.1) now transmits from any relay node to any node in the
network, so long as transmission requirements are satisfied. Constraint 3.13.(1.2) does
the reverse. The size of constraint 3.13.(5) has been reduced by summing over the
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transmissions. Moreover, the size of all constraints have been reduced by limiting the
effects of the network to the nodes, excluding 3.12.[8].(3) which requires that all
transmissions leaving a source must be less than the number originating at that source.
1
<¦¦¦¦¦ ci ,t , s * w yi ,t , s ,w , d
Total _ Net _ Value d w s t i
y
Subject To:

[8]Min z

¦y
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t, j

¦y

(1.2)

d capi ,l , s ,w , d < xi ,w ,d i, l , s, w, d

( j ,i ),t ,l , s , w , d
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(10) x i ,w ,d d 1 i,w, d
Model 3.13.[8]
The transmission flow function, which was just remodeled , now has

d <(w<(1  j <s)  i<(2<s<w<( j  l )  4<w)) constraints, the indices redefined as listed before.
This results in 9.22 < 1012 constraints, a significant reduction from before with no loss of
fidelity. This change is applied to the remainder of the model, and, in terms of writing
the model, nothing else is affected due to the selection of indices. However, as a whole
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the model now contains1.38 < 1013 constraints, again with no loss of fidelity. Recall that
the model began with 1.9 < 1016 constraints under this example, making this a reduction of
99.9%. These updates reallocate constraint percentages as presented in
Table 5.
Table 5: Constraint Groupings of Model 3.13
Function

Constraint Numbers

Number of Constraints
In Variable Terms

Attacker Model
Transmission
Flow
Value
Calculations
Active Defense
Position
New Network
Mobility
States

[1]-[7]
(1)-(8)&(10)

2+i < (d < (2+2 < a))
d < (i < ( < (2+3 < t < s+l < s)+t < s)+
 < (t < s+1))
3+s < (t+ < d)

(9) &(11-14)
(15),(16)
(18)-(21)
(22)-(26)
(27)-(30)&(35),(36)
(17)&(31)-(34)

e < a < d < (i+1)
4<i<<d
5<i<j<<d
i < (2+4 < d)
i < (d < (+3)+1)

Primary
Example’s
(%) of
Total
1.08E-03
66.63
1.37E-03
2.49E-03
7.81E-02
33.27
5.41E-04
1.98E-02

To proceed, the medium/long-term model is reformatted in such a manner that, at
the very least, the Defender model may be solved. As such, the focus shall rest on the
Defender model for the remainder of this section.
Since it is clear that the majority of the short term constraints cannot remain
within the model due to the large number of resulting constraints, and since the size of
the model as well as current solving techniques suggest the development a heuristic to
solve the bi-level program, instead the Defender model is reconstructed utilizing Goal
Programming, which is imbedded in the bi-level program heuristic. This is developed in
the following section, Heuristic H-1.
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It is assumed priorities of certain regions of the planet may vary to the extent that
priority n areas are of much greater significance than priority n+1. This method is known
as Lexicographic Goal Programming, or Pre-emptive Goal Programming (Ignizio p. 5).
While this explanation is sufficient for this research, the reader may read more on this
method in James Ignizio’s Goal Programming and Extensions and others. One method
for prioritizing the regions is based upon the value of the transmissions originating or
concluding there. With this method, varying thresholds must be set for value cutoffs such
that if a region’s transmission values fall within the range, then the region is part of the
priority, otherwise it is assigned to a different priority group.
Another method for prioritizing regions is to rank the regions themselves based
upon some weighting structure. For example, in the military a nation at war may be of
higher concern than the nation providing backdoor support which is higher than a neutral
nation, and so on until a region not requiring coverage would be prioritized lowest. In
this method, the prioritization is based upon the importance of the possible transmissions
and not a region’s cumulative transmission value.
Clearly, either of the methods, as well as many more, may be appropriate in a
variety of situations. The Chapter IV case study will utilize the second method suggested
here with a rating for each region, which is discuss further in the Chapter IV section,
Case Study. Because each region has a rating, sets In are created such that if a region, j,
is within set In, then region j has a priority rating n, with 1 being the highest priority
rating. However, the lowest priority rating will continue being assigned to any region
sending/receiving no transmissions. While the optimization model will automatically
place these as the lowest level internally, creating a separate priority will reduce the
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amount of memory required with no significant change to system configuration and
performance.
Model 3.14 may also be referred to hereafter as the lexicographic model. In the
Model 3.14, the constraint numbers appear as they did in Model 3.12 solely for the
purpose of showing how many constraints were removed. A new binary variable, C j , w , d ,
was introduced along with new parameters, wj and Req j , w , d , which denote the time
independent importance of a region and the time-dependent number of required satellite
connections respectively. Priority parameter, wj must reflect the specified importance of
a region by varying greatly between priority levels, but only slightly within levels. If the
number of connections is independent of time, then the dimensionality of Req may be
reduced to one.
Note that the objective function was changed from maximizing the number of
completed transmissions to maximizing the number of priority n regions without
meaningful connections. In addition, recall that, as focus is only on the Defender model
in Model 3.14, the level of degradation, x, is considered to be known.
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Max vn =
),4

¦

jIn ,w ,d

w j C j ,w , d

Subject To:
(17) xi,w,d d Statei,d <(Statei,d 1) i,w, d
(18) POS)i,G ,d

Sin[(G t <w<360 / OT )  90<(OD 1)  OD<Arcsin()i,d / 90)]*90 i, w, d

(19) POS4i,G ,d

4i,d  180  360<(G t <w / (CT / CN ))  360<Wrapi,G ,d

(20) 0 d POS4i ,G ,d d 360 i, w, d

i, w, d

(21) Wrapi,G ,d ={0,1} i, w, d

Sin2[(POS)i ,G ,d  POS) j ,G ,d )<0.5] 

(22) HAi , j ,w,d

+Cos[POS)i,G ,d ]<Cos[POS) j ,G ,d ]<Sin2[(POS4i,G ,d  POS4 j ,G ,d )*0.5] i,j,w, d
Atan2 1  HAi, j ,w,d , HAi, j ,w,d

(23) disti , j ,w,d

i, j, w, d

(24) disti, j ,w,d d footprint i,rj <ChckI i , j ,w ,d  M <(1  ChckI i , j ,w ,d ) i,j,w, d
(25) disti, j ,w,d d footprint j ,ri <ChckJ i , j ,w ,d  M <(1  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ) i,j,w, d
(26) Conn

i , j ,w ,d

d 0.5<(ChckI i , j ,w ,d  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ) i,j,w, d

(27) maxfueli,d

maxfueli,d 1  FuelUseRi  Di,d <Fueli ( DistPosi ) i,d

(28) ¦ Di,d d Mobilei i
d

(29) maxfueli,d d M <emptyi ,d i,d
(30) ¦ xi,w,d d emptyi,d i,d
w

(31) Statei ,d d M * xi,d i, d
(32) Ri,d d Ri,d 1  Di,d i, d
(33) ¦ Ri,d t RepoDi (DistPosi ) i
d

(34) Statei ,d d 3  2< Ri,d i, d
(35) DistPosi

dist(i,1),(i,|d |) i

(36) minposi <Di ,d d dist(i,d 1),(i,d ) d maxposi <Di,d i, d
§
·
(37) Req j ,w,d <C j ,w,d d ¨ ¦Conn j ,i,w,d <xi,w,d ¸ i, w, d
© i
¹
(38) vm

¦

iIm ,w , d

wj <C j ,w,d m  n

Model 3.14
The determination if at least one meaningful connection exists is completed by
new constraint 3.14.(37), and the requirement of completing all previous optimal priority
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settings is constraint 3.14.(38). Note that no requirements for the higher priority node to
always be covered have been developed, but rather to be covered optimally as the
previous model settings allowed. This is to reduce infeasibilities which may arise from a
node’s connections being momentarily severed due to a malicious event. While a node
may not be continuously connected, the model does force it to reconnect to the network
when possible and optimal.
By doing this, if vn>0 for any priority excluding the last, then these alterations
have reduced the size of the problem by all regions that the model failed to connect to
while optimally, with respect to the priorities, connecting to all others. With widely
varying capacities on satellite components, it may be prudent to incorporate the
connected capacity versus a strict connection so as to reduce the likelihood of a
sufficiently connected region remaining under capacitated. Formatting the problem in
this manner, equation 3.14.(37) may be rewritten as:

§
·
§
·
§
·
(37) ¨ ¦ b j ,k ,s,w ,d ¸<C j ,w ,d d ¦ ¨ Conn j ,i ,w , d <¨ ¦ capi ,l , s ,w ,d ¸< x i ,w , d ¸ j , w, d
¨
¸
i ©
© k ,s
¹
© l ,s
¹
¹
Equivalently, this change may be created by defining:

Req j , w , d

§
·
¨ ¦ b j , k ,s, w , d ¸
© k,s
¹

(EQ 3.5)

§
·
¨ ¦ capi ,l , s , w , d ¸
© l,s
¹

If the transmission values reflect the priorities established through the region
ranking, and if they follow the inherent assumption that transmissions from region n are
greatly more important than transmission from region n+1, then this method will provide
an optimal solution to the original objective of maximizing the cumulative value of
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completed transmissions. However, if the transmission values are not widely separated
between priority settings, then this method, while providing a good network
configuration, may not necessarily provide the optimal configuration.
Using the resulting network configurations from the Lexicographic Goal
Programming, one then utilizes the constraints of the Defender model that were removed.
These constraints, which are primarily focused on the flow of the transmissions through a
given network, are very similar to that of the Short-Term Defender Model. This model is
referred to hereafter as the LTI Defender model.
1
<¦¦¦¦¦ ci ,t , s <w yi ,t , s ,w ,d
Total _ Net _ Value d w s t i
Subject To:

Min z
y

(1.1)

¦y

( i , j ),t ,l , s , w , d

d capi ,l , s ,w ,d < xi ,w ,d i, l , s, w, d

t, j

¦y

(1.2)

d capi ,l , s ,w ,d < xi ,w ,d i, l , s, w, d

( j ,i ),t ,l , s , w , d

t, j

(2)

¦¦¦ y

( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w , d

l

s

d capi < xi ,w ,d i, w, d

j

(3)  ¦¦ y(t ,k ),t ,l , s ,w ,d t bt ,t , s ,w < x t ,w , d (Supply node t) t , s, w, d
l

k

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w ,d  ¦ y(i ,k ),t ,l , s ,w ,d ¸ ¸  wyi ,t , s ,w , d bi ,t ,s,w ,d i, t , s, w, d
¨ l
¸
k
¹¹
© © j
(5) capi <Conn j ,i ,w ,d t ¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w ,d t 0 i, w, d (6) wyi ,t , s ,w , d t 0 i, t , s, w, d
j ,t , l , s

(7)

¦ wy

i ,t , s , w , d

t ,s

d ((¦ (TCi < xi ,w ,d ))  1)<(capi <(1  TCt ))<TCactivew ,d 
i

 (capi <( xi ,w ,d  (1  TCactivew ))) i, w, d
(8) TCactivew ,d d ¦ (TCi < xi ,w , d )

w, d

i

(9) Excess _ Caps ,w ,d

§

¦ ¨ cap < x
i,d

i

©

i ,w , d

·
 ¦¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w , d ¸ s,w, d
l
j
¹

(10) x i ,w , d d 1 i,w, d
(11) Excess _ Valuew ,d

¦ ec < Excess _ Cap
s

s ,w ,d

s
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¦¦ Excess _ Value

(12)Weighted _ Excess _ Cap _ PCT

w ,d

w

d

Total _ Net _ Value

(13)Total _ Net _ Value dmax <¦¦¦¦ ci,t ,s <bi,t ,s,w
w

s

t

i

(15) STe,a < ADFirede,i,a,w d f (Mi,a, g ,d ,0)<ADProt e,i,a e, i, a, d
(16)

d dˆ

¦¦ ADFired

e,i ,a ,w

ˆ
d 1 e, a, w Where d=

d' d i

ADRTe,a
IntDur

Model 3.15
The lexicographic model contains i<(d <(w<(6  5< j )  7)  2) constraints, and the
LTI Defender model contains d <(w<(1 j<s)  i<(2<s<w<( j  l 1)  4<w)  e<a<(i 1))  3
constraints.

Figure 19: Binary Land Matrix
Figure 19 is a binary matrix such that all entries darkened sections depict either
land or areas of water with extremely heavy usage, and all blank space is sparsely
travelled water. Using the previous example for comparison, and an estimated six
priorities of equivalent size, with Figure 19 white space as the least preferred sixth
priority, which encompasses 57.4% of the total area, Antarctica the fifth priority, which
encompasses another 21.1% of the total area, and lowering the fidelity of regions from
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1x1 to 2x2 grids, a reduction to 6.82 < 1010 constraints can be obtained. Reducing the
fidelity of LTI from every day to every week then results in 9.75 < 1009 constraints, or 975
billion.
As one can tell from the equation for the current example model, the number of
constraints is linearly related to each of the parameters. As it is relatively easy to reduce
the size of a exceedingly large constraint than a small constraint, the majority of the focus
should fall on i n , w, or d . This observation agrees with the earlier observation that the
number of nodes in the network is insignificant in terms of number of constraints when
compared to the terrestrial fidelity, or the time components.
In this example, the oceans were simplified to being the lowest priority.
However, there is no restriction on priority groupings being contiguous, which allows for
important regions being pocketed in otherwise insignificant zones. In this situation, if the
path travelled is well used, then a strip may be increased in priority so as to
accommodate. Similarly for Antarctica, stable locations such as research facilities may
be classified as higher priority pockets of interest.
It is also possible to assign objects other than plots of land as terminal nodes. For
example, if a vessel is traversing a rarely used path, then it might be prudent to utilize a
node that has a unique time-dependent location following the planned path of that asset.
However, pursuing this for even moderately sized sets of nodes is ill advised as it will
rapidly increase the size of the model.
As the size of the model is still cumbersome, even with Lexicographic Goal
Programming, the use of another simplification is recommended, which is the use of only
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discrete allowable locations of placement for mobile nodes. This will essentially restrict
ȣǡ Ȱ to be integers, with corresponding constant scalars attached for higher/lower fidelity.

Restricting the placement decision variables, decided from a move but not the
resulting positions in orbit, to discrete locations, it is possible to utilize a multitude of
simple and well investigated heuristics. The heuristic chosen will reside in the same
place in the BLP heuristic that an optimization solution would, only now optimality
cannot be guaranteed for the Defender’s model.
To proceed, a greedy algorithm is modified by the distance from the current
location. Imbedded inside of this algorithm is the connection and fuel constraints from
the Defender model, specifically 3.15.(22)-(26) and 3.15.(37), along with a new
constraint which simply requires that the node being repositioned to satisfy a specific
requirement actually fills that requirement.
This heuristic, modified to account for the mobility and time dependencies of the
network, utilizes many smaller calculations and memory storages to reduce the amount of
memory required at any given time or used for any single model. Step SCP.{3}, the only
optimization model in the heuristic, utilizes 6< j <w constraints. Recall that all j in this
model are j  I m , or the regions only of the current or higher priorities.
Steps SCP.{2} and SCP.{5.1}, while appearing large, are only minor calculations
which pulled constraints out of the model to maintain consistency. Step SCP.{5.2}
utilizes the results from step SCP.{3} to prevent unnecessary recalculations of previously
determined connections.
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{1}If ¦ Ci ,w ',d '  I m then
iI m

§
·
°
°½
Select ®i | Reqi ,w ',d ' <Ci ,w ',d ' d ¨ ¦ Conn j ,i ,w ',d ' < x j ,w ',d ' ¸ , i  I m ¾
© j
¹
¯°
¿°

^

`

Select j| min j dist(j,i)-footprint j ! 0 , j  J and J=J+{j}
{2}Calculate expected position of all mobile nodes except for j
[Constraints (18)  (20)]
°
{3}max 4) ® ¦ wk Ck ,w ,d ' | POS j ,0,d '
¯°kI m ,w ,d '
Subject to:

°½
(4, )) ¾
¿°

Sin 2 [(POS) i ,G ,d '  POS) j ,G ,d ' )<0.5] 

(22) HAi , j ,w ,d '

+Cos[POS) i ,G ,d ' ]<Cos[POS) j ,G ,d ' ]< Sin 2 [(POS4i ,G ,d '  POS4 j ,G ,d ' )*0.5] i,w
(23) disti , j ,w ,d '

1  HAi , j ,w ,d ' , HAi , j ,w ,d '

Atan2

i, w

(24) disti , j ,w ,d ' d footprint i ,rj <ChckI i , j ,w ,d  M <(1  ChckI i , j ,w ,d ' ) i,w
(25) disti , j ,w ,d ' d footprint j ,ri <ChckJ i , j ,w ,d  M <(1  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ' ) i,w
(26) Conn

i , j ,w ,d '

d 0.5<(ChckI i , j ,w ,d '  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ' ) i,w

§
·
(37) Reqi ,w ,d ' * Ci ,w ,d ' d ¨ ¦ Conn j ,i ,w ,d ' * x j ,w ,d ' ¸ i, w
© j
¹
(new) Conn
1
i , j ,w ',d

{4}If Fuel j > dist(j,(4)))@ ! maxfuel j ,d  FuelUseR j <(d max  d ')
Then J=J-{j}, J'=J'+{j}, and return to {1}
{5} Calculate time for movement subject to constraints and Record Connections from {3}

>constraints (32)  (34)@ simplify to
set State j ,d

1 for all d' d d <d'+RepoD j ( DistPos j )

>constraints (22) 

(26)

@
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{6}Calculate Value function ¦ zd subject to linear program:
d

1
Min zd
<¦¦¦¦ ci,t ,s <w yi,t ,s,w
y
Total _ Net _ Value w s t i
Subject To:

¦y

(1.1)

( i , j ),t ,l , s ,w ,d

d capi,l ,s,w,d < xi,w,d i, l , s, w, d

t, j

¦y

(1.2)

( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w , d

d capi,l ,s,w,d < xi,w,d i, l , s, w, d

t, j

¦¦¦ y

(2)

( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w ,d

l

s

d capi < xi,w,d i, w, d

j

(3)  ¦¦ y(t ,k ),t ,l ,s,w,d t bt ,t ,s,w <xt ,w,d (Supply node t) t , s, w, d
l

k

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l ,s,w,d  ¦ y(i ,k ),t ,l ,s,w,d ¸ ¸  wyi ,t ,s,w,d bi,t ,s,w,d i, t, s, w, d
¨ l j
¸
k
¹¹
© ©
(5) capi <Conn j ,i ,w,d t ¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l ,s,w,d t 0 i, w, d (6) wyi,t ,s,w,d t 0 i, t, s, w, d 
j ,t , l , s

(7)

¦ wy

i ,t , s ,w , d

t ,s

d ((¦ (TCi < xi ,w ,d ))  1)<(capi *(1  TCt ))<TCactivew ,d 
i

 (capi <( xi ,w ,d  (1  TCactivew ))) i, w, d
(8) TCactivew ,d d ¦ (TCi < xi ,w ,d ) w, d
i

(10) xi ,w ,d d 1 i,w, d
§
w<w max and ¨ J  J ', J' z  contains all mobile nodes or ¦ Ci ,w ',d t dmax < I m
iI m , d
©
then set w'=w'+1 and return to step {1}
{8}If J  J ' contains all mobile nodes, then set J=J'= and proceed to next d' such that
{7}If

·
¸,
¹

there exists a node i where xiIm ,d '  xiIm ,d '1 ! 0
Return to step {1}
Repeat until d'=dmax
Heuristic SCP
While SCP.{3} was focused solely on node j, meaning that initial connections
would need to be calculated before the first run of this heuristic, though those
connections may be accomplished trivially outside of the model, cumulating the
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connections dependent only upon the changing node reduce the number of calculations
and memory required by the computer. Step SCP.{6}, while appearing as an
optimization model, consists of only known parameters, reducing the region to be
searched from an infinite space to a single value.
Steps SCP.{7} and SCP.{8} allow the model to step through the various nodes
available for repositioning, switching the focus first on each STI, and then on each LTI.
This simple heuristic, when imbedded in the sequential inclusion of lower priorities that
comes with the use of Lexicographic Goal Programming, provides a good solution to the
long term model.
While acknowledging that the greedy heuristic is often dominated by other
methods (Capara p. 733), this type of heuristic was selected for the sole purpose of its
simplicity and adaptability. With the focus of this work on the development of
methodology for measuring Resilience in satellite communication networks, the
improvement of this time-dependent mobile network set covering heuristic is left to
future work.
While the model is now able to successfully reposition, and reconstitute a
network, there is still work left to be done in the area of the Defender value model. The
Defender value model, which is primarily comprised by the Transmission Flow function,
still poses a problem of having a size of 1.9*1010, even in this reduced fidelity situation.
However, there is still a key piece of the networking operations which has yet to be
exploited.
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lfL (c,•..d.) < II,.I then
i<el,.

Select

{iI

Select

{ilmin Adi st(j,i) -footprintj > O).J f

~Connj. i .8 '.d' * xj ,8',dJ i I,.}

Req,. ',d' * c ,.',d' ::;(

E

J,J '}

Set J=J+{j }

FuelA di st(j,(E><P))) > maxfuel j.d - Fue/UseRj * (d.,"' - d)

5 Calculate time for movement
Adjust State parameter to reflect movements
Record connections established from {3}

6 Calculate Value function

L zd ~
d
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Figure 20: Time-Dependent Covering Problem Heuristic Flow Chart
Gateways, as was discussed in Chapter II section Comparing Satellite Networks
to Supply Networks, must be traversed for the majority of known satellite communication
networks. As of 1995, the only documented gateways were terrestrial based, however
that is no longer true as gateways may exist both on Earth and in orbit aboard satellites.
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Regardless of their position though, the basic network operating parameters hold. The
main function of a gateway is to permit a user to access the full network, and as a result,
every transmission must either originate from, or be passed through a gateway.
Since every transmission must pass through a gateway before it may be passed
along to the destination, the gateways will now be defined as the sink nodes in the
network, with all previous terminal nodes being source nodes. In conjunction with this,
every transmission which previously had a single source and a single destination will
now be modeled as originating from the original source and destination, with the new
destination being any gateway. Because this change is essentially doubling
transmissions, but reducing the transmission distance, no change need be made to the
satellite capacities, however all transmission values must be halved. If they were set as
rankings, the rankings remain unaffected.
To model this, a single node is made with unlimited capacity and complete
demand as the sink of the network. Furthermore, this single node will have constant,
non-destructible connections to all gateways and only to gateways. If all gateways are
terrestrial based, if there are sufficiently many such that their capacity and location are
only minor considerations, or if every orbital gateway in the network has a continuous
connection to a terrestrial gateway or relay node, then modifications may stop here. Note
that only one of these three conditions need be met, and that, while a network may be
constructed specifically to not meet any of these, many if not all of the networks operate
within at least one of these categories.
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Using the described alterations to the model, which preserve validity in
transmission quantity, type and network operational behavior, following medium/long
term model Transmission Function constraints are achieved.
1
<¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c j , s <w y j , s ,w , d
Total _ Net _ Value d w s j

Min z
y

Subject To:

¦y

(1.1)

( j , i ),l , s , w , d

d capi ,l , s , w , d < xi , w , d  i , l , s , w , d

j

(2)

¦¦¦ y
l

s

d capi < xi , w , d  i , w , d

( j ,i ), l , s , w , d

j

(3) -¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , w , d  w y j , s , w , d

b j ,s, w , d  j , s , w , d

l ,i

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , w , d  ¦ y( i , k ),l , s , w , d ¸ ¸ d bi ,s, w , d  i , s , w , d
¨ l
¸
k
¹¹
© © j
(5) cap i <Conn j ,i , w , d t ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , w , d t 0  i , w , d
j ,l , s

(8) TCactivew , d d ¦ (TC i < xi , w , d )

w , d

i

Model 3.16 Transmissions
The reader may note that constraints 3.15.(1.2), (6), and (7) were removed. All
remaining constraints were also restructured by removing the dependency on the
origination of a transmission, which required extra effort on constraints 3.16.(3) and (4)
so that the failed transmissions are still properly attributed to the appropriate value. This
new version utilizes w<d <(i<(2  s  s<l )  j <s  l ) .
Additional insight is gained in reviewing the SCP heuristic. In SCP.{6} of this
heuristic, there is no direct dependency between d and w , and the flow of transmissions.
As such:
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¦ ¦ Min
d

w
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< ¦ ¦ c j , s <w y j , s ,w , d
Total _ Net _ Value s j

z

y

Subject To:
(1.1)

¦y

( j , i ),l , s , w , d

d capi ,l , s ,w , d < xi , w , d  i , l , s

j
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¦¦¦ y
l

s

d capi < xi ,w , d  i

( j ,i ), l , s , w , d

j

(3) -¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , w , d  w y j , s , w , d

b j ,s, w , d  j , s

l ,i

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , w , d  ¦ y( i , k ),l , s , w , d ¸ ¸ d bi ,s, w , d  i , s
¨ l
¸
k
¹¹
© © j
(5) cap i <Conn j ,i , w , d t ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s ,w , d t 0  i
j ,l , s

(8) TCactivew , d d ¦ (TC i < xi ,w , d )
i

Model 3.17 Transmissions
This change reduces the model size, but includes the need for w * d models, each
of size (i<(2  s  s<l )  j < s  l ) . However, there exists a subtle change to the models
optimization behavior precluding the substitution of Model 3.17 Transmissions in the full
Long-Term Model. By pulling the time components outside of the minimization as a
summation, Model 3.17 is now attempting to optimize each time period myopically. If
included in the full model, such an alteration would prevent a change in the network
which sacrificed a small amount of performance early on for a greater performance later.
Still, Model 3.17 Transmissions is still valid and fully applicable in a situation in
which the connections and locations are parameters and not variables, as occurs in the
SCP heuristic. Using the most recent example of i=90, now i=91 due to the required
inclusion of a new sink node, s=5, l=2, j=16291, w 144, d 156, this results in 22,464
linear models, each of size 82,987 constraints. While this may appear to be a large
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model, because it is linear it runs fairly quickly, even on a personal computer. If each
linear program requires only 4 seconds to solve on a personal computer, which is a
reasonable estimation, then the complete model will require approximately 25 hours.
While manageable in itself, when run through the heuristic this must be solved an
undetermined and potentially large number of times, which could require an exorbitant
amount of time. In the short term model, with d=1, this model only requires 72 minutes,
just over one hour. In the medium/long term model, the disruptive events can only occur
in regards to the LTI, d. This was exploited in the SCP heuristic by only analyzing the
network at the time of the next disruptive event. As such, a further exploitation is used to
reduce run time.
If this same method is utilized, then the number of LTI, d, is reduced to the
number of distinct time periods in which degradation, repositioning, or reconstitution
occur. However, the same value may be retained by multiplying the cycle network value
by the number of LTI between that event and the next network change. For example, if
the events occur within 6 distinct time periods and the model completes
repositioning/reconstituting in another 12, then the time to run, under the same
approximation of a 4 second LP duration, is 144 <18< 2 sec , or 2.88 hours on a personal
computer.
In a great many cases, considering the high costs associated with building and
operating satellite networks, this level of time, which would be considerably less on a
high performance computer, is certainly viable. However, as time on high performance
computers can be costly and results of this form of analysis could lead to changes in
design, the Chapter IV case study will show how aggregation and small sacrifices to
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fidelity can preserve enough memory to be accomplished on a personal computer in a
reasonable amount of time.
In this section, the models constructed in previous sections were improved by
reducing the memory requirements, increasing the viability of using the models as more
than tools for viewing a network’s operating procedures. This was accomplished by first
using an example to demonstrate how large the medium/long term model could become
and why it is not always possible to solve as it was previously constructed. After
analyzing the constraints it was determined that, in the model’s original form, Model
3.12, the number of components in the network were insignificant in regards to memory
consumption, and that the true problem laid with the ground fidelity and the time
dependencies. This led to the decomposing of the model into its many functions, which
showed how the Transmission Function was the true obstacle in the constraints.
After remodeling the Transmission Function constraints to reduce memory
consumption and the number of constraints, Lexicographic Goal Programming was then
pursued to prioritize regions/nodes and drastically reduce the scope of the problem and
provide a more manageable model to be solved. Finally, the simplest known heuristic
type, a greedy heuristic, was used to reduce the amount of memory required by an
optimization model at the cost of increasing time through multiple out-of-model
calculations. This, in effect, provides a suite of modeling options which offer a trade off
of fidelity versus computational speed.
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Heuristic H-1

In this section, the heuristic developed by Lim and Smith is adapted in order to
account for monotonically continuous non-linear functions by including aspects of Ant
Colony Optimization. The reader may notice that a large portion of the heuristic comes
from the Attacker model while the Defender model acts as a calculation stage to be
optimized repeatedly.
Recall from the Chapter II section Solving Bi-Level Programs, the heuristic
developed by Lim and Smith for solving continuous linear BLP is:

In addition, recall that Ant Colony Optimization effectively operates in a shortestpath-problem by adjusting the probability that an edge is chosen based upon the value of
the solutions achieved by selecting the edge in preceding iterations. However, there is
also a fading function to reduce the likelihood of premature convergence.
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The essence of a shortest-path problem is choosing the set of edges which will
connect two nodes with the shortest possible distance/time/cost, etc. In Salmeron et al.’s
model, the Attacker is selecting the set of nodes which will reduce their resource pool to
zero with the greatest possible degradation objective. This simple comparison is because
of Salmeron et al.’s use of discrete binary degradation levels.
The initial step to the heuristic follows directly from Lim and Smith’s heuristic,
which is to first approximate the impact that each node in the network has on the
objective function. To do this, the heuristic initializes with calculating the defender
model at various states, and considers each time interval, d, as a separate network. The
first state is fully operational, in which all applicable nodes are operating as if there is no
negative event. Following that, each node in the network is “turned off”, and only one
node is eliminated for any given run. This will provide an initial preference set that may
be used to increase the efficiency of the heuristic by essentially aiming it at the most
valuable nodes.
For the initial preferences, given node i, and attacker objective value vi, the
probability of a node being interdicted is denoted as follows:
pi ,d

vi ,d
n

¦v

(EQ 3.6)

For Each d

i ,d

i 0

where pi,d is the conditional probability of node i being interdicted given the incident will
happen in time-step d, and i=0 is the baseline operating state where no nodes are
degraded.
Next, Lim and Smith’s heuristic for solving continuous linear BLP is adapted.
Their heuristic, in essence, is to use the remaining budget at each round and apply it to
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the node which requires the minimum budget to eliminate and improves the attacker’s
solution. To proceed, a random number draw is utilized to select which nodes to degrade
based upon the derived probabilities.

Given nodes i and j, random number x  [0,1],and remaining budget B:
if pi ,d 0 or pi ,d  max{ pi ,d }½
0
d
°
°
i
i
°°
°°
1
®min{ fi (1), B} if x  [¦ p j ,d , pi ,d  ¦ p j ,d ) ¾
j 1
j 1
°
°
°0
°
Otherwise
¯°
¿°

Mi , d

(EQ 3.7)

Note that EQ 3.7 fully interdicts a set of nodes, and then uses the remaining
budget to partially interdict a final node. This is the same method used by Lim and
Smith, though altered such that less concern is placed on the resources required and more
for the impact of the node. This method still permits little freedom in regards to time
though.
To allow for this, one must first determine the period of time that a node is
degraded, and thus non-targetable, based upon the intensity of the previous incident.
Since this structure has already been developed in the Attacker-Defender model, given by
constraints 3.12.[5], [6] and [7]:
[5]¦ Mi,a,g,d d M Zi , a ,d i, a, d
g

[6]

d d

¦ ¦Z

i ,a ,d '

d' d

1  M (1  Ii ) i, d

Where d=

a

[7]Ii , d d TimeRi ,d ( fi ,a ,d (Mi , a , g , d )) i, d

one may use the same method in restricting the heuristic.
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TimeRi ,d ( fi ,a ,d (Mi , a , g , d ))
IntDur

For a given time interval, d, pi,d=0 if

¦Z

i ,a ,d

| A | where |A| is the number of

a

attack types, a. This equation restricts a node from being targeted if all attack types have
been used on the node thus far. However, the model has yet to prevent the same attack
type to be used repeatedly during a degraded state. To do this, simply make the use of an
attack type an inclusion criteria in selecting which node to degrade. This is done by only
selecting those nodes who have an attack method usage variable, Zi , a , d

0.

Next, one must establish the terminating conditions for the initial search. The
termination condition is the occurrence of results within some value epsilon of the current
best result found by the heuristic for a set number of iterations, m. The following
heuristic, which is referred to henceforth as Heuristic-1 (H1), is:
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1) Set B to the amount of resources, z=0, H be an arbitrarily small number,
m be a sufficiently large integer, and v'= max (vi )
i

2) For every i,d combination, set x i , d '

0,

(or expected with no incident) for all d' t d,
and record resulting Attacker objective as value vi ,d '
3) Reset all x i ,d to initial values and set x i ,d '
vi ,d

4) Set pi , d

and pi ,d '

n

¦v

xi ,d , x i , a ,d ' 0

pi ,d for each i,d

i,d

i 0

pi ,d

5) Set pi ,d

n

¦p

i ,d

6) If

i 0

¦Z

i ,a ,d

| A |, then set pi ,d

0 and return to step 5.

a

7) If x i ,d ' 1, then set pi ,d

0 and return to step 5.

8) Select a random number x  [0,1]

9) Set M

10) xi , a ,d

if pi ,d 0 or pi ,d  max{ pi ,d }
0
½
d
°
°
°
°
§
· ½
i
i
°°
°°
°¨
1
1
¸ °
® Min ®¨ min { fi , a ,d (1)  f i , a , d (x i ,d ')} ¸ , B ¾ if x  [¦ p j ,d , pi , d  ¦ p j , d ) ¾
j 1
j 1
¸ °
°
° d °¨ a | Zi,a,d 0
©
¹
¯
¿
°
°
°
°0
Otherwise
°¿
°̄
f i , a ,d (Mi ,a ,d

11) If xi , a ,d

M  f i ,a1,d (x i ,d ')) for each a

max ^ xi ,a ,d ` and no other xi ,a ',d

a | Zi ,a ,d

0

xi ,a ,d . If there exists xi ,a ', d

then set xi ,a , d '

xi ,a ,d

then set xi ,a , d '

xi ,a ,d such that TimeRi , d ( xi ,a , d )

and set Zi ,a ,d

1.

12) Set x i ,d '

¦x

i ,a ,d

', B

B  M , pi ,d

0

a

13) If B>0, then return to step 5, else continue
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max ^ xi ,a ,d ` , a ' z a, exists,

a | Zi ,a ,d

0

max ^ xi ,a ,d ` , a ' z a,

a | Zi ,a ,d

0

^TimeRi,d ( xi,a,d )` ,
max
a

14) Calculate resulting Attacker objective value and denote value as v.
§
·
¨ ¦ wyt ,l , s ,t ,d ¸
s
t
© l
¹
n
§
·
ci ,t , s ¨ ¦ wyi ,l ,s ,t ,d ¸
¦¦¦
i 1 s
t
© l
¹

¦¦ c

t ,t , s

Set failedvd

v
! 1  H then z=z+1
v'
16) If v>v', then set v'=v and Xi ,a ,d xi ,a,d '  i, a, d .
15) If 1  H !

17) If z>m then terminate, else continue
§ v· p '
18) Set pi ,d 0.5<¨1  ¸< n i ,d 
© v'¹
¦ pi,d '
i 0

§
·
§
§
··
¨
¸
¨¨ ¦¦ ci ,t , s ¨ ¦¦ y(i , j ),l ,s ,t ,d ¸ ¸¸
¨ § v<(1  failedvd ) · © s t
© j l
¹ ¹ § v< failedvd · xi ,d ¸
 0.5<¨ ¨
¨
¸< n
¸< n
¸
v'
v'
§
· ©
§
·
¹
©
¹
¨
¸
x
¦
,
i
d
ci ,t ,s ¨ ¦¦ y(i , j ),l , s ,t ,d ¸ ¸
¦
¨¨ ¦¦
¸
¨
¸
i
i 1© s
t
© j l
¹¹
©
¹
19) Every ] itterations, utilize previous ] degradation, and corresponding resilience, cost, and
repair times, to determine the current best time dependent resilience per unit cost.
19.1) Denote this degradation combination as BINx,1. For each i from 2 to the number of
degraded nodes in BINx,1 , let BINx,i

BINx,1 except for the ith degraded node, which

will be set equal to 1.
19.2) Set BIN'x,1 equal to the degradation vector of the best time dependent resilience per unit
cost from all BINx,i . If BIN'x,1 z BINx,1 , then return to step 19.1 and repeat.
Else go to step 19.3.
19.3) Set pi ,x

^1  BIN ` and go to step 20

20) Set pi ,d '

pi ,d for each i,d, reset all x i ,d to initial values,

i ,1

and set x i ,d ' xi ,d , x i ,a,d ' 0 and return to step 6.

Heuristic-1 (H1)
Though this method looks much larger than Lim and Smith’s heuristic, the
increased size comes primarily from accounting for the multiple time steps, the inclusion
of probability ranges based upon objective value, the more fully expanded steps, and the
logical requirements which more precisely choose the best option among otherwise
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equivalent attack types. Note that the termination criterion is experiencing a change of
less than H more than m times, regardless of if the heuristic is improving or not. At the
point of termination, the choice exists to either reset and begin again, or to press on. This
decision is left to the analyst measuring resilience.
Step 18 in H1 is the equation which determines the probabilities for the nodes in
the next iteration. It is broken first into two distinct pieces, which is the current
probability and the probability gained from the most recent iteration. In this second half,
the gain in probability is determined through two criteria. The first is how much value a
particular node moved at each time step. The second piece, however, is the opposite,
instead providing higher probability to degraded nodes based upon how much value
failed to even enter the network. Either piece alone would likely lead to a premature
convergence, either by targeting only transit nodes, or by targeting only those nodes
degraded previously. Together, they permit the model to locate a synergy between
supply and transit nodes.
Finally H1 step 19 performs a small local search around previous run iterations.
It selects the combination which showed the greatest drop in resilience per unit time and
cost, and then searches around that point for improvements by removing extraneous
degradations. In this manner, the heuristic is able to pull the Attacker-Defender model
from overwhelming a small time span in exchange for continuous degradation, but at a
lower level.
Heuristic H1 is displayed in flow chart form in Appendix A. In the flow chart, a
rectangle refers to a process, an oval to the checking of a logical variable, and a circle
with a single letter inside is used to bridge the flows over page breaks.
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Note that, in H1, the majority of the complexities arise from step 9, which is the
large equation driving the selection of nodes. It has been broken down as such to better
show how it may be implemented in a computer program which is unable to understand
the compressed equation form. Steps requiring multiple blocks have been grouped using
a dotted box line.
In this section, the base operating concepts of Ant Colony Optimization were
utilized to adapt Lim and Smith’s heuristic for continuous linear bi-level programs to a
monotonically nonlinear situation.

Methodology for Output Analysis

In the preceding sections, the methodology for measuring time-dependent
network performance using multiple measures, and over varying time intervals was
developed. In this section, the resulting output is explained along with the process for
developing it. It is in this section that the suggested single-value measure for resilience is
presented, as well as time-dependent network performance chart.
The previous section concluded with a heuristic locating one or more degradation
and network reaction plans. As a consequence of these results, two measures can be
attained, value weighted percent of blocked calls, the Defender model objective value,
and value weighted percent of remaining capacity, model constraint 3.12.(11).
The first step is to determine what value excess capacity provides, as well as what
value a blocked transmission loses. Because values were placed on the individual
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components in the model, what remains is to do is the combining of the ending measures
that the model returned. As such a weight function may be applied. However, the
function must be piece-wise continuous and either non-decreasing or non-increasing.
The combined value of these measures, percent blocked transmissions and percent
excess capacity, is the resilience measure. Note that there will actually be two values, the
resilience of the network in regards to a short term event and a long term event. Both
measures are the time-dependent performance of the network under an extreme event,
and both provide equally important information, though to slightly different questions.
However, both results provide an answer to resilience in the face of extreme event
network degradation. A time-dependent network performance was also utilized because,
based upon the definition of resilience, a network may be more resilient if it can resist an
event which many models including ours examine, but also if it can be repaired quickly,
or can quickly adapt to operating within the new state, which relatively few models have
captured thus far. Furthermore, the inherent defenses, as well as the active defenses, that
a network may incorporate to lessen the impact of an event, if not prevent it altogether,
were included so that their effectiveness to an extreme event could be gauged.
This time-dependent network performance under extreme event degradation
captures the ability of the network to resist, adapt, absorb, respond to, and recover from
an unlikely, yet possible occurrence. The attentive reader may notice that the model
failed to properly address the “anticipate” portion of the definition. Unfortunately that is
something that is currently outside the capabilities of the presented deterministic model,
but which may be included later with future work.
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While single value measures are useful, there is also a great deal of data within
the model that may aid a decision maker. Two vastly different networks may experience
an equivalent measure of resilience, though they may achieve this measure in very
different ways. For example, a fragile network which can recover rapidly can be as
resilient as a hardened network which takes a long period of time to recover.
To determine how a network is degraded and how it recovers, it is recommended
the analyst utilize the variables xi,d, and vd and Excess_Valued, which combine into the
measure of Network Performance. By plotting each of these variables over time, the
analyst may see what aspect of their network struggled, as well as what aspect may have
save them.

Figure 21: Example Slow Recovery High Robustness
For example, if a network began with a high Network Performance, but that value
degraded over a long time period, and xi,d took a long time to recover, then the network is
resilient because of an aspect such as its massive size, or capacity, but may become more

166


resilient if its ability to recover is improved. Figure 16 displays a notional chart of
network performance over time in such a situation when repair/replacement time is long.

Figure 22: Example Rapid Recovery Low Robustness
If the network experiences frequent changes in Network Performance, and those
changes show a high correlation to changes in xi,d, then the network is resilient because of
its ability to recover, and may become more resilient by increasing its initial capacity or
hardening against some form of attack. Figure 22 shows an example of network
performance over time when a node experiences frequent degradations, but quickly
recovers. Note that while Figure 21 and Figure 22 examples behave very differently,
both exhibit the same average resilience measure of approximately 0.709 over the
bounded time period.
Both situations may warrant a greater emphasis on defensive measures, though
more in depth analysis into the changes of Network Performance as a result of expended
Attacker resources would be required to make such a determination. Finally, if a node i
rarely or never experiences degradation, then it may imply that the node is either
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extremely well protected, superfluous, experiences a recovery time that precludes the
resources expended to degrade it, or a combination of the three. Again, further efforts
and sensitivity analysis would need to be conducted before a conclusion as to which
situation is true.
In this section, the resilience measure is defined as the time-dependent network
performance under an extreme event, keeping the short term and long term measures
separate as they provide very different information as to the behavior of the network
under different scenarios. The utilization of the measure of network performance and the
degradation variables from the model were shown as a method for drawing basic
conclusions about the network’s behavior under a degrading event.
In this chapter, a bi-level Attacker-Defender model was formulated to capture the
options and constraints available to the network operator and the degrader. Once
formulated, this model was adjusted to allow for reduced memory consumption.
Heuristics were then employed to reduce the bi-level program to an algorithm containing
a linear program. Finally, the methodology for analyzing the outputs from the main
heuristic, H-1, were presented with example graphs. This approach offers the user a suite
of model options with varying fidelity and precision at varying computational
requirements.
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IV. Analysis and Results

In this chapter, a notional satellite communication network of GEO satellites and
terrestrial nodes is utilized as a case study. Using the results of that case study and its
variations, analysis is conducted on the behavior of the network performance over time to
determine the approach proposed in this thesis. By doing so, insights may be gained as to
the changes one could expected in the network performance based upon a change to the
network. After the case study has been completed, the performance of the model and
heuristic during those variations is analyzed.
Case Study

A notional satellite communication network constructed of GEO satellites and
terrestrial nodes serves as the basis for a case study. The base configuration and various
values of the GEO satellite communications network is fully laid out in Appendix B. The
notional network consists of six GEO satellites, and nine terrestrial nodes which may
communicate within, but not across, continents, and two sink nodes, both of which are
terrestrial.
Primary variations affect the number of nodes in the network, as well as values
such as recovery time, attacker resources, and initial nodal placement. These variations
are run systematically, their network performance charts and degradation levels presented
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in the following section and as well as the variation data tables that may be found in
Appendix B.1.
Secondary variations are performed on the base settings, and involve including
more unique changes to the network, such as the inclusion of a satellite gateway or the
use of active defenses. Results are fully displayed in Appendix B.2; a selection of those
results are displayed in the following section.
The case study COMSAT network operates six GEO satellites, all positioned
evenly around the equator at an altitude of 35,786 km. Each of these satellites may
operate only as a relay in the base scenario, however that is altered in one of the
secondary variations.
Most equatorially based geosynchronous satellites can communicate with
locations as far north or south as 75 degrees (Geo-orbit p. 1). The resulting radius is
10,348 km, which is equivalent to a footprint of 336,395,288 km2. Secondly, a maximum
inter-satellite link range of 90,000km is permitted, which is approximately one third of
the total GEO orbital circumference.
Since this resilience measure is intended for use as a key criterion in selecting a
new satellite architecture, the use of a high performance computer is not unreasonable at
an operational level during a design stage. However, a base level analysis, with a
reduction in fidelity, can still be performed on a personal computer while continuing to
provide valuable insight.
To attain the memory and time reduction required to implement this model on a
personal computer in a reasonable amount of time, preprocessing aggregation of
transmissions is conducted. By distributing the transmissions of many regions to their
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connected network nodes, the cumbersome effect generated by the granularity of the
terrestrial partitioning is effectively eliminated. However, the shortcoming of doing this
is that the high fidelity of associating the exact regional transmission value is lost.
To compensate, the costs of the transmissions being preprocessed to a satellite are
averaged to arrive at a new cost-per-transmission. For example, assume the analyst is
presented with a situation in which six regions, {A, B, C, D, E, F}, and their associated
transmission values, vi, and number of transmissions, ni, are connected to a single
satellite. Then the value of transmissions originating from that satellite, v’, in the
aggregated model is defined as:

¦v n
¦n

i i

v'

i

i

(EQ 4.1)

i

=

vAnA  vB nB  vC nC  vD nD  vE nE  vF nF
nA  nB  nC  nD  nE  nF
When a region is connected to multiple satellites, the transmissions are divided

evenly across all connected satellites. This method may be substituted to filling satellite
capacity with high value regions first and working down, however this may leave some
regions transmitting to satellites with no remaining capacity while other satellites have
excess.
To compute the distance traversed, both for transmission linkages as well as nodal
movement, the Haversine Formula for great circle distances is used (Miller p. 134):
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The Haversine formula has known problems with rounding errors with extremely small
distances or as the two points approach opposite ends of the sphere. However, this may
be alleviated in the model by preventing the satellites from approaching those two
conditions. To do this, set a minimum distance a satellite may be repositioned, minposi,
and a max, maxposi. In this formulation, r is the radius of the nodes from the center of
the sphere, or in this case, the center of the Earth.
The distance to determine connections, disti,j,į, is calculated using two methods.
First, if the two nodes are satellites, not necessarily of the same altitude, then use:

disti , j

ri  rj

2

§
§H
 ¨¨ 2<ri <sin ¨ i2, j
© ri
©

··
¸ ¸¸
¹¹

2

(EQ 4.3)

where Hi,j is the Haversine distance between two nodes of the same radius, r1 is the radius
of satellite i, and r2 is the radius of satellite j. As a note towards wording, altitude denotes
the distance from the surface of the Earth, and radius denotes the distance from the center
of the Earth. For simplification, if the satellites are at approximately the same altitude,
then the Haversine Formula alone may suffice.
Along with the six homogenous GEO satellites, nine terrestrial locations are
included. Seven of these locations act solely as relay points, while the other two are the
gateways through which all transmissions must flow. The terrestrial locations may
communicate with satellites in range; however they may only communicate directly with
another terrestrial location if both sites are on the same continent. This is simply an
assumption of the case study which encourages use of the satellite network by reducing
intercontinental transmissions via another method, and may be altered to suit the
network’s operational abilities.
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For simplicity, it is assumed in this case study that the cost to attack and time to
repair all terrestrial nodes is the same. In the base scenario, the cost to fully destroy a
terrestrial node is $1.41M, and the time to rebuild after destruction is 42 days, or 6 weeks.
All terrestrial relays will follow degradation function D=x5 where I is the percent of
permanent destruction resources used. Meanwhile all gateways will follow degradation
function D=(1/3) < (5 < x2-2 < x5). All terrestrial nodes will follow a linear repair function.
The GEOs in this notional scenario require an estimated $180M to be fully
destroyed, and will follow degradation function D=3 < (x)2-2 < (x)3 which simulates an
early high return on even a small allocation of resources towards degradation. Unlike
terrestrial nodes, GEOs always require the full time to recover, which is assumed to be 26
weeks in this notional case study. Note that this six month period is likely an
underestimation of the time required. The different degradation and repair functions
were utilized to demonstrate that the nodes may be degraded in a variety of ways, and
that those degradations may be modeled via a mathematical function.
Each variation of this baseline case study is processed in the long term for a
duration of three years, the short term for one week, and is placed against three
magnitudes of attacks. The smallest attack has a resource capacity of $1.44B, with the
medium set at $2.16B and the largest set at $2.88B. These values were derived from a
run with three GEO satellites with the smallest resource capacity being the minimal
approximated adversity level required to reduce that scenario measure to 0 Resilience.
To reduce the size and runtime of the model, the time-dependent transmissions
are averaged to a single time-independent set, and their value determined by the location
from which they originate. Furthermore, the defender’s value model will only be run
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each time a change occurs in the network, such as a new degradation, repair, or
repositioning.
In this notional example, gateways, which are acting as the sink nodes are not
targetable. When permitted as targetable, and even bolstering the cost of eliminating
them to equivalent with GEOs, the model, as constrained, always strikes them.
This is because with only two gateways, the cost to the Attacker to reduce flow
within the network is extremely small, making any other targets, be they terrestrial or
orbital, less desirable targets. Therefore, it is clear that the first step to improving any
satellite network is to increase the number of gateways, or nodes which may act as
gateways, and for their defense. This could, however, present other security and
operational difficulties that need to be considered.
If the network is one in which many structures exist which were not required to
access a gateway to proceed, such as is the case when the source or destination of a
transmission may act as gateways as well or are permitted to bypass that restriction, then
making the sinks in the network non-targetable is a valid alteration. This alteration is a
valid approximation because transmissions are still flowing around the network, but are
required to pass through a set of nodes that must always exist. As always, special and
rare situations may be constructed which would call into question the validity of the
method after alteration.
In such an uncommon scenario, other adaptations to the heuristic may be made,
or the original model, Model 3.12, still remains valid and may be optimized as is. Both
methods are valid, though the memory requirements for both are vast, and are
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recommended only in extremely high cost situations. As it happens, constructing satellite
networks is often an extremely high cost endeavor.
The majority of the focus on the case study is on processing the long-term
model. Due to time and resource restrictions, the array of options available to short term
degradations is not coded. Instead, both time periods will rely on physical events in the
case study. However, the model and heuristic constructed in Chapter III are capable of
operating under a conglomerate of options.
The node HQ (Bethesda, MD), which may act only as a terrestrial relay, was also
labeled as a non-targetable node. This was done to exemplify that some nodes may be of
such importance that the network operator will have taken sufficient steps to assure that
the site would be extremely difficult to eliminate. This was the only non-gateway node
permitted this “perfect defense”.
Table 2 shows the major baseline parameters. Table 3 lists the aspect of the
model to be altered, as well as the corresponding name associated with each variation. In
Table 3, “Satellites Redistributed” denotes that the remaining satellites in the network
were repositioned at equivalent intervals around the equator with at least one satellite
positioned at 0o Longitude. This position being filled is simply part of the case study and
is in no way a requirement of the model, as seen in variation Shifted, which has no
satellites positioned at 0o Longitude. In this notional model, it is assumed that the orbital
positions of each satellite has receives the necessary approvals.
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Satellite(Y/N) Target(Y/N) InterSatLink(km)
12000
12000
12000
12000
12000
12000
12000
12000
12000
7768
7768
7768
7768
7768
7768

Degrees
80.238166
66.8350185
51.25
45.652527
66.1333
41.252181
35.414842
23.502574
40.98472
0
0
0
0
0
0

12.447236
Ͳ149.65307
Ͳ126.1
Ͳ82.381961
Ͳ24.9333
Ͳ80.744541
Ͳ114.909319
Ͳ161.022938
Ͳ80.09472
Ͳ120
Ͳ60
0
60
120
180

1410
1410
1410
1410
1410
1410
1410
1410
1410
180000
180000
180000
180000
180000
180000

N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

172000
172000
172000
172000
172000
172000
172000
172000
172000
20000
20000
20000
20000
20000
20000

42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
42
182
182
182
182
182
182

Up/DownlinkRadius(km) Latitude(NS) Longitude(EW) Funds($USThousands) Sink(Y/N) Capacity Rebuild

LinkingParamters
NodeName

90000
90000
90000
90000
90000
90000

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

TTACͲ1(Svalbard,Norway)
TTACͲ2(Fairbanks,AK)
TTACͲ3(estVancouver,canada)
TTACͲ4(estToronto,canada)
TTACͲ5(estreykjavik,iceland)
SatNetworkOpsCenter(SNOC)(Leesburg,virginia)
CommercialGateway(Tempe,Arizona)
DoDGateway(Wahiawa,HI)
HQ(Bethesda,MD)
GEOSAT1
GEOSAT2
GEOSAT3
GEOSAT4
GEOSAT5
GEOSAT6

Table 6:BaselineMajorParameters

SatellitesRedistributed
SatellitesRedistributed

PrimaryChange AccompanyingChange
None
GEOLongͲ30
Rebuild/2
Ͳ2GEO
+2GEO



Baseline6
Shifted
Repair
Reduced4
Increased8

Table 7: Variation Changes
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Another point of interest is how the values of the transmissions are set. As the
model is running on a basis of Lexicographic Goal Programming, it is important to know
where the priorities are in order to assign the transmissions from those locations
appropriate values.



Figure 23: Location Transmission Priority
Figure 23 shows the priority of transmissions originating from the surface. In this
notional case study, the greatest value is placed on those areas colored purple. Two or
more separate and geographically diverse locations were used in most of the priority
levels to demonstrate that the priorities need not be continuous.
Another variation of interest is the inclusion of Active Defense nodes in the
network. Active Defense nodes are stations which may be used to protect other nodes
and prevent degradation. While they are operational and ready for use, an attack made by
the Attacker which the active defense is prepared to defend would be rendered inert,
though resources are consumed. As a result of using one of these nodes, a “reload” time
is incurred, leaving the nearby nodes vulnerable for the duration. The Attacker has
perfect knowledge of these sites, but still may pursue to strike protected nodes.
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The inclusion of Active Defense nodes is processed as a secondary variation, and
as such, is only processed against the Attacker budget of $2.16B resources, and only with
the original baseline case study parameters. This variation utilizes three Active Defense
nodes spread relatively evenly around the world. In this notional case, the nodes are
located in Australia, Djibouti, and Montana.

Case Study Output Analysis

The previous section presented the case study and its variations, establishing a
base to perform the demonstrative resilience analysis. In this section, the outputs from
the baseline case study and variations are presented and analyzed.
The baseline GEO SATCOM network consisted of six satellites, seven terrestrial
relays, and two terrestrial gateways, which acted as the sink nodes. Recall from Chapter
III that the output from the model would consist of a single value, which was the average
network performance for the duration of the model, but that the graph of that network
performance over time could be of equal or greater importance than the final number.
Figure 24 shows the resilience with the baseline case study parameters as well as
the four primary variations made to the case study. The values graphed in Figure 24 are
the single values under a long term model, with the vertical axis displaying the resilience
measure, and the horizontal axis showing the change in attacker resource capacity,
presented in millions of dollars.
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As expected, the level of resilience drops in response to the increased level of
adversity. This shows the inescapable nature of a resilience measure based upon
extreme-event or worst-case. When utilizing a method such as this, the probability of
events is eliminated, allowing exposure of events that may rarely, if ever, occur. As such,
this resilience measure, like other measures developed in a similar fashion, is dependent
upon the scenario, which in this case is represented by the level of resources the attacker
may implement. It is for this reason that a spread of adversity magnitudes is utilized in
this case study, and recommended for use in future analysis of this type.

Resilience
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Figure 24: Resilience of Case Study and Primary Variations
Along with the drop of resilience in response to increased adversity, another trend
can be seen, that of diminishing returns on the part of the attacker. Though the increase
of resources is the same, the decrease in resilience from $2.16B-$2.88B is less than
$1.44B-$2.16B.
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These diminishing returns are expected as eliminating a smaller set of scattered
transmissions is more difficult than eliminating the large dense pockets. Knowing this,
the variations Reduced 4, Baseline 6, and Increased 8 may be viewed together. Recall the
varied parameters and names of the variations are outlined in Table 6.
Having the greatest difference in the change of resilience, Reduced 4 goes from a
0.24 drop to a 0.04 drop in resilience. This is because the scenario exaggerates the
situation with high value targets being eliminated, having relatively few high value
targets to destroy thereafter. With the increase to $2.16B, the high value assets remain
mostly destroyed for the duration of the model. Increasing the resources further to
$2.88B allows the model to strike at the significantly lower value assets, further
decreasing resilience.
Figure 26 displays the time-dependent network performance of variation Reduced
4 under each of the three resource capacities. The legend for this resilience overlay, as
well as all that follow, is shown in Figure 25.
As predicted from the Resilience chart in Figure 24, the majority of the network
performance was already eliminated in 2160, leaving very little to be eliminated in 2880.
Moreover, it is clear that the degradations were carried out for the entirety of the time
period. For reference, all Network Performance charts (such as Figure 26) begin with a
two period warm-up of no degradation. This is so that, in a scenario such as Reduced 4,
one can determine if the network performance is low because of degradation or if the
network experienced imperfect network performance even before degradation. This twostep warm-up is not utilized in the resilience measure calculations though.
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Figure 25: Attacker Budget ($M)
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Figure 26: Reduced 4 Resilience Overlay
Increased 8 has the theoretical lowest drop, with no change in the drop of
resilience from 1440-2160 to 2160-2880. This suggests that at the first two initial levels,
and possibly the third, the model was still using all of its resources to eliminate the high
value nodes in the notional communications network.
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Figure 27: Increased 8 Resilience Overlay
To examine if this is the case, Figure 27 is presented. In Figure 27, it is clear that
the model is degrading one or more nodes because of the sharp drop in performance.
However, because of the large cost to degrade a GEO satellite, and the inherent
construction of the network which, more often than not, places a GEO as a high value
target, the attacker has insufficient resources to keep the degradation for the duration seen
in the Reduced 4 scenario with the notional repair time.
For comparison, it is valuable to also view the connections occurring before and
after a degradation, to inspect the topological effects of an event. The before and after
coverage for Increased 8 are shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29 respectively. A green
circle represents an active node while a red circle represents a destroyed node. The
remaining colors follow the same legend as used in Figure 18, though simply put follow a
basic stoplight chart.
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Figure 28: Pre-Event Coverage

Figure 29: Post Event Coverage
Using these two maps, further insight is gained about the network. The first thing
one might notice is the green dot located north of Europe. This point represents a
terrestrial location, and is clearly outside of the reach of any other point in the network.
A review of parameters may remove that node, or may find that it was incorrectly placed.
In this case, the former is true.
Another insight gained from these two maps is the manner in which the
“Attacker” behaves. Even with eight GEO satellites, each of which is very costly to
remove, the model has selected the four nodes best suited to cover northern Africa and
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western Asia, which include the largest plot of land associated with Priority 1 as well as
roughly half of Priority 2. While the model is going after high-value areas, it is focusing
on the nodes directly serving demand. The question may be asked if it would be better to
eliminate the nodes servicing the gateways instead.
In Figure 28, this notion is addressed by the coverage of the gateway in Hawaii,
which also is in range of four GEO satellites. The second gateway, located in Arizona, is
serviced by three of those four, and so removing those GEO satellites appears to be a
promising strategy. However, intra-continental terrestrial connections were permitted.
This information, coupled with the terrestrial nodes in Virginia and Maryland
being covered by another satellite, which serves neither of the gateways, striking the
relays or downlink nodes would require the striking of minimum five satellites to achieve
equivalent or greater degradation within a single time epoch. Even if the Maryland node
was not assumed indestructible in the example, the cost would still require destroying two
additional terrestrial nodes, and keeping them destroyed for the duration.
Doing so, the model could achieve a greater raw impact, however the cost of
doing so is prohibitive. Instead, the model selected four GEOs which provided a greater
reduction per dollar expended for this notional data set.
Baseline 6 and its Shifted variation fall in the middle of this change in resilience
drops. Losing 0.28 and then 0.16 for the increase of $1.44B to $2.16B and $2.16B to
$2.88B attacker resources respectively, both are able to remove a material amount of the
high value network assets and move on to lower valued assets; however, the trend
suggests that there was still room for improvement event at the $2.88B level.
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Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the Baseline 6 and Shifted network performance
over time respectively. Analyzing any one of them independently shows something
slightly different than what was predicted from the resilience measures alone. Based on
those measures and trends seen in Figure 24: Resilience of Case Study and Primary
Variations Figure 24, it was thought that the high value assets may have been degraded
already and that the model had moved onto some lesser nodes. However, as can be seen
in the specified figures, this is not the case.
Instead, there exist time steps in which high value nodes may continue to be
degraded. The most enlightening portion of this graph to a first time viewer is the change
that occurs in $1.44B at approximately time step 55. Before that jump, more than 90% of
the network performance is eliminated, and yet afterwards less than one quarter is. To
examine why, the degradations are inspected.
In Baseline 6, three GEOs, those located at -60o, 0o, and 60o latitude, are fully
degraded from timestep 1 and until timestep 54. At timestep 55, the -60o GEO is
reactivated and remains so, leaving the other two degraded until timestep 82. In Shifted,
a similar event occurs, only now with GEOs shifted +30o latitude. This change aligns
with the jumps in network performance seen in Figure 30 and Figure 31 respectively.
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Figure 30: Baseline 6 Resilience Overlay
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Figure 31: Shifted Resilience Overlay
If the effects of degradation were simply additive, then one might expect the time
period spanning from 55-82 to have a more significant loss of performance as two nodes
remain destroyed. Especially when compared to the time period preceding this when
only one more was destroyed.

186


However, this is a common phenomenon in networks known as synergy. From
the point of view of the defender, keeping any one of the three GEO satellites operational
provides a safety net in case of unseen events. The attacker may attack any one, leaving
two to fill the gap and maintaining roughly 0.95 of the network performance. Given the
resources to eliminate two nodes, the network value plummets to 0.78. After eliminating
three, this drops even further to 0.06.
This synergy is exemplified in the variation Repair, whose network performance
over time is shown in Figure 32.

Figure 32: Repair Resilience Overlay
In the variation, Repair, the time to repair the nodes was cut in half, all else
remaining equivalent to Baseline 6. Intuitively, one might believe that the degradations
would simply be left shifted, the resilience doubled. However, it can be seen that the
model and heuristic focused on drawing out the triplet of degraded nodes for as long as
possible.
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Viewing the Repair variation resource capacities of 1440 and 2880 together, four
distinct plateaus are seen. The lowest occurs in the majority of the scenarios involving
six GEOs, and occurs when three are simultaneously eliminated. The second lowest was
seen in Baseline 6 and Shifted, and occurs when only two are eliminated. The third
lowest only occurs in Repair when a single GEO is destroyed, and the fourth is the ever
present baseline that the network restores itself to. The levels are shown in Table 8.
GEOs Simultaneously Eliminated

Resulting Network Performance

0

1

1

0.956

2

0.780

3

0.065

Table 8: Repair Variation Network Performance Under Adversity
From 0.045, to 0.176, to 0.715, the change in loss of performance is clearly not
linear. The synergistic effects can be best seen in expanding the number of
simultaneously degraded nodes. However, notice that the Attacker never pushed beyond
degrading three nodes in the baseline case study. Synergy is common in many
distribution networks. The fact that the model was able to locate and exploit this effect
increases the validity of the method.
As the heuristic tested degradation combinations, it was common for the model to
strike six or seven nodes simultaneously. In the best case though, the one which provided
the most degradation over the model duration, the Attacker stopped at three nodes. This
is because of diminishing returns of the resilience measure as previously discussed and
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the time-dependent nature the model is allowed to pursue. Were the model only
permitted to strike once, then there would be no reason to consider the efficiency of the
strike and it may have continued pursuing a full assault on the network. Instead, it was
better to only degrade up to the maximal return vs cost, and then save the remaining
resources until the next time the node or nodes were activated again.
The Figure 32 shows the state of the Repair network under these three plateaus,
beginning with the greatest loss of performance.
The inclusion of Active Defense nodes is also a point of interest for many
network operators. As the reader will recall, these special nodes may be used to protect
other network components, but at the cost of a reload time, during which those
components are once again vulnerable.
This secondary variation on the case study resulted in a resilience of 0.52. Recall
that the same network against the same level of adversity without these Active Defense
nodes had a resilience of 0.36 (see Figure 24). Including Active Defense increased the
resilience of the notional network by 45%.
To view how Active Defenses influenced the Attacker, consider Figure 34.
Originally, the attacker could keep the network at a degraded level of performance for
108 weeks (see Figure 30). However, because the Attacker needed to force the Active
Defenses to fire before taking advantage of the short window of vulnerability, this
degradation could only be continued for 82 weeks.
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Figure 33: Degradation Progression of Repair 1440
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Figure 34: Active Defense vs. $2.16B
Therefore, for the case of the pure geosynchronous satellite communications
network used in this example, the inclusion of Active Defenses did increase resilience. In
this case study, and with only three such nodes, the increase was material.
For a numeric comparison of resilience measures, the same assumption of one
single strike which Salmeron et al. made in their “long term models” is utilized against
the Baseline case in the study. In this situation, with all else equivalent, the model is
capable of eliminating all attackable nodes, reducing the network performance to nearly
0. However, the terrestrial nodes are rebuilt after six time steps and the GEOs in 36 time
steps.
In this situation, the attacker required only $1089.87M to eliminate the network,
but it is not capable of utilizing the remaining funds. The resulting network performance
chart appears in Figure 35. The resulting resilience measure is an impressive 0.822.
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While this number may encourage a network operator, the reader is reminded that
the Attacker is seeking to minimize the network performance. Comparing models when
that with the Single-Event assumption is incapable of effectively utilizing the full
resources may not be a fair match though, so a test is run with $1090M. The results of
the baseline case study without the single-attack assumption are shown alone in Figure
36, and alongside in Figure 37.
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Figure 35: Single Attack Network Performance Over Time
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Figure 36: Baseline 6 Against $1090M Attacker
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Figure 37: Comparison of Models
From the start of the model and until the GEO nodes are first able to be rebuilt
and operational at time step 28, Multiple Attacks performs worse Single Attack at a
comparison of 0.06-0.00. For the next 28 time steps, when the Single Attack model
shows the network fully operational once more, the comparison changes to 0.06-1. After
time step 55, they are equivalent.
While higher network performance is desirable, attaining such a value due to
inadequacies in the model is not desirable. The purpose of the model is to degrade the
network performance as far as possible. Thus a lower, feasible value, with no change to
the system, is preferable and more accurate. With a simplifying Single Event
assumption, the model is incapable of locating a much more significant impact, thereby
inflating the resilience measure.
Already it can be seen that repetitive strikes, even under equivalent conditions,
may prove to be more troublesome than a one-hit attack. To determine how much more
troublesome, the resilience under each condition is calculated. Recall that the
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assumptions made by the model developed by Salmeron et al. model would have reported
a resilience of 0.822 under the measure used here (Salmeron). Instead, the true resilience
is closer to 0.684, and could be even lower than that. This is an improvement of model
performance, and by extension accuracy of the calculated resilience measure to that
proposed, of at least 77.5%.
To calculate the improvement, the simplest way is to calculate the percent
difference in the calculated measure and the actual measure. Because of the simplifying
assumption of only physical attacks, as well as the removal of network reliability from
the modeled measure, the true resilience is expected to be lower than that calculated. The
lowest the resilience can be is 0. Thus, the lowest possible increase in accuracy is:

Accuracy Improvement =

1 R '
<100%
1 R

(EQ 4.4)

In EQ 4.4, R is the model with the simplifying Single Event assumption and R’ is the
resilience of the model without the simplifying assumption.
Due to the restrictions placed on the case study short term attacks, the only
method available to the Attacker model was the use of physical degradation. With
relatively large resources, it would be expected that the model would strike the
synergistic nodes, and then continue with the remaining nodes, either locating lesser
combinations, or single high value assets.
This effect was seen on the short term model runs, which were conducted on the
baseline case study. The highest level of adversity was set to $800M Against this level
of adversity, the resulting resilience measure was 0.0589. Note that this is only a drop of
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0.0061 compared to when only the three best nodes are degraded, exemplifying the
diminishing returns the Attacker must cope with.
The next short term attacker level run was $500M. This value is low enough to
preclude a full degradation of the desired triplet, but high enough that it may still pursue a
two GEO combination and either partially degrade another, or select terrestrial nodes
instead. Another option theoretically available is to partially interdict each node of the
triplet, however the heuristic developed by Lim and Smith forces the full degradation of
the preferred nodes first and utilizes the remainder to partially interdict the last.
With $500M resources, the best combination the model was able to locate was to
fully degrade GEOSATs 3 and 4, which were two of the triplet, refer to Table 2 for
locations. For the partial degradation, the node selected was GEOSAT 6, which was not
part of the commonly hit triplet. This plan resulted in a short term resilience of 0.448.
To determine if GEOSAT 6 was a throwaway node or actually of value, the reader is
referred to Table 8, in which the best 2-node resilience of 0.78 is listed. This means that
even partially degrading GEOSAT 6 provides an additional 0.34 impact when used in
junction with GEOSATs 3 and 4.
Because these models were run with physical degradations and at the short term
level on a GEO network, there is no need for a network performance chart as it is a single
plateau, making it equivalent to the resilience measure. However, in a network with
time-dependent locations or transmissions over the course of a single cycle, this chart
may still show multiple plateaus and valleys and provide valuable insight.
In this section, the output from the case study and its variations were analyzed.
The results showed a 77.5% in attacker performance due to recurring attacks over the
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same method under previous works’ assumption of single event. Moreover, the Attacker
was capable of exploiting synergistic degradations, both in the long term and short term
models, increasing the validity of utilizing a modified heuristic based upon Lim and
Smith’s.

Analyzing Costs

In this section, the costs associated with the results of the Case Study and its
variations are analyzed.
One major parameter which was not altered in this study was that of the resources
required to degrade or destroy nodes. Recall from Table 7 that the cost of destroying a
GEO satellite is set at $180M. This value is constructed primarily from the cost required
to launch a satellite into GEO orbit.
… the Atlas 5 and Delta 4's potential, with the launchers selling
for more than $160 million in the last two years to government customers
like the Air Force and NASA.
Clark
However, this cost was increased for the inclusion of a missile borne into orbit on
the rocket. The costs were estimated based upon the Standard Missile 3 unit cost of
$13.4M (Eshel p. 1), bringing the total cost to roughly $173.4M. This number was
rounded up to an even figure, $180M.
For the destruction a terrestrial node, the cost of a Tomahawk cruise missile was
utilized. The total cost of each missile is reported to be $1.41M (Weinberger p. 1).
However, these missiles are highly accurate, having a hit rate of 85% during the Gulf
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War, and carrying a payload strong enough to strike even heavily defended targets
(Weinberger p. 1).
Though not used as decision variables in the case study, there were also costs
associated with the Defender’s responses. The largest of these was the cost to build and
launch replacement GEOs. Looking to the most recent DoD GEO satellites developed,
the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), the cost to simply build a replacement
is $975M (Lockheed p. 1). It then must be launched into orbit, the current method being
to deliver it with an Atlas V (Lockheed p. 1), which has already shown a cost of over
$160M. For this demonstration, each AEHF that must be replaced is estimated to cost
$1135M.
Furthermore, the cost of Active Defenses must be inspected. Utilizing the US
missile which was used in an ASAT capacity, the Standard Missile 3 is the clear choice
to intercept a physical attack aimed at an orbital component. As previously stated, the
cost of one such missile is $13.4M (Eshel p. 1).
Recall Figure 34, in which the time-dependent network performance for the
Active Defense variation was presented. In this setting, Active Defenses were utilized
three times, each one stopping an Attacker strike costing $180M in the demonstration.
Each of these uses was modeled at a cost to the Defender of $13.3M.
However, under the same resources without Active Defense, the Attacker was
able to strike an additional three GEOs. As the cost of replacing a GEO is estimated at
$1135M, this means in the scenario that expending $40M allowed the Defender to waste
$540M of the Attacker’s resources while simultaneously saving $3405M. In this section,
the costs associated with the case study were presented and explained. The cost effect of
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the inclusion of Active Defenses for both the Attacker and the Defender were calculated,
showing that the rewards of using such defenses far outweigh the costs. It should be
noted, however, replacement costs do not represent the potential value of the lost
communications. These could be added if they are quantified.

Heuristic Performance

In this section, the performance of H-1, the heuristic developed in Chapter III and
based upon Lim and Smith’s heuristic, is analyzed. Along with its running efficiency, its
strengths and weaknesses are reviewed, as well as interesting aspects discovered while
processing the case study.
To begin, the computer and programs which all of the scenarios were modeled on
have the following specifications:
Model:

Windows 7 x86 AFIT LAB Image v1.2

Processor:

AMD Athlon™ II x2 215 Processor 2.70 GHz

Installed Memory (RAM):

4.00 GB

System Type:

64-bit Operating System

Solver Software:

Lingo 11© 2008 Lindo Systems Inc.

Coded In:

Microsoft Office Excel 2007 VBA © Microsoft

The average time to run a long term pure GEO model was 35.18 minutes with a
standard deviation of 10.28 minutes. The minimum time across all long term runs was
15.8 minutes, which occurred on Reduced 4 against 2880 Attacker resources. The
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longest run time was 51.25 minutes, which occurred on Increased 8 against 2880
Attacker resources. With all of the other variations of the case study falling between
these two values, it is possible that the run time is correlated to the number of nodes in
the network. This observation is in-line with the method in which the heuristic selects its
targets, as well as the increased memory requirements for larger models discussed in
Chapter III.
The average number of iterations requiring processing for the long term model,
which would be modeled over10 runs, was 7.167, with the mode being 8 runs. This
means that most of the runs exhibited 8 degradation variations which differed from the
preceding iteration in some manner. However, this in no way guarantees that the 8 runs
were unique. On average, the best degradation method was located in 4.167 iterations,
with the mode being 4.
The average run time per iteration was 5.00 minutes. This number does not take
into account the increased time requirements for performing the local search which
occurred every twice in every run. It should be noted that, in the long term models, the
best value was always returned by one of these searches, though it did not always occur
on the first one.
In the two short term model runs, the average time to complete a pure GEO one
attack method model was 6.09 minutes. Interestingly, the half resources, $500M versus
$1000M, required almost double the time. This is likely due to the reduction of options
which $1000M permitted. With a resource capacity so close to the amount required for
full interdiction, the focus changed to what not to attack instead of what to attack. In the
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$500M case, the resource capacity was fairly restrictive, forcing the model to determine
what the best combinations were.
The amount of time required per iteration was fairly close though, with the
average time at 0.79 minutes, the max occurring in the $500M case at 0.89 minutes. It
was determined unnecessary to perform a local search on the short term scenario in a case
of physical interdiction as any event of that type would be preferred front loaded.
Surprisingly the $1000M variation’s best combination was located on the initializing
iteration, while the $500M best option was located on the 7th iteration.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the gateways were denoted as non-targetable.
When targeting of gateways was permitted, the model selected them for destruction every
time, even without the local search.
With the gateways unable to be targeted, the focus primarily stayed with the
satellites in the network. However, when excess resources were available, the terrestrial
node most commonly attacked was TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK). This node was selected for
interdiction so often because it was commonly used as a relay point, being on the same
continent as a gateway and thus having a connection to the sink nodes. However,
because the satellite servicing this station also directly serviced Commercial Gateway
(Tempe, Arizona), destroying the node had little to no impact in the notional case.
Destroying the servicing GEO also had little impact because of the four relay
nodes, TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada), TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada), Sat Network Ops
Center (Leesburg, Virginia), and HQ (Bethesda, MD), and the large amount of overlap
able to cover said nodes in the demonstration. As such, the model commonly chose to
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instead focus on the satellites showing the highest uplink value, always finding its best
value in such a situation.
An inherent weakness to the heuristic, H-1, comes from the heuristic it was based
upon. H-1 was not structured to overcome the basic operational behavior of allocating
full resource requirements to degrading nodes in the order they were selected. As such, it
may suffer a disadvantage when the optimal solution is to partially degrade a set of
nodes.
The heuristic also shows a preference for front-loading the degradations instead of
spreading the degradation more uniformly over a period of time. This was the motivation
for the inclusion of a small local efficiency search in the heuristic, which in the case
study was processed every fourth iteration. With the inclusion of this efficiency search,
the performance of the heuristic is greatly improved, however it comes at a sacrifice in
run time.
One strength of this heuristic is its ability to locate the combinations of nodes
which provide the greatest drop in network performance. This result was observed many
times over, being greatest exemplified in the variation Repair and in the short term model
run against $500M. Both in the situation of a set containing full degradation, and a set
with one partial degradation, the model exploited the redundancy of network nodes to
yield a synergistic attack plan.
Other strengths of this heuristic are its ability to be run on a personal computer for
relatively small networks as well as its ability to locate the strengths and weaknesses of a
network. Though the runs commonly required a half hour or more, the time requirement
to run a model is far outweighed by its ability to locate the strengths or weaknesses of an
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extremely costly network. In the case study, the network’s weakness was its small
number of GEO satellites, which could be destroyed and kept destroyed for a long time
span. However, it showed the strength of a network which had, in most of the variations,
anywhere between two and five satellites covering a high value location. In that
situation, losing any single or pair of satellites had a relatively small impact.
The greatest strength of the heuristic, though, is its adaptability. From its original
version as developed by Lim and Smith, to the version developed in this thesis based
upon the bi-level model, and even for the addition of imbedded local searches to improve
its performance, the heuristic is capable of being altered to suit the situation.
In this chapter, a notional GEO SATCOM network was created to utilize as in a
case study to demonstrate the model developed in this thesis. In calculating the resilience
of this notional network, it was determined that the relatively few gateways within the
network created a key point of concern for transmission flows in adverse operational
conditions. After assuming these points to be non-targetable, multiple variations and
levels of adversity were employed so as to view the behavior of the model and the
heuristic developed in Chapter III.
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V. Summary and Conclusion

Contributions

In this chapter, the contributions made by this thesis to the area of resilience
research are summarized. The contributions include the measure itself, which is timeaveraged network performance under an extreme-event situation, the Attacker-Defender
model, which accurately models the majority of options available to the operator of a
satellite communications network, as well as an intelligent adversary seeking to degrade
said network for one or more reasons, and the heuristic used to solve the bi-level
program.
At the beginning of this research, it became clear that selecting a definition for
resilience, from the many that exist, was required if a measure was to be attained. After a
review of many definitions and their underlying components, the definition developed by
Argonne National Laboratories was selected:
Resilience is the ability of an entity -e.g., asset, organization,
community, region- to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt
to, and recover from a disturbance.
Argonne National Laboratory (Carlson p. 7)
With this definition of resilience in mind, previous measures utilized in
distribution and transportation networks were analyzed. As a result, two key methods
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came to the forefront. The first was that of “Worst-Case Interdiction”, with major works
conducted by Salmeron et al. and Brown et al. (Salmeron 2004), (Brown 2005), (Brown
2006), (Salmeron 2009). The second was the inclusion of probability and risk in a timedependent situation, which was seen in the work of Klibi and Martel (Klibi).
Both of these methodologies provided a valuable component to the extreme-event
time-dependent network performance developed in this work; however, each still had
weaknesses. The work performed by Klibi and Martel, which focused on the probability
and severity of events, underplayed the potentially disastrous situations, while the work
performed by Salmeron et al. was lacking in the handling of a time component which
underpins resilience (Klibi), (Salmeron 2009). Building on key elements of both works,
it was determined that any degradation must capture the worst-case scenario, but must do
so in a manner which exemplifies the role of time in a measurable fashion.
As such, the measure developed in this work is the time-averaged expected
network performance under extreme-event degradation. To capture the worst case event
and the best case response, a bi-level mathematical program known as an AttackerDefender model was constructed. As the measure is being applied to a satellite
communications network, the nuances and vulnerabilities of a satellite network were
included in the model, increasing its validity. To reduce the model’s size, minor optional
sacrifices were made to its fidelity and accuracy, such as aggregation of transmissions.
From review of the previously developed measures, as well as long term and short
term vulnerabilities, it was clear that along with the time component, there was a distinct
difference between objectives existing in each time span. As such, a second model was
developed, extending the first. This resulted in two variant bi-level programs, one which
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models the short-term Attacker and Defender options, and a second which does the same
for a prolonged period of time.
Finally, a heuristic developed by Lim and Smith to solve bi-level models was
modified for use with this model (Lim). The models and the heuristic are presented in
Appendix A.
Methods for analyzing the outputs of the model, which include a time-dependent
measure of network performance, were presented. Using the time-dependent network
performance, the reader was shown how the strengths and weaknesses of the network
could be located and presented. Furthermore, the synergies available to the attacker and
redundancies existing in the network are highlighted by the outputs, allowing the analyst
and network operator to focus their attention to these commonly less-visible
combinations.
To show the performance of both the model and the heuristic, a case study
consisting of a notional global satellite communications network was analyzed. In this
case study, variations and sensitivity analysis were performed on the major parameters of
the network. This method showed how processing multiple scenarios under identical
threats allows a comparison of the resilience of differing networks, as well as showing
which network configuration is the most or least resilient.
Furthermore, a secondary variation on the Baseline case study in which Active
Defense nodes were included was performed. The review of the literature did not reveal
any previous measure of resilience which includes such a network component; previous
efforts restricted themselves to passive or continuous defenses. The inclusion of Active
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Defenses showed an improvement to the long term resilience of approximately 45% for
the specific example case, suggesting the effect may be generalized to other settings.
Along with the outputs from the case study, the performance of the heuristic was
analyzed, increasing the understanding of the operation of the network, the model
formulation, and the behavior of the heuristic. It was noted that the key strengths of the
heuristic were its adaptability, its ability to locate synergistic degradation combinations,
and its exploitation of network weaknesses.

Future Research

Throughout this thesis, strengths and weaknesses were presented and addressed,
followed by improvements and compromises made where necessary to provide an
operational model. Any compromise suggested, especially in regards to accuracy, may
be optional, depending upon the availability of a high performance computer. However,
as with any modeling efforts, improvements are possible. As such, major areas of future
research are presented in this section.
The heuristic used in this thesis operates on a basis of linear constraints. Since
this is an approximation, it may be improved upon to better handle the non-linear satellite
communications network. Research may be conducted into modifying this heuristic for a
non-linear situation, or to develop a follow-up local search to do the same. One possible
method for permitting such an improvement can originate from utilizing low-adversity
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scenarios, extending the degradations and adversity levels together. Such a search may
provide a different set of nodes than seen with higher levels of adversity.
Another potential improvement to the model may come in the form of Dynamic
Programming. Dynamic Programming permits successive decision making, which is
essentially what the model is striving to optimize. By converting the model into a
Dynamic Programming representation, it may be possible to locate an optimal solution,
which currently is not possible with the prescribed Attacker-Defender model and known
BLP solution methods. In addition, the use of Dynamic Programming would allow for
locally optimal policies at different points in time, which could be used for network
planning purposes.
The resilience measure calculated in this thesis is currently a deterministic value,
but note the measure itself was proposed as:
Resilience is measured as the time-averaged expected network
performance under extreme-event degradation.
The inclusion of probability into this measure exemplifies the need for inclusion within
the modeling methodology itself. A simple addendum may include the reliability of the
final degradation combination based upon the time, location, and type of attack.
However, a more in depth continuation may consider how reliability analysis may be
included into the model itself to improve accuracy and validity. Such reliability-based
modeling is used in other areas of design and analysis, such as aerospace and structural
design.
Another aspect of resilience measuring which is of interest to many operators is
deciding how to improve the resilience of their network. In this thesis, a simple analysis
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of the outputs was presented which could provide minor insight into the weaknesses of
the model. Further research into evaluating options to improve their network would be of
value. This may include the adaptation to a tri-level model, or a method for testing a
variety of situations for improvement under a cost constraint. The model proposed here
could be used to identify potential weaknesses while a second model might locate options
available to mitigate the vulnerabilities. This also indicates the potential for Dynamic
Programming, since as the levels of modeling increase, so does the complexity of multilevel solution approaches.
The coding which processed the heuristic and the model may also benefit from
increased attention. Improving the coding for reduced memory consumption, eliminating
redundant commands, or containing the analysis within one program instead of three
could reduce the run time required to process a network. Many of these improvements
could potentially be achieved by converting the coding to a new, more robust language.
Due to the size and time required to calculate the resilience for a small
geostationary satellite system, the LEO scenario was not run, even though the model,
heuristic, and coding are capable of analyzing a larger system. Based upon current case
study variations, it is believed that a LEO system would require in excess of 12 hours per
iteration on a personal computer. This time requirement is likely acceptable for network
operators and architects of multimillion dollar satellite systems. However, due to time
restrictions, such a scenario was not processed in this work. Future research could
analyze a LEO satellite network, making improvements to the code or heuristic where
necessary, just as improvements were made to the code to improve GEO run time.
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The potential future research stemming off of this thesis will serve to advance
aspects of theory and application. Various topics include heuristics analysis and
construction, multi-level mathematical programming, reliability theory, risk analysis, and
computer programming. Other questions, topics, and methods for improvement exist in
dealing with resilience. This suggests a rich area for future work.
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Appendix A: Models and Heuristics

Model Index Change
Short-Term Model:

Primary Time is Short Term Interval (STI)
Secondary Time is always 1

Medium/Long-Term Model: Primary Time is Long Term Interval (LTI)
Secondary Time is Short Term Interval (STI)
Indices
i, j , k
t

All three are to be used to denote the node.
Source node of the transmission

l
s

The network system the transmission last experienced
The security level of the transmission

d
w

Time (Primary)
Time (Secondary)

Gt
a
e

Duration of a single STI
Attack type
Active Defense node

r

Orbital Radius {0,1,2}
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Variables
yi, j ,t ,l ,s,w,d
wyi,t ,s,wd
TCactivew,d
Excess_Caps,w,d
Excess_Valuew,d
Excess _ Cap _ PCTw,d
Total_Net_Value

Mi,a,g,d
Zi,a,d
ADFirede,a,d
xi,w,d
Fueli DistPosi
emptyi,d
RepoDi (DistPosi )
RepoSi
DistPosi
Repi,d

Flow of transmission from node t currently flowing from node i to node j
with security level s and node i operating in network system l
Amount of unsatisfied demand at node i with security level s
Binary variable noting whether an active TC station exists at time d , w
(1=yes, 0=no)
Amount of capacity of security level s in the network that
remains after all demand has been filled at time d.
Value of remaining capacity in network at time d
Percent capacity remaining in Network at time d
Total value of the attempted calls in the network
Amount of resources of type g to be used against node i in attack type a
ª¬0, RqRsci,a,g º¼
Binary Variable denoting an attack of type a against i at time d
Binary Matrix specifying if defense e, a was used at time d
Degradation of node i at LTI time d
Fuel burned by node i given the distance repositioned
Binary variable denoting if node i is out of fuel at time d
Time to reposition node i given the distance repositioned
LTI time node i begins its repositioning
Distance repositioned by node i
Binary matrix signalling a repair for node i at time d
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Parameters:
bi ,t , s
ci ,t, s
capi ,l , s
x i ,w , d
TCi
Network _ Value
ecs
Conn i, j,w ,d
costOi

Supply/Demand at node i from source node t with security level s
Value of transmission to node i
Capacity of node for network type l and security level s
Operational Status of node i at time d , w
Vector denoting if node i is a Tracking and Control station
Sum of network capacity multiplied by value of security rating
Value of excess capacity with security level s
Binary parameter denoting the connection between node i and j
at time interval d , w
Cost of operating node i for 1 time step

GlobeMax
RegMax

Cost of reparing node i from attack type a
Global capacity of network
Regional capacity of network

CostMax
AdvRsc g

Maximum possible cost resulting from a probable event
Adversary Resources of type g

costR i , a

Required Resources of type g to eliminate node i via attack type a
f i , a ,d (Mi , a , g , d , ADFired e ,i , a ,d ) Function computing node i effectiveness at time d
based upon amount of resources used and active defenses used

RqRsci , a , g

IntDur
TimeRi , d ( xi , a , d )

Duration of each time step
Time to repair node i after an attack degrading to xi ,a ,d

CostRi , d ( xi ,a , d )

Cost to repair node i after an attack degrading to xi ,a ,d

TimeRpci

Time to replace node i

CostRpci

Cost to replace node i
Minimum threat of type a worthy of considering defense from e

STe , a

ADRTe , a

Maximum distance defense e can protect against attack type a
Cost to use defense node e against attack type a
Time between uses of defense e given it was used to

ADProt e ,i ,a

protect against type a
Binary matrix denoting if node i is protected from attack type a

ADFPe , a
ADRCe , a

Mobilei
maxposi
minposi
maxfueli , d
FuelUseR i
footprint i , r
OD
CN
OT
CT

by defense node e
Binary variable denoting if node i is mobile
Maximum distance node i may be respositioned to
Minimum distance node i may be respositioned to
Maximum fuel available to node i at time d
Amount of fuel used by node i per time step d
Radius of footprint of node i for orbital radius r
Polar Orbit Direction of orbital plane at some starting time d =0
in regards to a contiguous half sphere of Earth (1 if North, -1 if South)
Number of lateral orbits completed during each cycle
Orbit Time
Cycle Time
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Short Term Model
ci , s <w yi , s ¦¦ c j , s <w y j , s
¦¦
Cost
Max v
 i s
 jR s
M
CostMax
GlobeMax
RegMax
Subject To:
§§
·
·
[1]Cost= ¦ ¨ ¨ ¦ CostR i ,a ( xi ,a ) ¸  (1  xi )<CostOi ¸  ¦¦ CostR i,d ( xi ,a ,d )
i ©© a
¹
¹ i d
§
·
 ¦¦ ADRCe ,a ¨ ¦ ADFired e ,a ¸
e
a
© d
¹
¦ xi ,a,d i

[2] xi ,d

a

¦¦ M

[3]

i

d AdvRscg g

i ,a , g

a

f i ,a ,d (Mi ,a , g ,d , ADFired e ,i ,a ,d ) i, a, d

[4] xi ,a ,d

[5]¦ Mi,a ,g,d d M <Zi ,a ,d i, a, d
g

[6]

d d

¦ ¦Z

i ,a ,d '

d' d

1  M (1  Ii ) i, d , where d

a

ª TimeRi ,d ( f i ,a ,d (Mi ,a , g ,d )) º
«
»
IntDur
«
»

[7]Ii ,d d TimeRi ,d ( f i ,a ,d (Mi ,a , g ,d )) i, d
[8] Min z
y

1
<¦¦¦ c j , s <w y j , s ,d
Total _ Net _ Value d s j

Subject To:
(1)

¦y

( j ,i ),l , s , d

d capi ,l , s ,d < xi ,d i, l , s

j

(2)

¦¦¦ y
l

s

( j ,i ),l , s , d

d capi < xi ,d i

j

(3) -¦ y( j ,i ),l , s ,d  w y j , s ,d

b j ,s,d j , s

l ,i

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , d  ¦ y( i ,k ),l , s ,d ¸ ¸ d bi ,s, d i, s
¨ l
¸
k
¹¹
© © j
(5) capi <Conn j ,i , d t ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s , d t 0 i
j ,l , s

(8) TCactived d ¦ (TCi < xi ,d )
i

(9) Excess _ Caps ,d

§

¦ ¨ cap < x
i ,d

©

i

i ,d

·
 ¦¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,d ¸ s,d
l
j
¹

(10) x i ,d d 1 i,d
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(10) Excess _ Valued

¦ ec < Excess _ Cap
s

s ,d

s

(11)Weighted _ Excess _ Cap _ PCTd
(12)Total _ Net _ Valued

¦¦ c
s

j ,s

Excess _ Valued

Total _ Net _ Valued

<b j , s , d

j

(14) STe,a < ADFired e,i ,a ,d d f (Mi ,a , g , d , 0)<ADProt e,i ,a e, i, a, d
(15)

d  dˆ

¦ ¦ ADFired

d' d

e ,i , a , d

d 1 e, a, d , where dˆ

i
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ADRTe ,a
IntDur

Medium/Long Term Model
ci ,t , s <w y i ,t , s
¦¦¦ ci,t ,s <w yi ,t ,s ¦¦¦
Cost
 i t s
 iR t s
M
CostMax
GlobeMax
RegMax
Subject To:
Max v

§§
·
·
[1]Cost= ¦ ¨ ¨ ¦ CostR i ,a ( xi ,a ) ¸  (1  xi )<CostOi ¸  ¦¦ CostR i,d ( xi ,a , d )
i ©© a
¹
¹ i d
§
·
 ¦¦ ADRCe ,a ¨ ¦ ADFired e ,a ¸
e
a
© d
¹
¦ xi,a ,d i

[2] xi ,d

a

¦¦¦ M

[3]

d

i

i,a,d

d AdvRsc

a

[4] xi ,a ,d t Ii , d < f i ,a ,d (Mi ,a ,d ) + (1-Ii ,d )< xi , a , d 1

i , a , d

[5]Mi,a ,d d M <Zi ,a ,d i, a, d
[6]

d d

¦ ¦Z

d' d

1  M (1  Ii ) i, d ,

i ,a ,d '

a

[7]Ii ,d  Rep

i ,d 

TimeRi ,d ( f i ,a ,d (Mi ,a ,d ))

ª TimeRi ,d ( f i ,a ,d (Mi ,a , g ,d )) º
«
»
IntDur
«
»
f i , a , d (Mi ,a , d )) i, d

where d

d M <(1  ¦
a

IntDur

[8] xi ,w , d t xi , d i, w , d
1
<¦¦¦¦ c j , s <w y j , s ,w , d
Total _ Net _ Value d w s j

[9] Min z
y

Subject To:
(1)

¦y

( j ,i ),l , s , w , d

d capi ,l , s ,w , d < xi ,w , d i, l , s

j

(2)

¦¦¦ y
l

s

( j ,i ),l , s , w , d

d capi < xi ,w , d i

j

(3) -¦ y( j ,i ),l , s ,w ,d  w y j , s ,w , d

b j ,s,w ,d j , s

l ,i

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s ,w , d  ¦ y( i ,k ),l , s ,w ,d ¸ ¸ d bi ,s,w ,d i, s
¨ l
¸
k
¹¹
© © j
(5) capi <Conn j ,i ,w ,d t ¦ y( j ,i ),l , s ,w ,d t 0 j , i, w, d
l ,s

(8) TCactivew , d d ¦ (TCi < xi ,w ,d )
i

(9) Excess _ Caps ,w , d

§

¦ ¨ cap < x
i,d

©

i

i ,w ,d

·
 ¦¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w ,d ¸ s,w , d
l
j
¹
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(10) xi,w,d d 1 i,w, d

¦¦ec <Excess _ Cap

(11)Excess _ Valued

w

s ,w , d

s

s

(12)Weighted _ Excess _ Cap _ PCTd
(13)Total _ Net _ Valued

¦¦¦c
w

i ,s

s

1
<¦ Excess _ Valuew,d
Total _ Net _ Valued w
<bi,s,w,d

i

(15) STe,a x ADFirede,i,a,w d f (Mi,a, g ,d ,0)<ADProt e,i,a e, i, a, d
d dˆ

ª ADRTe,a º
d 1 e, a, d where dˆ «
»
d' d i
« IntDur »
(17) xi,w,d d Statei,d <(Statei,d 1) i,w, d

(16)

¦¦ ADFired

e,i ,a,d

(18) POS)i,w,d Sin[(G t <w<360 / OT )  90<(OD 1)  OD<Arcsin()i,d / 90)]<90 i, w, d
(19) POS4i,w,d

4i,d 180  360<(G t <w / (CT / CN ))  360<Wrapi,G ,d

(20) 0 d POS4i,G ,d d 360 i, w, d
(22) HAi, j ,w,d

i, w, d

(21) Wrapi,G ,d ={0,1} i, w, d

Sin2[(POS)i,w,d  POS) j ,w,d )<0.5] 
+Cos[POS)i,w,d ]<Cos[POS) j ,w,d ]* Sin2[(POS4i,w,d  POS4 j ,w,d )*0.5] i,j,w, d

(23) disti, j ,w,d

Atan2 1 HAi, j,w,d , HAi, j ,w,d

i, j, w, d

(24) disti, j ,w,d d footprinti,rj <ChckI i , j ,w,d  M <(1 ChckI i , j ,w,d ) i,j,w, d
(25) disti, j ,w,d d footprint j ,ri <ChckJ i , j ,w,d  M <(1 ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ) i,j,w, d
(26) Conn

i , j ,w ,d

(27) maxfueli,d

d 0.5<(ChckI i , j ,w ,d  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ) i,j,w, d
maxfueli,d 1  FuelUseRi  Di,d <Fueli (DistPosi ) i,d

(28) ¦Di,d d Mobilei i
d

(29) maxfueli,d d M <emptyi,d i,d
(30) ¦ xi,w,d d emptyi,d i,d
w

(31) Statei,d d M < xi,d i, d
(32) Ri,d d Ri,d 1  Di,d i, d
(33) ¦Ri,d t RepoDi (DistPosi ) i
d

(34) Statei,d d 3  2<Ri,d i, d
(35) DistPosi

dist(i,1),(i,|d|) i

(36) minposi <Di,d d dist(i,d 1),(i,d ) d maxposi <Di,d i, d
(37) xi,d d xi,d  Repi,d i, d (38) Repi,d {0,1} i, d
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Time Dependent Set Covering Problem Heuristic
{1}If ¦ Ci ,w ',d '  I m then
iI m

°
½°
§
·
Select ®i | Reqi ,w ',d ' * Ci ,w ',d ' d ¨ ¦ Conn j ,i ,w ',d ' * x j ,w ',d ' ¸ , i  I m ¾
°¯
°¿
© j
¹

^

`

Select j| min j dist(j,i)-footprint j ! 0 , j  J and J=J+{j}
{2}Calculate expected position of all mobile nodes except for j
[Constraints (18)  (20)]
°
{3}max 4) ® ¦ wk Ck ,w ,d ' | POS j ,0,d '
¯°kIm ,w ,d '
Subject to:

½°
(4, )) ¾
¿°

Sin 2 [(POS) i ,G ,d '  POS) j ,G ,d ' )<0.5] 

(22) HAi , j ,w ,d '

+Cos[POS) i ,G ,d ' ]<Cos[POS) j ,G ,d ' ]< Sin 2 [(POS4i ,G ,d '  POS4 j ,G ,d ' )<0.5] i,w
(23) disti , j ,w ,d '

1  HAi , j ,w ,d ' , HAi , j ,w ,d '

Atan2

i, w

(24) disti , j ,w ,d ' d footprint i ,rj <ChckI i , j ,w ,d  M <(1  ChckI i , j ,w ,d ' ) i,w
(25) disti , j ,w ,d ' d footprint j ,ri <ChckJ i , j ,w ,d  M <(1  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ' ) i,w
(26) Conn

i , j ,w ,d '

d 0.5<(ChckI i , j ,w ,d '  ChckJ i , j ,w ,d ' ) i,w

§
·
(37) Reqi ,w ,d ' <Ci ,w ,d ' d ¨ ¦ Conn j ,i ,w ,d ' < x j ,w ,d ' ¸ i, w
© j
¹
(new) Conn
1
i , j ,w ',d

{4}If Fuel j > dist(j,(4))) @ ! maxfuel j ,d  FuelUseR j <(d max  d ')
Then J=J-{j}, J'=J'+{j}, and return to {1}
{5} Calculate time for movement subject to constraints and Record Connections from {3}

>constraints (32)  (34)@ simplify to
set State j ,d

1 for all d' d d <d'+RepoD j ( DistPos j )

>constraints (22) 

(26)

@
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{6}Calculate Value function ¦ zd subject to linear program:
d

1
Min zd
¦¦¦¦ci,t,s <w yi,t,s,w
y
Total _ Net _ Value w s t i
Subject To:

¦y

(1.1)

(i , j ),t ,l , s ,w ,d

d capi,l ,s,w,d < xi,w,d i, l , s, w, d

t, j

¦y

(1.2)

( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w , d

d capi,l ,s,w,d < xi,w,d i, l , s, w, d

t, j

¦¦¦ y

(2)

( j ,i ),t ,l , s ,w ,d

l

s

d capi < xi,w,d i, w, d

j

(3)  ¦¦ y(t ,k ),t ,l ,s,w,d t bt ,t ,s,w <xt ,w,d (Supply node t) t , s, w, d
l

k

§ §
··
(4) ¨ ¦ ¨ ¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l ,s,w,d  ¦ y(i ,k ),t ,l ,s,w ,d ¸ ¸  wyi,t ,s,w,d bi,t ,s,w,d i, t, s, w, d
¨ l j
¸
k
¹¹
© ©
(5) capi <Conn j ,i ,w,d t ¦ y( j ,i ),t ,l ,s,w,d t 0 i, w, d (6) wyi,t ,s,w,d t 0 i, t , s, w, d 
j ,t , l , s

(7)

¦ wy

i ,t , s ,w , d

t ,s

d ((¦ (TCi < xi ,w,d ))  1)<(capi <(1  TCt ))<TCactivew ,d 
i

 (capi <( xi ,w,d  (1  TCactivew ))) i, w, d
(8) TCactivew,d d ¦ (TCi < xi ,w ,d ) w, d
i

(10) xi ,w,d d 1 i,w, d
§
·
{7}If w <w max and ¨ J  J ', J' z  contains all mobile nodes or ¦ Ci ,w ',d t dmax * I m ¸ ,
iI m , d
©
¹
then set w'=w'+1 and return to step {1}
{8}If J  J ' contains all mobile nodes, then set J=J'= and proceed to next d' such that
there exists a node i where xiIm ,d '  xiIm ,d '1 ! 0
Return to step {1}
Repeat until d'=dmax
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Heuristic One

1) Set B to the amount of resources, z=0, H be an arbitrarily small number,
m be a sufficiently large integer, and v'=max (vi )
i

2) For every i,d combination, set x i , d '

0,

(or expected with no incident) for all d' t d,
and record resulting Attacker objective as value vi ,d '
3) Reset all x i ,d to initial values and set x i ,d '
4) Set pi , d

vi , d

and pi ,d '

n

¦v

xi ,d , x i , a , d ' 0

pi ,d for each i,d

i ,d

i 0

5) Set pi ,d

pi ,d
n

¦p

i ,d

i 0

6) If ¦ Zi , a , d | A |, then set pi , d

0 and return to step 5.

a

7) If x i , d ' 1, then set pi , d

0 and return to step 5.

8) Select a random number x  [0,1]

9) Set M

10) xi , a , d
11) If xi , a , d

if pi , d 0 or pi , d  max{ pi , d }
0
½
d
°
°
°
°
§
· ½
i
i
°°
°¨
°°
1
1
¸ °
® Min ®¨ min { fi , a , d (1)  fi , a , d (x i , d ')} ¸ , B ¾ if x  [¦ p j , d , pi , d  ¦ p j , d ) ¾
j 1
j 1
¸ °
° d °¨ a | Zi,a,d 0
°
¹ ¿
¯©
°
°
°0
°
Otherwise
¯°
¿°
fi , a , d (Mi , a , d

M  fi ,a1, d (x i , d ')) for each a

max ^ xi , a, d ` and no other xi , a ', d

a | Zi ,a ,d

then set xi , a , d '

0

xi , a , d . If there exists xi , a ', d

xi , a , d

then set xi , a , d '

xi , a , d such that TimeRi , d ( xi , a , d )

and set Zi , a , d

1.
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max ^ xi , a, d ` , a ' z a, exists,

a | Zi ,a ,d

0

max ^ xi , a, d ` , a ' z a,

a | Zi ,a ,d

0

^TimeRi, d ( xi,a, d )` ,
max
a

12) Set x i , d '

¦x

i ,a ,d

', B

B  M , pi ,d

0

a

13) If B>0, then return to step 5, else continue
14) Calculate resulting Attacker objective value and denote value as v.
v
15) If 1  H ! ! 1  H then z=z+1
v'
16) If v>v', then set v'=v and X i , a ,d xi ,a , d '  i, a, d .
17) If z>m then terminate, else continue
p '
x '
18) Set pi ,d 0.5< n i , d  0.5< n i ,d
¦ pi,d '
¦ xi,d '
i 0

19) Set pi ,d '

i 1

pi , d for each i,d, reset all x i , d to initial values,

and set x i , d '

xi , d , x i ,a , d ' 0 and return to step 6.
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Heuristic One Flow Chart
B=Resource Cap

and p ,A ' =

p ,A for each i,d x;,.o-=x ;,.o for e ve ry (i, d ''>d )

1+-----1,;,
6.;;,7_, setp,.~

=

0

x,,, ' = 1

E

F

A
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E

•

•

...... ~:>,.•>

re r~::>,..,P
j•l

Set <p =

Mini[
'

'
'''
'

min

j•l

u;:~,(l)- J..:.. ')}).B)
<x...

a l 61;p,d=()

··---

--------j

'

'''

l{x;.,.lx;,,. =...........
max {x;_...]-}!=1

'

set

x....

1' -

x..•.~

Che:klf

X.o e

{x._.. x,_.. • ma.'t {x..,.}}

.

"""

..

Check if

TimeR;..(x,,,,) =max {TimeR;,.(x,.,,)}

•

E

'

'''
''
~----------------------··------------------·-·-··-·------·-··---·----
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F



F

set ~, ' s X.... ·.-

set GJ~ ~ -1

I

(

"

1+ £ > - > 1- £
II '

se t v'=v 3l d X, .., • x•.
~• '

"' t, a, d

F
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F

p. '

p ..l = 0.5*- -'·'No

f,p,.~ '

.

X.

+0.5*- '"'-

'

i:,x,_,'

p,.~ ' = p,.~
Save Result and
Terminate

for each i,d

reset all x,.~ to initial value
set X ;, 1 ' = x..,~
X ;,=.,/

I =

0

Current Itteration Mod ~=0

Set p,_. ={1- BIN,, }
Utilize previous ( degradation, and corresponding
resilience, cost, and repair times, to determine
the current best resilience per unit time per unit cost .

Denote this degradation combination as BIN., .
For each i from 2 to the number of degraded nodes in BIN._,,
let BIN ... = BIN •., except for the ith degraded node, which
\vill be set equal to 1.
Set BIN'•.1 equal to the degradation vector of the best resilience
per unit time per unit costcost from all BIN....

BIN' •.1 ,. BIN.,
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Appendix B: Case Study and Variation Parameters

Node Name

Satellite

Operating

Spare

(Y/N)

(Y/N)

(Y/N)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

N

Y

N

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

N

Y

N

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

N

Y

N

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

N

Y

N

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

N

Y

N

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia)

N

Y

N

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

N

Y

N

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

N

Y

N

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

N

Y

N

GEOSAT1

Y

Y

N

GEOSAT2

Y

Y

N

GEOSAT3

Y

Y

N

GEOSAT4

Y

Y

N

GEOSAT5

Y

Y

N

GEOSAT6

Y

Y

N
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Node Name

Target

InterSat

Up/Downlink

(Y/N)

Link (km)

Radius(km)

Y

N/A

12000

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

Y

N/A

12000

TTAC-3 (est Vancouver, Canada)

Y

N/A

12000

TTAC-4 (est Toronto, Canada)

Y

N/A

12000

TTAC-5 (est Reykjavik, Iceland)

Y

N/A

12000

Sat Network Ops Center (SNOC)

Y

N/A

12000

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

N

N/A

12000

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

N

N/A

12000

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

N

N/A

12000

GEOSAT1

Y

90000

7768

GEOSAT2

Y

90000

7768

GEOSAT3

Y

90000

7768

GEOSAT4

Y

90000

7768

GEOSAT5

Y

90000

7768

GEOSAT6

Y

90000

7768

Telemetry Tracking and C/C (TTAC)-1
(Svalbard, Norway)

(Leesburg, Virginia)
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Location at Time=0 (in degrees)
Node Name

Latitude (NS)

Longitude (EW)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

80.238166

12.447236

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

66.8350185

-149.65307

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

51.25

-126.1

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

45.652527

-82.381961

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

66.1333

-24.9333

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia)

41.252181

-80.744541

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

35.414842

-114.909319

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

23.502574

-161.022938

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

40.98472

-80.09472

GEOSAT1

0

0

GEOSAT2

0

120

GEOSAT3

0

-120

GEOSAT4

0

60

GEOSAT5

0

180

GEOSAT6

0

-60
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Node Name
TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)
TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)
TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)
TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)
TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)
Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg,
Virginia)
Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)
DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)
HQ (Bethesda, MD)
GEOSAT1
GEOSAT2
GEOSAT3
GEOSAT4
GEOSAT5
GEOSAT6
Degradation Function

Resources Needed to Permanently
Interdict Node ($US Thousands)
1410
1410
1410
1410
1410
1410

Sink
(Y/N)
N
N
N
N
N
N

1410
1410
1410
180000
180000
180000
180000
180000
180000

Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Function1: Sharp Spike at End

D=(x)15

Function2: Gentle Spike at End

D= (x)5

Function3: S Curve with Early High

D=3*(x)2-2*(x)3

Function4: S Curve with Right Translated Point of Inversion

D= (1/3)*(5*x2-2*x5)

Function5: Linear

D=x

Repair Function
Function 1: Full Rebuild Time Always
Function 2: Recovery Time Linearly Related to Degradation
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Node Name

Degradation

Capacity Repair

Rebuild

Function

(Users)

Function (Cycles)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

2

172000

2

42

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

2

172000

2

42

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

2

172000

2

42

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

2

172000

2

42

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

2

172000

2

42

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg,

2

172000

2

42

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

2

172000

2

42

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

4

172000

2

42

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

2

172000

2

42

GEOSAT1

3

20000

1

182

GEOSAT2

3

20000

1

182

GEOSAT3

3

20000

1

182

GEOSAT4

3

20000

1

182

GEOSAT5

3

20000

1

182

GEOSAT6

3

20000

1

182

Virginia)
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Node Name

Mobile

Max Fuel

(Y/N)

Fuel Used per
Deg. Shift

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

N

1

1

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

N

1

1

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

N

1

1

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

N

1

1

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

N

1

1

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia)

N

1

1

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

N

1

1

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

N

1

1

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

N

1

1

GEOSAT1

Y

5113

340

GEOSAT2

Y

5113

340

GEOSAT3

Y

5113

340

GEOSAT4

Y

5113

340

GEOSAT5

Y

5113

340

GEOSAT6

Y

5113

340
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Node Name

Fuel Used per Reposition Min Cycles
Cycle

Deg per

Operational

Cycle

Post Move

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

0

1

1

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

0

1

1

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

0

1

1

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

0

1

1

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

0

1

1

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg,

0

1

1

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

0

1

1

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

0

1

1

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

0

1

1

GEOSAT1

1

2.4

42

GEOSAT2

1

2.4

42

GEOSAT3

1

2.4

42

GEOSAT4

1

2.4

42

GEOSAT5

1

2.4

42

GEOSAT6

1

2.4

42

Virginia)
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Variation Changes

Baseline 6

Degrees

Node Name

Latitude

Longitude

(NS)

(EW)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

80.238166

12.447236

42

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

66.8350185

-149.65307

42

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

51.25

-126.1

42

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

45.652527

-82.381961

42

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

66.1333

-24.9333

42

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia)

41.252181

-80.744541

42

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

35.414842

-114.909319

42

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

23.502574

-161.022938

42

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

40.98472

-80.09472

42

GEOSAT1

0

-120

182

GEOSAT2

0

-60

182

GEOSAT3

0

0

182

GEOSAT4

0

60

182

GEOSAT5

0

120

182

GEOSAT6

0

180

182

232


Rebuild

Shifted

Degrees

Node Name

Latitude

Longitude

(NS)

(EW)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

80.238166

12.447236

42

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

66.8350185

-149.65307

42

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

51.25

-126.1

42

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

45.652527

-82.381961

42

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

66.1333

-24.9333

42

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg, Virginia) 41.252181

-80.744541

42

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

35.414842

-114.909319

42

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

23.502574

-161.022938

42

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

40.98472

-80.09472

42

GEOSAT1

0

-150

182

GEOSAT2

0

-90

182

GEOSAT3

0

-30

182

GEOSAT4

0

30

182

GEOSAT5

0

90

182

GEOSAT6

0

150

182
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Rebuild

Repair

Degrees

Node Name

Latitude

Longitude

(NS)

(EW)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

80.238166

12.447236

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

66.8350185 -149.65307

21

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

51.25

-126.1

21

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

45.652527

-82.381961

21

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

66.1333

-24.9333

21

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg,

41.252181

-80.744541

21

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

35.414842

-114.909319

21

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

23.502574

-161.022938

21

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

40.98472

-80.09472

21

GEOSAT1

0

-120

91

GEOSAT2

0

-60

91

GEOSAT3

0

0

91

GEOSAT4

0

60

91

GEOSAT5

0

120

91

GEOSAT6

0

180

91

Rebuild

21

Virginia)
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Reduced 4

Degrees

Node Name

Latitude

Longitude

(NS)

(EW)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

80.238166

12.447236

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

66.8350185 -149.65307

42

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

51.25

-126.1

42

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

45.652527

-82.381961

42

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

66.1333

-24.9333

42

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg,

41.252181

-80.744541

42

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

35.414842

-114.909319

42

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

23.502574

-161.022938

42

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

40.98472

-80.09472

42

GEOSAT1

0

-180

182

GEOSAT2

0

-90

182

GEOSAT3

0

0

182

GEOSAT4

0

90

182

Rebuild

42

Virginia)
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Increased 8

Degrees

Node Name

Latitude

Longitude

(NS)

(EW)

TTAC-1 (Svalbard, Norway)

80.238166

12.447236

TTAC-2 (Fairbanks, AK)

66.8350185 -149.65307

42

TTAC-3 (Vancouver, Canada)

51.25

-126.1

42

TTAC-4 (Toronto, Canada)

45.652527

-82.381961

42

TTAC-5 (Reykjavik, Iceland)

66.1333

-24.9333

42

Sat Network Ops Center (Leesburg,

41.252181

-80.744541

42

Commercial Gateway (Tempe, Arizona)

35.414842

-114.909319

42

DoD Gateway (Wahiawa, HI)

23.502574

-161.022938

42

HQ (Bethesda, MD)

40.98472

-80.09472

42

GEOSAT1

0

-180

182

GEOSAT2

0

-135

182

GEOSAT3

0

-90

182

GEOSAT4

0

-45

182

GEOSAT5

0

0

182

GEOSAT6

0

45

182

GEOSAT7

0

90

182

GEOSAT8

0

135

182

Rebuild

42

Virginia)
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